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INTRODUCTION 
Taken as a group, United States life insurance 
coarpaaies control a vast amount of American savings. The 
manner 1n which these funds are invested bas an important 
and far-reaching effect on the nation's economy.. This 
paper will discuss the major channels of investment for 
life insurance funds, and more importantly, the reasons 
or factors that determine investment choices. Investment 
policies of the iadustry as a whole will be examined, but 
greater emphasis will be placed on the activities of the 
leading companies. The large life companies account for 
a great percentage of total industry assets, and must ne-
cessarily dominate any discussion of life insurance invest-
ments. 
The tone of life insurance investing is set down 
1n the state investment laws whiCh typically require ample 
margins of safety for life insurance assets. The legal re-
strictions currently placed on iuvestment practices are ex-
amined in Chapter I with special attention given to the New 
York Investment Law, which governs a large amount of life 
insurance assets. In Chapter II the basic factors involved 
in the invesbDent of life insurance funds are discussed. 
Other factors, which can be important in investment 
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decisions from time to time, are mentioned in Chapter III. 
After reviewing these considerations and the legal frame-
work involved, one can see that the bulk of life insurance 
assets is appropriately placed in long-term high-grade 
debt. Therefore, it is not surprising that 4pproximately 
seventy-five per cent of the total assets of the life in-
surance industry is currently 1D corporate bonds and real 
estate mortgages. These two areas are discussed in Chap• 
ters IV and V. Investment in U.S. Government Bonds, which 
has been minor 1n post-war years, and State and Local 
Goverraaent Bonds is duscussed in Chapter VI. Chapter VII 
deals with the equity investments of the industry. These 
account for only a minor portion of industry assets, but 
are tbe most controversial aod probably the most interest-
ing forms of life insurance investment. 
The author expresses his gratitude to the follow· 
1ng life insurance officers who gave generously of their 
time in interviews, and w1 tbout whose cooperation this paper 
would not be possible: Mr. Arthur S. Worthley, Investment 
Officer; Mr. William A. Beverly, Mortgage Officer; and 
Mr. Gordon E. Emerson, Associate Director, all of Jobn Han• 
cock Mutual Life Insurance Company; and to Mr. Howard A. 
Williams, Investment Officer; Mr. Hamilton Coolidge, Mort-
gage Officer; and Mr. Stanley Pierce, Real Estate Officer, 
of New England Mutual Life Insurance Company. 
CHAPTER I 
LEGAL RESTRICTIONS 
Life insurance is one of the most regulated 
industries in the United States. Industry investment prac-
tices come under the direct control of the various state 
investment laws, with the allowable areas of investment 
ltmited by statute to insure the proper safety and diversi-
fication of life insurance assets. The underlying reason 
for this can be found in the uature of the business in 
which the industry is engaged. Life insurance is a vital 
part of family financial planaing with death payments often 
badly needed. Billions of dollars in personal savings are 
involved, with the individual policyholder having little or 
no control over how life 1nsur81lce funds are invested. 
For these reasons it is felt that life insurance funds must 
be safeguarded from loss, for the protection of the policy• 
holder and for the good of the whole economy. 
State Inveageent Laws 
The initial regulation of the industry appeared 
in charters which were individually granted to companies 
through the enactment of special state statues. Later 
state iBsurance departments were set up to administer the 
- 5 -
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general regulatory laws that pertained to the insurance 
business. There was a great deal of variety in the invest-
ment laws of the various states in the early years of leg-
islation, and in many cases they were not sufficient to 
cope with the investment problems or were practically non 
existent. OUt of this situation grew a number of abuses 
and practices which were harmful to the industry. 
New York Investmeat Law.•-Major regulation of the 
life insurance business began tn Rew York state in 1906. 
This came about as the result of the Armstrong iuvestiga• 
tion, which is a landmark in the history of life insurance. 
Before 1906, life insurance companies in the state bad a 
great degree of freedom in choice of investments, and legis-
lative restrictions were kept to a minimum. But after the 
Armstrong committee bad uncovered widespread abuses, in-
cluding investments which led to financial control of 
banks, railroads, and other corporations, and the financing 
of private speculating by directors and officers of various 
companies, the state enacted a completely new investment 
law for life insurance companies. 
The law imposed very strict regulations on the 
allowable area of investment, and aade the legal pattern 
almost the opposite of what it previously bad been. In-
vestments were not permitted in: (1) stocks, (2} income 
7 
producing real property, (3) unsecured corporate obliga• 
tions, and (4) obligations of unincorporated organizations 
or individuals unless secured by real estate mortgages or 
by collateral in which investments could be made directly; 
also, investments were limited to public debt obligations, 
including those of the Federal goveX'DIDent, states, and 
counties and other political subdivisions, adequately 
secured corporate bonds, mortgage loans secured by improved 
and unencumbered real estate worth fifty per cent more than 
the amount loaned, and such real property as might be 
needed for company occupancy. 1 
This had an important aad far reaching effect on 
life investing throughout the whole country. ' Other states, 
aroused by this action, passed similar legislation which 
embodied large sections of the New York statutes. Since 
that time, New York has taken the leading role in regulat• 
ing life insurance investment practices. What is put into 
effect in that state is often followed quickly by similar 
changes elsewhere, especially in the few states which have 
a great percentage of life insurance assets under their 
jurisdiction. As seen in Table 1•1, the percentage of life 
1Life Insurance Association of America, Life 
Insurance C~anies as Financial Institutions (Englewood 
cli!!s, New~rsey: Prentice Hilt; tnc., 1962), p. 76. 
tABLE I-1 
ADMI!TED ASSETS OF LD'E USURANCE COMPANIES 
DOMICILED IN SIX STATES (as per cent of total) 
Year 
S tate 
1906 1928 1940 1950 
New York 58.1 40.5 41.5 37.8 
New Jersey 8.0 16.1 16.4 16.1 
Mat:J&achusetts 6.1 7.9 8.6 9.8 
Connecticut 7.6 7.5 8.4 9.4 
Wisconsin 7.6 5.5 4.6 4.2 
Pennsylvania 6.5 5.1 4.9 4.1 
Total six states 93.3 82.6 84.3 81.4 
Total all U.S. 
companies 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
8 
1958 
34.4 
15.5 
10.3 
10.1 
3.8 
2.9 
77.0 
100.0 
Source: Life Insurance Companies as Financial Institutions, 
p. 77. 
9 
companies domiciled in New York, therefore falling directly 
under its regulatory control, represent a good portion of 
total industry assets, although it bas declined from 1906 
to 1958. Along with this, New York, which represents a 
major insurance market, has generally required substantial 
compliance by out of state companies selling insurance 
within its borders. With the impetus given by the 1906 
law and a history of leadership, it can be seen why the 
state bas led in the control over life insurance investing, 
and why its laws have become models for new legislation. 
The effect of the 1906 law was to move life in• 
surance investing a~st exclusively into the category of 
long-term secured debt, consisting mostly of real estate 
mortgages, railroad and public utility bonds, government 
obligations, and policy loans. There was a general decline 
of all malpractices and unsafe investment policies, and the 
industry quickly gave the impression of being a wise cus-
todian of public funds. 
Gradually a degree of protest arose against the 
strictness and severe limitations in effect, and many were 
of the opinion that most of the laws were impeding progress 
and preventing the life companies from performing their 
proper functions as investors, with some contending that 
they were downright unnecessary. Hence, with the passage 
of time, a high rate of asset growth, and the establishment 
10 
of the industry as a bulwark of the economy, the states 
recognized a need for further liberalization. Since 1927, 
the New York law has been constantly relaxed with the fol• 
lowing areas made eligible for investment: 1928, unsecured 
corporate obligations and preferred stock provided they 
meet certain earnings tests; 1934, mortgage loans insured 
by the FHA; 1938, housing projects; 1945, mortgage loans 
guaranteed by the VA; 1946, income producing real estate; 
1951, common stock subject to certain limitations; 1958, 
the leeway clause. 1 These change~ undoubtedly influenced 
by a changing economy and pressure from government and the 
industry itself, enabled the life companies to broaden 
their investment portfolios and strive for greater diversi• 
fication and a higher rate of return. After 1928 a company 
could participate in unsecured corporate debt and pre-
ferred stocks paving the way for heavy investment in in-
dustrial securities, especially after World War II. Be• 
cause of their guaranteed nature, the lack of alternative 
investment outlets, and public needs, FHA and VA mortgages 
were invested in extensively after they became legal. 
Lifting of the restrictions on cOIIDOD. stock in 1951, which 
had been in effect for almost half a century, was a very 
important amendment to the law. This, along with earlier 
11 
legalization of real estate, meant that life companies 
would be allowed to invest more extensively in the equity 
field. As evidence of continued sentiment along these 
lines the common stock amendment was further liberalized 
in 1957, and in 1958, as a result of the passage of the 
leeway clause, 2 per cent of assets could be placed in in-
vestments otherwise not permitted. The law as it reads 
today is sUDIDarized in Table 1•2. It can be seen that the 
law takes the form of either authorizing specific types of 
assets with certain requirements attached, or ltmiting the 
amount a company can invest in a particular category or in 
individual issues, with real estate and common stocks re-
stricted much more closely than either mortgages or cor-
porate bonds. 
State vs. Federal Control.••Tbe r~gulation of 
the life insurance industry has always been in control of 
the states. This is mainly because New York took forceful 
action in the early part of the century, which was quickly 
adopted in part by other major states; and also, because 
the Federal government could not interfere, or as in later 
years, has seen fit to let the states handle it themselves. 
In Paul vs. Virginia in 1869, it was decided by the Supreme 
Court that insurance writing was not commerce and could 
12 
TABLE I-2 
MAJOR PROVISIONS IN NEW YORK STATE LAW REGULATING 
ACtiVITIES OF LIFE IHSURANCE COMPANIES 
1. Corporate Bonds 
Type of collateral 
Earnings requirements: 
Years available to 
pay interest 
Years interest 
actually earned 
MiD:I.mum: earnillga 
times fixed charges 
Maximum investment 
in bonds of one com-
pany as a per cent 
of total assets 
Maximum investment 
in any single issue 
as a per cent of 
total assets 
2. Mortgage Loans 
Type of property 
-fee 
leasehold 
minimum lease 
texm 
Location of property 
Loan-to-value ratio 
fee 
leasehold 
Not more than one •third of 
required collateral can be 
in common or non-eligible 
preferred stock 
five 
three 
one and one fourth 
five per cent 
one and one-half of one 
per cent 
yes 
yes 
twenty-one, amortized 
within thirty five years 
u.s. 
seventy-five per cent 
sixty-six and two-thirds 
per cent 
~LE 1-2--c99tinued 
2. Mortgage Loans (Cont'd) 
Limit on total hold-
1Dgs as per cent of 
total assets forty per cent 
Liud.t on one mortgagor 
as per cent of total 
assets teD per cent 
Limit on loan secured 
by single parcel 
amount $30 .ooo 
per cent of total 
assets two per cent 
3. Preferred Stocks 
Prohibited types 
Earnings requirements: 
Years earnings 
requirement fully 
met 
Years available to 
pay dividends 
Net earnings times 
average annual 
fixed charges 
Stock not in default 
KaxiuuD holdings as 
per cent of total 
assets 
own except for mutualiza-
tion 
one of last two 
five 
one and one-half 
must be income paying 
two per cent 
13 
Maximum per cent of 
outstanc!:l.ns r:ferred 
stock of a s le 
company 
Leeway provision 
twenty per cent 
leeway limit is two per cent 
of assets but subject to 
specific authorization pro-
vision 
14 
TABLE I-2--conttnued 
4. CQEOil stocks 
Marketability re-
quirement listed on recognized 
Prohibited types 
exchange 
own, except for mutual-
ization 
Earnings requirements: 
Number of years 
dividend paid ten 
Number of years 
earnings available ten 
M1utDP.DD per cent of 
eamings in previ• 
ous year to par (or 
stated) value of 
stock four per cent 
Must be income 
paying yes 
Maximum holdings: 
as per cent of 
five per cent total assets 
as a per c~t of 
capital and/ or 
fifty per cent surplus 
Maximum investment 
in one corporation 
as per cent of 
one-fifth of one per cent total assets 
Maximum per cent of 
outstaD~ oommon 
stock of a single 
corporation two per cent 
5. Income Producing Real 
Estate 
TyCs authorized: 
dustrial or 
coaaercial yes 
residential housing yes 
TABLE I-2--continued 
5. Income Product• Real 
Estate (Cont' d) 
Types prohibited: 
~~ltural and 
other 
Allortization or 
depreciation require-
ments 
Transfer provision 
Maximum holdings as 
per cent of total 
assets 
Maximum loan secured 
by a single parcel 
as per cent of total 
assets 
yes 
yes 
two per cent per year 
yes 
five per cent 
.005 per cent of assets 
to $500 million; 
.0025 per cent of 
assets over $500 million 
Source: Ltf:jasurance "!f' in the ca;eital Market, B r, 1952, pp. j. 
15 
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not be subject co federal legislation. 1 In 1944, however, 
the court reversed that decision stating that "no cODJDer-
cial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities 
across state lines bas been held to be wholly beyond the 
regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
We cannot make exception of the business of insurance. "2 
Unless unusual circumstances occur, Congress seems satis-
fied to let the regulatory powers lie under state control. 
Uniformity. --The various states maintain a high 
degree of uniformity, achieved in good part by the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners, which is a 
voluntary organization of state insurance commissioners 
and bas no legal status. Their many services act as a 
unifying effect in legislation, reports, annual statements, 
and valuation procedures. Therefore, while the laws of 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania may 
vary in certain categories and may not be as strict as the 
New York law, they are in substantial complaince with it. 
17 
In a way, the commissioners have the effect of substitut-
ing or supplying the service that an agency of the federal 
government would perform. 
Cgliance. ••A question does arise, however, as 
to which state investment laws apply to a particular com-
pany. Because many companies have even stricter policies 
than most &tate& require, and there is often only a slight 
difference in requirements between tbe important states, 
and, also because an individual state would not require 
literal compliance as long as a company's investment prac-
tices are in substantial agreement with the state's 
statutes, this question is not a major problem. The gen-
eral rule on this matter is as follows: 
• • • the investment laws of the several states 
apily directly to life insurance companies domi-
ci ed in the state and often have some applica-
tions to out-of-state compaaies licensed to sell 
insurance in the state. Hence! each life insur-
ance company must conduct its 1nvestment opera-
tions in accordance with the laws of the state 
of domicile and, in many cases, with due regard 
also to laws of other states in which it sells.l 
1L1fe Insurance Association of America, Life 
Insurance Companies as Financial Institutions, p. sr.-
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Valuation of Assets 
The second major phase of life insurance legis-
lation is the regulation of values put on securities for 
statement purposes. From past difficulties it was found 
that the industry needed a system where it would know how 
to uniformly prepare its annual statements, and to deter-
mine what values should be placed on an asset at a partic-
ular time, whether it be a bond or a stock. Before 1907 
there was little legislation and minimum research on the 
matter. Thus, stocks and bonds were carried at market 
value which, at that time, resulted in a lack of uniform-
ity at which the various companies were carrying the same 
securities. Since then, the states, recognizing that the 
life companies, because of the long-term nature of their 
contracts, typically bold their fixed interest invest-
ments until maturity, have strived through trial and error 
to stabilize the valuation procedures. This would help 
eliminate major fluctuations in a company's financial po-
sition from year to year, help prevent recurrences of tech· 
nical insolvencies, and put an end to lllUcb confusion. 
Amortization.-·A major step was taken in this di-
rection with the introduction of the principle of amortiza-
tion in 1909. Since then, all bonds not in default as to 
principal and interest are valued at amortized cost (cost 
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adjusted for amortization of premium or discount) provided 
they meet certain tests, with corresponding stabilization 
for dividend paying preferred stocks. Bonds and preferred 
stocks in default and all common stocks continue to be 
stated at market value. A securities reserve is set up 
against which realized losses and write downs of unstabil-
ized bonds and preferred stocks can be charged. Intricate 
formulas, based on the amortizability of various classes of 
securities, were devised for arriving at the size of the 
reserves and changes in them thereafter. 
Bonds.••All bonds passing the amortizable tests 
can be carried at cost regardless of their market values 
at that time. At present the tests include the following: 
All bonds in the first four rating grades of any 
one of the accredited agencies automatically 
passes Test I. Also passiDg Test I are bonds 
reflecting maximum debt ratios varying from 50 
per cent to 75 per cent of total capitalization, 
average earninas coverage of at least one and 
one-half times before taxes over the preceding 
five years, and actual coveraae of one and one-
half times in either of the last two years • • • 
Test 2 is designed to measure more carefully the 
risk likely to be incurred on bonds falling to 
pass Test I. This test sets lower coverage 
standards but broadens its illquiry into cash 
flow, current position, and other more detailed 
financial analysis • . • Bonds failing to pass 
Test 2 and other bonds ineligible for amortiza-
tion continue to be carried at market value in 
the annual statement and require annual reserve 
accruals of one per cent .1 _ 
lHarold G. Fraine, Valuation of Securities Holdings 
of Life Insurance Campa¥§!! ~omewood, Illinois: Richard D. 
irwin, fnc., 1962), p. • 
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Preferred Stock. --Valuing preferred stocks which 
usually fall somewhere between bonds and common stocks in 
degree of risk is set up as follows: 
In 1957 the NAIC adopted provisions for stabiliza-
tion of the value of qualified preferred stocks. 
It did so under the "one-fifth rule," in which the 
year-end value of qualified preferred stocks was 
to be the statement value for the prior year (cost 
if purchased during the year) plus or minus one 
fifth of tbe difference between this value and 
year end market price. 
To qualify for stabilization under the new 
rules, preferred stocks must meet certain earn-
ings and dividend requirements. Cumulative pre• 
ferred stocks must have a coverage after income 
taxes of at least one and ooe•fourtb times for 
the last three years and DIU&t be paying full divi• 
dends. No.ncumulative preferred stocks must meet 
the same earni,s requirements and must have paid 
full dividends or the last three years. Pre-
ferred stocks 110t ~:meetiq these requirements must 
be valued at year end market (Association) values. 1 
The NAIC super,ises the valuation regulations, 
and this is the area of legislation in which it has bad 
the most unifying effect among the various states. A 
permanent committee of the Association constantly checks 
and examines the area, and at the annual meeting, a ~ 
of Valuations is put out setting down policy for the com-
ing year. 
The valUF.ttion laws become an important faccor in 
determining industry invescment policies. This is evi-
denced by the fact that almost all bonds held by the 
1 Ibid., p. 15. 
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industry are amortizable. The llfe companies must invest 
within the quality guidelines set down if they are to 
present stable values. 
C H A P T E R II 
MAJOR INVESTMENT DETERMINANTS 
The legal ltmitatioDS placed on life insurance 
investing were examined in Chapter I, with the primary 
purpose of these laws being to inaure a proper degree of 
safety and diversification ift investment choices. The 
basic needs and major characteristics of the life insur-
ance industry t which determine investment policy t will 
now be discussed. The four major determinants are secur-
ity of principal, long-term investing, diversification, 
and the desire for income. Working within legal limits, 
the life companies must select iuvestment channels that 
will offer the best combination of these characteristics. 
Safety of Px;&ncipal 
The most important factor in life insurance in-
vesting is the safety of principal. The life companies 
recognize this factor to be of paramount consideration in 
almost all investing and often limit their choices to a 
higher degree of safety than the law requires. This arises 
from the nature of the life insurance contract and the li-
ability to the policyholder. In a practical sense a com-
pany is put in a trusteeship position with respect to 
- 23 -
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its policyholders. 
Almost all life insurance policies contain the 
elements of pure protection and saving in varying degrees. 
A policyholder paying the common form of ordinary life 
insurance with a level premium payment, accumulates a re-
serve after a number of years. This is because the pos-
sibility of death increases as a person advances in age, 
and is actuarially represented on a mortality table, 
from which the company determines the premiums to be 
charged. It is necessary to overcharge in earlier years• 
under the level premium plan in order to build up a fund 
to meet the higher mortality rates in later years. Thus, 
policy reserves are created, representing the amounts a 
company sets aside on the basis of actuarial calculations 
to meet its future obligations. These reserves have 
grown enormously in the last two decades, although declin-
ing in rate of growth in recent years. This parallels an 
increase in personal disposable saving, and a greater pub-
lic demand for life insurance protection in an expanding 
economy. The savings element is definitely present to a 
large degree, with some contending that this should not 
be a major function of life insurance; however, with total 
assets of leading financial institutions totalling $310.9 
billion at the end of 1959, we can see that the life com-
panies comprise one of the nation's largest repositories 
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of personal savings. 1 Policy reserves have always accounted 
for a high percentage of total assets, totaling $103.3 bil-
lion for the industry as a whole at the end of 1961, with 
policy dividend accumulations $3.7 billion, special surplus 
$2.3 billion, unassigned surplus $7.3 billion, capital of 
stock companies $919 million, $210 billion set aside for 
policy dividends, and $7.3 billion in other obligations. 2 
When a policyholder dies, the reserve must be there to meet 
the company's liability. In order to carry out their role 
as managers and trustees of policyholders• funds the com-
panies must invest with this in mind. 
Long•Term Maturities 
Life insurance saving differs greatly from sav-
ing in other financial institutions such as mutual savings 
banks, savings and loan associations, and commercial banks, 
in that it is basically long-term and contractual in nature 
and is, therefore, more stable. Most life insurance saving 
is done primarily because of a desire for family financial 
1Andrew F. Brtmmer, Life Insurance ComGanies in 
the Capital Market (East Lansing, Michigan: Mic lgan State 
university, 1962), p. 39. 
2tnstitute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance Fact 
Book~ 1962 (New York: Institute of Life Insurance, 1962), 
p. 6 . 
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protection in the event of untimely death, and it is ordi-
narily expected to be left intact until the death of the 
insured ratber than withdrawn beforehand for some other 
use. When the average policyholder takes out a policy, he 
will start paying regular premiums, and his beneficiary 
(or htmself, if it is an annuity) will not collect until 
many years have passed. This is DOt true of everyone, but 
a life company bas its risks spread out over numerous 
policyholders, with the premium rates determined by a con-
servative mortality table. They can predict very ac-
curately tdlat their loss experience will be. This accounts 
for a second basic characteristic of life insurance invest-
ing, and that is its long•term nature. If the industry 
were to invest the bulk of its assets in relatively short-
term securities, the rates (earnings) obtained would fluc-
_tuate more than long•term rates, reducing the stability 
desired in the earnings rate; and also would involve con-
tinuous sbif ting of large amounts of funds. 
Therefore, life insurance funds are appropriately 
placed in relatively safe investments which have a distant 
maturity date, and which parallel the contractual obliga-
tions of the company. 
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Diversification 
Along with these characteristics, diversifica-
tion is an important element in life insurance investing, 
being a major way in which the safety of invested assets 
is achieved. For the life insurance industry diversifica-
tion comes rather easily. In order to maximize earnings, 
the life companies have sought new outlets within the 
area of long-term debt, and, as major suppliers of funds 
in the capital market, are constantly under pressure to 
lend to the many corporate users of funds. Diversifica-
tion is generally sought in four ways: (1) geographically, 
to insure participation in major growth areas such as the 
West and Southwest and to purchase assets in the most at-
tractive and stable investment regions; (2) spreading in-
vestments among the various types of business activity, so 
that a serious decline in one or more sections of the 
economy will not endanger the investment portfolio; 
(3) diversification according to maturity, to insure a 
steady flow of funds for death payments and new invest-
ments; and (4) the spreading of investments among various 
types of assets. 
Investment Outlets.--observing these principles, 
the traditional investment outlets of the industry, as seen 
in Table II-1, have consisted of long-term fixed interest 
TABlE n-1 
IERCENTAGE DISTRmUTION OF ASSETS OF U.S. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
State 
For- Provin- Indus-
u.s. eign cial & Rail- Public trial Total 
Govt. Govt. Local road Utility & Misc. Mort- Real Policy Mise. (in millions 
Year Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds Stocks gages Estate Loans Assets Total _of dollars) 
1917 1.2% 2.8% 5.6% 30.5% 1.9% .8% 1.4% 34.($ 3.0% 13.6% 5.2% 100.0% $ $,941 
1920 11.3 2.3 4.8 24·3 1.7 -7 1.0 33·4 2.3 ll.7 6.5 100.0 7,320 
1925 5.4 1.3 4.6 19.4 6.0 .8 .7 41·7 2.3 12.5 5.3 : 100.'0 ll,538 
1930 1.7 .9 5.4 15.5 8.6 1.9 2.8 40.2 2.9 ~14~9 5.2 100.0 18,880 
1935 12.3 .s 7.3 ll.3 9.1 2.5 2.5 23.1 8.6 15.2 7.3 100.0 23,216 
1940 18.7 1.0 7.8 9.2 13.9 5.0 2.0 19.4 6.7 10.0 6.3 100.0 30,802 
1941 20.8 1.2 7.0 8.7 14.9 5.6 1.8 19.7 5.7 8.9 5.7 100.0 32,731 
1942 26.6 1.5 5.8 7.8 14.8 5.2 1.7 19.2 4.8 7.7 4.9 100.0 34,931 
1943 33.2 1.8 4-7 7-3 13.8 5.0 1.7 17.8 3.6 6.3 4.8 100.0 37,766 
1944 40.3 1.9 3.5 6.7 12.9 4.6 1.9 16.3 2.6 5.2 4.1 100.0 41,054 
1945 45.9 2.1 2.3 6.6 11.6 4.3 2.2 14.8 1.9 4.4 3.9 100.0 44,797 
1946 44.9 2.1 1.9 6.0 ll.6 6.9 2.6 14.8 1.5 3·9 3.8 100.0 48,191 
1947 38.7 2.0 1.8 5.5 13.4 9.6 2.7 16.8 1.7 3.7 4.1 100.0 51,743 
1948 30.2 2.0 2.2 5.4 15.7 12.9 2.6 19.5 1.9 3·7 3-9 100.0 55,512 
1949 25.6 1.9 2.3 5.1 16.4 14.6 2.9 21.6 2.1 3·7 3.8 100.0 59,630 
1950 21.0 1.7 2.4 5.0 16.5 14.9 3·3 25.1 2.2 3.8 4.1 100.0 64,020 
1951 16.1 1.3 2.5 4.9 16.4 16.8 3.3 28.3 2.4 3.8 4.2 100.0 68,278 
1952 14.0 1.0 2.4 4.8 16.3 18.7 3.3 29.0 2.6 3.7 4.2 100.0 73,375 
1953 12.5 .7 2.6 4.7 16.3 19.7 3.3 29.7 2.6 3.7 4.2 100.0 78,533 
1954 10.7 .5 3.1 4.5 16.0 20.0 3.9 30.7 2.7 3·7 4.2 100.0 84,486 
1955 9.5 .4 3.0 4.3 15.5 20.1 4.0 32.6 2.8 3.6 4.1 100.0 90,432 
1956 7.9 .4 3.1 4.0 15.1 20.6 3.7 34·4 2.9 3.7 4.2 100.0 96,0ll 
1957 6.9 .3 ,3.1 3.8 15.1 21.5 3.3 34.8 3.1 3.8 4·3 100.0 101,309 
1958 6.7 .3 3-3 3.6 14.8 21.8 3.8 34.4 3.1 3.9 4·3 100.0 107,.5SO 
1959 6.0 .3 ,3.7 3.3 14.5 22.1 4.0 34·5 3.2 4.1 4·3 100.0 113,650 1960 5.4 .,3 3.8 3.1 14.0 22.4 4.2 34·9 ,3.1 4.4 4·4 100.0 119,576 1961 4·9 .3 4.0 2.8 1.3.4 22.6 4.9 .34·9 ,3.2 4.5 4.5 100.0 126,816 ro co 
SOURCE: Life In_sm-~ce Fact Book, 1962, pp. 66-67. 
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obligations such as real estate mortgages, government 
bonds, and corporate bonds. carefully selected real es-
tate mortgage loans provide ample safety in that the 
underlying security consists of unencumbered real property 
which, in the event of default, could be sold after fore-
closure proceedings. FHA and VA mortgage loans involve 
practically no risk in that they are guaranteed by the 
Federal Government. Safeguarding features are included 
in private bargaining between life companies and industrial 
corporations, with some securities taking the form of mort-
gage bonds representing first liens on physical assets of 
the borrower. Along with this, careful investigation and 
analysis of the corporate borrower is usually made with 
assurance of its ability and willingness to repay. Chart 
11-1 reflects the quality of life insurance investments 
through the years, with total income following the pattern 
of yields achieved on high grade government and corporate 
bonds. The average quality of corporate bonds acquired by 
the industry is conceded to be in close approximation to 
the AA rated series. 1 
1 Brimmer, p. 110. 
CHART II-1 
NET RETURN ON INVESTED FUNDS OF THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND YIELDS 
ON CORPORATE BONDS AND LONG-TERM U.S. GOVERNMENT BONDS 
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Maximizing the Rate of Return 
Only after the safety of principal is satisfied 
can a life company be concerned with income and maximiz-
ing its investment return. Although income is not the 
overriding factor in most investment decisions, it is, 
however, an important one in that investment earnings must 
be sufficient to cover the assumed interest rate on policy 
contracts, and that earnings over and above the assumed 
rate can be used to reduce the net cost of insurance; and, 
therefore, make an individual company more competitive. 
Assumed Interest Rate.-·As the policyholder con-
tinues to pay premiums, a policy reserve builds up, which 
invested by the company continues to earn a certain amount 
each year. This income would add to the value of the re-
serve and company assets; therefore, so as not to over-
charge the policyholder, this factor is accounted for by 
adjusting the premium to be paid, to an amount lower than 
mortality experience would call for. Reserves are calcu-
lated so that, together with future premiums and an assumed 
earnings rate, they will enable the company to pay all 
future claims. Therefore, investment earnings in the long 
run must be adequate to cover this assumed rate on policy 
reserves or the company will be receiving less than it 
allowed for in the premium, and depending on favorable 
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or unfavorable mortality experience and amount of operat-
ing expenses, may have to increase the assumed rate, thus 
raising premiums on future policies. 
The company sets the assumed rate itself and for 
the sake of security it bas historically been on the con-
servative side, well below earnings actually achieved. 
Currently set at approximately 3%, for many years the 
average rate was 2\%, a rate, it was felt, was the minimum 
rate which investments of a life company should, under any 
economic circumstances be certain to return. 1 However, in 
the late forties, for reasons to be examined later, the 
overall rate achieved on investments approached, and for 
some companies fell slightly under, the assumed interest 
rate. 
Net Cost of Insurance.--A life company desires 
to maintain the widest spread possible between actual 
earnings and the assumed rate. High investment earnings can 
be an important factor in reducing the net cost of insur· 
ance and keeping a company in a good competitive position. 
Policyholders, having bought life insurance with the net 
cost in mind, expect dividends which will reduce their 
1Ralph Hendershot, The Grim Truth About Life 
Insurance (New York: C.P. Putman's Sons, 19S7), p. 23. 
34 
gross premiums. (Policyholders of stock companies receive 
no dividends. but are generally charged lower premiums to 
bring the net cost in line with policies issued by the mu-
tual companies.) The degree to which actual earnings ex-
ceed the assumed rate determines the ability of a mutual 
company to pay out dividends (or a stock company to reduce 
premiums) and/or to add to its surplus. Therefore, the 
higher the yield, the lower the cost of insurance can be. 
This is illustrated in Table II-2. Had assets held in 
1949 and 1956 been invested at tbe rate prevailing in 1930, 
the net cost of insurance could have been reduced some 
17.6% and 15.3% respectively. Although this indicates 
that some companies could reduce their cost far below 
others, the degree to which this is probable is limited. 
The situation is conditioned by such factors as a slowness 
in the movement of earnings rates, either up or down, 
over a short period of time, and common investment poli-
cies by different companies. This results in the earnings 
rate for most companies, and for all leading ones, not 
being too far from the median earnings rate for the indus-
1 try as a whole. 
1James E. Walter, The Investment Process: as 
Characterized bl Leadinf Li~e insurance t!omj)&llies (BostOn: 
Harvard UD!vers ty, 196 ), p. 66. 
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TABLE 11·2 
NET RATE OF Drl'EREST EARNED ON INVESTED FUNDS 
AND 1'HE NET COST OF DtSURABCE TO 
POLICYHOLDERS, EXPERIENCE OF 
TWEHrY COMPANIES, 
1949 and 19568 
(in millions of dollars) 
Gross Premiums 
Policy Dividends 
Aggregate Net Cost 
Net Investment Income: 
Assume 1930 rate (4.811) were 
applied to assets held in 
1949 and 1956 
Actual at 1949 rate (2.98%) 
and at 1956 rate (3.31t) 
Potential Increase in Dividends: 
Assume return to 1930 rate 
Potential Increase in Dividends: 
As per cent of net cost 
Year 
1949 
$5,280 
615 $4,66S 
1956 
$7,726 
1,194 $6,532 
$2,152 $3,25l!-
$1,331 $2,253 
$ 821 $1,001 
17.6 15.3 
a In each year, statistics are for the 20 largest mutual 
companies whose combined assets were 80% of the industry 
total in 1949 and 65% in 1956. 
Source: Life Insurauce CO!!J!Yies in the Capital Market, 
p. 25. 
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Yield §xperience.--Actioas past and present are 
summarized in the rate of returD on invested assets. The 
rate before federal income taxes is taken because taxa• 
tion of life compard.es (see Chapter III) is minor and until 
recently bas been very negl:l.g:l.ble. Observing the histor-
ical pattern of earnings, certain observations can be 
made. First, earnings seem to be directly affected by 
changes in overall economic coaditions, which affect the 
demand for long-term loanable funds and the level of inter-
est rates over various periods of time. Before and during 
the 1920's relatively high rates could be obtained on ex-
isting bond and mortgage investments. However, with the 
onset of the depression, conditions changed, and the 
steady decline in the rate of earnings on invested assets 
can be traced to an insufficient demand for funds, accom-
panied by lower interest rates. This resulted in numerous 
refunding a of corporate securities, which wer£~ issued at 
the higher rates prevailing in the 1920's, thus adding to 
the surplus of funds in the bands of the life companies. 
The lack of attractive investment outlets necessitated 
heavy investment in low yieldiag U.S. Government Bonds 
which was later accelerated by entry into World War II. 
After the war, the nation experienced an economic boom 
which has continued on to the present. This has resulted 
in an enormous demand for capital funds from industry, a 
rapid growth in housing, and a rising pattern of interest 
Year 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
TABLE II-3 
NET BATE OF INTEREST EARNED ON INVESTED FUNDS 
U.S. LIFE INSUBAHCE COMPANIES 
Rate Year Rate Year Rate Year 
4.77% 1927 5.05'%. 1939 3.54% 1951 
4.80 1928 5.05 1940 3.45 1952 
4.81 1929 5.05 1941 3.42 1953 
4.72 1930 5.05 1942 3.44 1954 
4.66 1931 4.93 1943 3.33 1955 
4.83 1932 4.65 1944 3.23 1956 
5.02 1933 4.25 1945 3.11 1956 
5.12 1934 3.92 1946 2.93 1958 
5.18 1935 3.70 1947 2.88 1959 
5.17 1936 3.71 1948 2.96 1960 
5.11 1937 3.69 1949 3.06 1961 
5.09 1938 3.59 1950 3.13 
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book, 1962, p. 59. 
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Rate 
3.18% 
3.28 
3.36 
3.46 
3.51 
3.63 
3.75 
3.85 
3.96 
4.11 
4.22 
rates. The life companies proceeded to liquidate their 
holdings of government securities in order to satisfy 
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this demand and obtain higher returns. This economic 
growth is largely responsible for the continuing improve-
ment being realized in investment yields. This would sug-
gest that the industry earnings situation at a given time, 
is, in part, determined by outside factors beyond its con~ 
trol. 
Because of changing economic conditions, consid-
erable variability in actual yield experience is noticed. 
Since 1915, the highest annual rate of return was 5.18% 
in 1923, with the lowest, at 2.88%, being obtained in 1947. 
Another noticeable feature is the gradual movement in the 
earnings rate, both when improving and declining. Also, 
for the period as a whole, the rate changed directions 
only seven times. Beginning in 1923 there was a gradual 
decline, interrupted briefly in 1942, which extended to 
1947. Since then the rate has risen continuously until it 
is once again over 4%. A priDcipal reason for this is the 
length of time it takes the earnings rate to reflect pres-
ent investment decisions. Asset turnover each year is 
small in relation to total invested funds, because of the 
wide diversification in maturity dates necessitated by 
continuous long•term investing. The significance of this 
for the near future is that earning rates are likely to 
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be as good or even better than current ones, and should 
they begin to decline again, a number of years would prob-
ably pass before they would fall as low as 3.5% or 3%, if 
they were to decline to that vicinity. 
Cae!citx for Risk T&kiQS··-wbile all author-
ities agree that life companies are limited in their abil-
ity to make risky iavestments, same say they are highly 
limited, and others hold that their capacity for risk tak-
ing is much greater than investment practices currently 
show. The following reflects this feeling: 
Whether life companies as a group perform 
as well as they might is doubtful. The CODIDOtl 
focus seems to be upon matching or outperform-
ing competition rather than upon exhausting the 
feasible possibilities for bigber returns. In 
part, this orientation is attributable to the 
besitanci of most life companies to deviate 
notably from standard patterns of behavior. In 
part, it is due to a tradition of limited in-
vestment staff and to certain ambiguities in 
the risk-taking capacity of life companies. As 
a basis of investment bebaviori matching compe-
tition bas an element of circu arity in that A 
looks at B, B looks at C and C looks at A. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • It is reasonable to conclude that the ca-
pacity of life companies for risk taking is ap-
preciably greater than the degree of risk
1
taking 
reflected in their investment portfolios. 
This conclusion is based on the power of the 
large life companies, because of their great asset sizes, 
1 Ibid., pp. 6·7, 61·62. 
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to get the maximum benefit from diversification. The 
cushions offered by surplus and the difference between ac-
tual earnings and the assumed rate, were deemed large 
enough to absorb investment losses if they were to cluster. 
This did happen during the depression years of the 1930's, 
but the industry as a whole had a favorable loss experi-
ence in this period, with the majority of troubled cases, 
confined to small mismanaged companies • Also, the cash 
flow history of the industry has been excellent, with in-
flow of premiums and other income exceeding outgoing pay-
ments year after year, even in the worst depression years. 
Based on this reasoning, a greater capacity to 
assume risk appears valid, but so far the life companies 
have not accepted this in their investment policies, and 
even if they should they would proceed gradually and with 
caution. The individual company must decide based on its 
own particular position and experience, and in the final 
analysis it is the degree of risk that is important. The 
primary duty of the investment department is to raise long• 
run net returns on investments as high as possible without 
jeopardizing the ability of the company to meet its obliga-
tions. The return on investment is second only to safety 
of principal as a factor in investment policy. If esti-
mates of safety and other factors are assumed to be the 
same, a life insurance company will naturally invest in 
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the outlet which will give the maximum return. Chapters 
four through seven will show bow these characteristics of 
safety, diversification, and income are combined to 
achieve an investment portfolio of bonds, mortgage~and 
equities. 
C H A P T E R III 
MINOR INVESTMENT DETERMINANTS 
Having discussed the major determinants of life 
insurance investment (safety, diversification, income, 
long-term maturities), with which all life insurance com-
panies are concerned, attention will now be given to the 
less important investment determiDants. These are con-
siderations which ordinarily do not exercise an important 
influence over investment policy, but, from time to time, 
and for cer~in proposals, can be determining factors. 
The first of these is life insurance taxation. 
Federal Income Taxes 
Up to recent years the life insurance companies 
have bad to take little if any account of federal income 
taxes in their investment decisions. From 1921 to 1957 
taxation of the industry was insignificant, with a tax im-
posed on only a small amount of net investment income. 
From 1951 to 1954 a deduction of 87~% of net investment 
income was allowed, with the remaining 12~% the only tax-
able income; from 1955 to 1957, the deduction was 87~% of 
the first million dollars and 55i. of the remaining net 
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investment income. 1 Gains from insurance operations or 
capital gains were not taxed. Therefore, the after tax 
yield on life insurance investments was in substantial ac-
cord with the before tax yield. 
The special treatment given to the life compan-
ies stems from the nature of the amounts received by such 
companies as gross premiums, and the difficulty of de-
termining, in any one year, the income from the ordinary 
long-term insurance contract. It was felt that the life 
insurance business was a service industry supplying a 
vital need to the nation's population, and that a net 
premium gain on investment income, over and above the 
amount assumed in the premiums, would be paid out in divi-
dends, or added to surplus, thus increasing the margin of 
safety for the policyholder. Gains from sale of assets 
were not taxed, because Congress apparently wanted to 
avoid wide fluctuations in the taxable income of the life 
companies, on the theory that the capital gains would gen-
erally be offset by capital losses over a period of time 
and, also, because the industry holds very little equity 
investments. 
1Ricbard L. Denney and Anthony P. Rua, Federal 
Income Taxation of Insurance cr.ewes (New York: The 
IODiid Press eo., !961), p. 1 .. 
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Federal Income Tax Act of 1959.--However, after 
a number of hearings in 1959, Congress passed the Life 
Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 which increased 
the tax burden for the life companies. Under the new law 
they are taxed partly on investment earnings and capital 
gains, and partly on general operations. Section 802 (a) 
of the law reads as follows: 
1. In general. - •A tax is hereby imposed 
for each taxable year beginning after December 31, 
1959, on the life insurance company taxable in-
come of every life insurance company. Such tax 
shall consist of: 
A. a normal tax on such income com-
puted at the rate provided by 
section ll(b), and 
B. a surtax, on so much of such in-
come as exceeds $25,000 computed 
at the rate provided by section 
ll(c) 
2. Tax in case of capital gains.--lf for 
any taxable year beginning after December 31 
1958, the net long-term capital gain of any life 
insurance company exceeds the net short-term cap-
ital loss, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 
25% of such excess.l 
For taxable years begimliag before July 1, 1962, 
the normal tax rate provided by section ll(b) is 30%. 
For taxable years beginning after that date the rate pro-
vided is 25%. 2 
1 Ibid., pp. 4.19-4.20. 
-
2 Ibid., p. 4.20. 
-
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Life insurance company taxable income is defined 
as the sum of: 
1. the taxable investment income or, if 
smaller, the gain from operations. 
2. If the gain from operaticms exceeds the 
taxable investment income, an amount 
equal to 50% of such excess, plus 
3. the amount subtracted from the policy-
holder's surplus account for the tax-
able year .. 1 
Taxable investment income is determined by sub-
tracting from the gross investment yield the allowable 
deductions for investment expenses, real estate expenses, 
depreciation, depletion, and certain trade business ex-
penses. Investment yield is then divided into the policy-
holder's share (the amount of investment income that was 
assumed to have been earned in the policy premiums) and 
the company's share. Taxable investment income is the com-
pany's share, less deductions for wholly tax-exempt inter-
est, partially tax-exempt interest, dividends received, 
and the small business deduction. A gross amount consist-
ing of premiums, decreases in certain reserves, and other 
amounts is added to the company's share and deductions are 
l Ibid., p. 4.19. 
made from the total to arrive at the gain or loss from 
operations. 
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The 1959 law bas added a great deal of complexity 
to life insurance taxation, and has aroused such discussion 
within the industry. It is generally recognized that the 
law has about doubled the tax from what it was previously. 
Table III-1 shows that taxes for the industry as a whole 
rose from $292 million in 1957 to $534 million in 1961. Al-
though it has increased, this is not a heavy tax burden for 
the life companies. They are still taxed on only the com-
pany's share of investment income, with deductions and ad-· 
justments allowed, and at a rate far below the regular 
corporate rate. Federal inca. taxes paid in 1957 totaled 
$292 million on total investment income of $3,331 million, 
and taxes paid in 1960 totaled only $479 million (which in-
cludes taxes on the gain from operations) on total invest-
ment income of $4,303 million. 1 
With few exceptions, the new tax law should not 
be expected to exercise any great influence on overall in-
vestment policy or cause chances from past policies. The 
area most seriously affected appears to be real estate, 
wbere increased taxation bas reduced the attractiveness of 
1Institute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance 
Fact Book, 1961 (New York: Institute of tile Insurance, 
1961), p. 54. 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
TABLE III-1 
TAXES, LICENSES AND FEES PAID BY U.S. LIFE INSUBANCE COMPANIES 
(in millions of dollars) 
State Federal Federal Real Other Taxes 
Taxes on Social Secur- Income Estate Licenses, 
Premiums ity Taxes Taxes Taxes Fees 
$123 $12 $ 20 $27 $23 
134 14 95 29 26 
146 15 125 32 27 
161 17 141 33 28 
177 22 158 38 26 
189 26 189 39 29 
206 28 265 42 32 
223 33 292 50 35 
240 36 32~ 53 37 252 43 55 61 45 
270 53 479 68 50 
309 55 534 71 57 
-----~----
Total 
$ 205 
298 
345 
380 
421 
472 
573 
633 
687 
958 
920 
1,026 
---
a This figure includes part of the 1958 tax obligation which was deferred pending fi-
nal enactment of the new tax law in 1959. 
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book, 1962, p. 57. 
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purchase and leaseback deals. The law will undoubtedly 
spread the small differential between the before and 
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after tax yield somewhat, aad make the tax exeapt govern-
ments more attractive than they have been in the past. 
Before the law was passed, capital gains could be taken 
with unbiased judgment. Now. the tax will have to be 
given consideration in the sale of c011110n stocks and real 
estate. Investment in state bonds, cOUIDOD. stock, and real 
estate comprise a small percentage of life insurance 
assets, as seen in Table II-l, and are discussed in 
Chapters VI and VII. 
Liquidity Reguirements 
Liquidity is of only minor concern to the life 
insurance industry, and for most companies, poses no prob-
lem at all. Their r~quirements have little similarity to 
other types of financial institutions such as commercial 
banks, savings banks, and savings and loan associations. 
The outflow of benefits and expenses and the inflow of 
premiums exhibit great stability and a high degree of 
predictability. There is also a wide spread between in-
flow in the form of premiums and outflow in the form of 
dividends and payments. This resulted in ne~ policyholder 
savings of $5.2 billion in 1957, $5.3 billion in 1958, and 
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$5.4 billion for the industry as a Whole in 1959.1 Table 
III•2 shows the flow of funds through U.S. life insurance 
companies and the total available for long-term investment 
for the years 1957 and 1958. 
Policy reserves are essentially a long-term li-
ability rather tban a short-term deposit and policyholders 
rarely use the option available for withdrawals of built-
up cash values. Premiums are based on conservative mortal• 
ity tables and tbe risks are wall diversified. Purchase of 
life insurance shows a constant rise which parallels the 
growth of disposable income aad new family formations. 
Unless there is a national holocaust, resulting in heavy 
loss of life, a life company can predict accurately what 
its losses will be. 
The liquidity requirements of the life companies 
contrast with the requirements of the fire and casualty 
companies. These institutions must hold a large amount of 
cash and short•term securities because of the shorter-term 
nature of their insurance contracts and the frequent occur-
rence of storms and other catastrophies. 
A life company, of course, must have sufficient 
liquid resources available to meet all claims and expenses 
1tife Insurance Association of America, Life 
Insurance Companies as Financial Institutions, p. ~ 
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TABLE 111•2 
GROSS fl.Dl 0"1 lNVIS'DIIN'r FUNDS (CASH rLCll) 
TllltOmB U. S. LUI INSURANCE COMPANIES 
YEAR 
1957 1958 
ln In 
Millions Millions 
of In of In 
DollaJf rer Cent Dollars Per Cent 
Net new money (cash basis) 4,968 49.8 5,151 47.0 
MOrtsas•• (total) 2.800 28.1 3.180 29.0 
AmDrtuation and 
partial prepayments 1,960 19.7 2,110 19.2 
Other cash payments 810 8.1 1,060 9.7 
Outright sales 30 0.3 10 0.1 
Securities (total) 2,190 21.9 2,170 24.7 
BOnd maturities 710 7.1 900 8.2 
Contingency sinking 
funds 120 1. 2 100 0.9 
Other security calls 230 2.3 300 2. 7 
Sales of u. s. Govt. 
lo~·tena bonds 430 4.3 620 5. 7 
Salu of other securities 700 7.0 790 7.2 
All other aalea and repay• 
mente 120 1. 2 150 1.4 
Net increase (•) 1n cash and 
short•term investments •100 •1.0 •220 •2.0 
Total available for long• 
term investments 9.978 100.0 10,971 100.0 
SOUB.CE: =~surnal of :r'yncs. May. 1960, P• 156. 
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promptly and to carry out normal business transactions. 
The need for this is not great with u.s. life insurance 
companies holdiqg 1.2% of total assets in cash and bank 
deposits, at the end of 1959, while an additional 0.2% 
was in the form of short-term U.S • Government securities, 
which could be sold quickly without substantial loss. 1 
Although no pressure is exerted upon the in-
vestment portfolio to meet any liquidity requirements 
arising out of operations of the company, sometimes a 
company will be in need of cash because of its desire to 
remain fully invested. A life insurance company will com-
mit its funds many months in advance through the forward 
ccnaaitment process discussed in Chapter IV. The invest-
ment department will plan disbursements so that they will 
not exceed total cash expected in the same period, but 
because of unusually attractive investment opportunities, 
or a periodic decrease in cash flow, or a combination of 
both, more funds are required. This rarely happens, espe-
cially in the larger companies. They usually have the 
opposite problem of finding enough suitable outlets for 
their invesbDents. If more funds are needed they are gen-
erally sought in three ways: (1) reduction in cash and 
holdings of short-term securities, (2) sale of long-term 
l Ibid., p. 62. 
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securities, (3) short-term borrowing from commercial banks. 
The larger life companies will not use short-term borrow-
ing, considering it unnecessary for the most part, and not 
in accordance with the fiduciary principles which they 
should maintain. Both John Hancock and New England Life 
would never consider this method, preferring to handle 
new investments out of cash flow and sell short-term 
assets if necessary. The small companies will borrow, from 
time to time, to even out their cash flows, but even they 
frown on extensive or long•term use of borrowing. 
Industry Established Norms 
The life insurance companies, as suppliers of a 
vital commodity, recognize their responsibilities to the 
policyholder and keep their investments in safe outlets. 
The industry is concerned with the public image it portrays 
through its investment and selling activities. Tbe follow-
ing statement by M. Rey Dodson, Chairman, Institute of 
Life Insurance, reflects this: 
Why should we be concerned with the public 
image of the life insurance business at this time? 
We can take satisfaction in tbe fact that we have 
become one of the str~est bulwarks of the Ameri• 
can economy. Certainly sales of life insurance 
have increased. The return on our investments is 
reasonably good. The regulatory agencies are 
satisfied td.tb the way we operate under the law. 
Why, then, be concerned? The answer is--we should 
be concerned about the importance of maintaining a 
clear image of our business because we need the 
support and approval of the public to preserve 
the voluntary system of life insurance.l 
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Industry publications constantly refer to the 
role that life insurance investment plays in the nation's 
economy and cite many past contributions. In the t~ords 
of o. Kelley Anderson, President, New England Mutual Life 
Insurance Company: 
l do, however, feel, very strongly that we in 
the insurance business, with out great public 
trust, must think in terms of statesmanship rather 
than expediency. Our Directors, our Finance Commit-
tees, and our senior officers must not think in 
terms of day•to•day decisions that may be good for 
this year's earnings and this year's dividends, but 
rather in lons•raqe terms of what is going to be 
good for our policyholders, our business, and our 
country five, ten, aad even 1110re years away. We 
must lose no opportunity to prove by our actions 
that we are worthy of tbe trust the American 
p::lle have shown in us. We must lose no appor-
t ty to impress upon the American public the con• 
structive role which we are playing in our country 
through the investment of their savings. 2 
The life insurance companies, especially the 
large ones, recognize certain public and social obligations, 
and the responsibility to invest in safe outlets, over and 
above the requirements set down in the state investment 
~. Rey Dodson, ''A Clearer Public Impression for 
Life Insurance," Institute of Life Insurance, Annual Meet-
ipg and Staff Reports (New York: 1962), pp. 8-9. 
2o. Kelly Anderson, "The Life Company Investment 
Officer: His Obligations in the Nation's Economy," Ameri• 
can Life Convention, Procee~s of the Forty-Eizbt Annual 
Meeting (Chicago: l9S3), p. 1. 
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laws. This affects overall investment policy, as set down 
by the Finance Committee of the Board of Directors. 
Company Size 
The size of a life insurance company can often be 
a determining factor in the types of investments made. In 
discussing life insurance investing, it must be remembered 
that the "Big Five" (Metropolitan, Prudential, Equitable, 
New York Life and John Hancock) combined, accounted for 
over $60 billion or almost half of the total industry assets 
of $126 billion at the end of 1961; the first fifteen com-
panies ordered by asset size, accounted for $88 billion or 
approximately 701 of total assets. 1 These companies 
dominate the industry and account for a very important part 
of all life insurance investing. Therefore, while this 
paper is concerned with industry f.uvestment policies, 
emphasis is placed upon the activities of the leading com-
panies. 
Table III-3 shows that companies with assets of 
over $1 billion invest a greater percentage in industrial 
bonds than do those companies falling under the $1 billion 
1
"Half a Hundred U.S • Giants: a Study in Growth," 
Best's Insurance News: Life Edition, LXIV (May, 1963), 
p. 12. 
TABLE III-3 
DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED ASSETS OF FORTY-NINE LIFE DJSURANCE COMPANIES 
(in per cent) 
Aggregate of Aggregate of A==- of Nine 
Nineteen Cc:apanies Twenty-oa.e Companies es with 
with Assets with Assets :if1ng Assets ~g 
over frOID ~200 mil • froaa $60 mi 1. $1 bUlion to 1 bill. to $200 mill. 
Total Bonds 50.6~ 40.7%. 47.3% 
Industrial Bonds 26.0 13.2 12.5 
Public Utility BoDds 12.6 14.6 16.1 
Total Mortgages 34.0 40~.9 34.8 
Farm Mortgages 3.1 1.4 .4 
FHA Mortgages 6.9 11.9 9.7 
VA Mortgages 4.8 5.4 4.4 
Conv. Mortgages 18.8 22.2 20.3 
Preferred Stock 1.7 1.4 1.1 
COIIIDOD Stock 2.0 1.7 1.5 
Real Estate 2.9 3.1 3.4 
Source: Joint Investment Bulletin, ALC and LIAA, No. 482, pp. 3-8. 
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asset category. The large companies originate more pro• 
posals, have more adequate facilities for processing and 
negotiating them, generate larger cash flows, and thus, 
are better equipped to make large loans to industrial 
corporatiofts. The companies in the $200 million to $1 bil• 
lion range rely on mortgages to a greater extent. The 
small companies, those in the $60 million to $200 million 
range, show the same percentage in mortgages as the com-
panies over $1 billion, with the percentage of total bond 
holdings approaching that held by the large companies. 
Some tendency towards the safer public utility bonds and 
F.H.A. mortgages, with a decrease in asset size, is also 
reflected. Outside of these categories, investment dif-
ferences with regard to asset size appear to be minor, 
with all life insurance companies holding very little in 
equity investment. The main difference is in the acquisi-
tion of indus trial bonds. 
Other Factors 
Other factors which could affect investment de-
cisions and deserve meation tnclude location of the company, 
attitudes of top management, and the qualifications and 
specialties of members of the investment staff. 
C H A P T E R IV 
CORPORATE BONDS 
Corporate bonds provide an extremely attractive 
investment medium for life insurance funds. For well over 
a decade the industry has had more funds invested in the 
debt of business and industry than in any other type of 
asset. Referring to Table II•l, it can be seen that the 
total of industrial, public utility, and railroad bonds 
amounted to 38.8% of total assets at the end of 1961. 
These accounted for nearly half of the entire asset growth 
during the year, and together with mortgages provide the 
bulk of all life insurance investing. The fact that cor-
porate debt is issued for long•term periods, has definite 
maturity dates, carries a fixed interest rate, and repre-
sents a senior or prior claim on the assets of the bor-
rower, strongly recommend corporate obligations to the 
managers of life company portfolios. These characteris-
tics parallel the long-term nature of life insurance ob-
ligations and satisfy the desired elements of safety, di· 
versification, and income to a better degree than most 
other investment media. 
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Industrial Bonds 
The greatest emphasis in corporate bond investing 
is in the securities of industrial concerns. In fact the 
most striking feature of life insurance investment activ-
ity since World War II has been the concentration in indus-
trial and commercial financing. Since 1945, when total 
holdings represented only 4.3% of assets, they have multi-
plied by more than thirteen times to stand at 22%, at the 
end of 1961. In the decades before the war, industry in-
vestment in industrials was nominal, and the tremendous 
growth in this area in the last two decades is essentially 
the result of a changing and expanding economy. 
Histo;x.--In the 1920's railroad financing dom· 
inated the corporate investment activity of the life com-
panies. In d1at period, the railroads were flourishing and 
in need of capital, and good yields were available on high 
grade railroad bonds. The attitude of the life companies 
was that a lien on real property represented the best 
security for loans rather than the current or prospective 
earning power of the company, so that railroad mortgage 
bonds were deemed the most attractive corporate securities. 
Although industrial expansion was on the rise, it did not 
approach the importance of industrial gr~1th seen in the 
recent past. Many industrial concerns sold stocks for 
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their external financing requirements, because of the ris-
ing pattern of prices generated by extensive public inter-
est in stock ownership; and, also, because of the advan-
tages incurred from the low corporate income tax rate then 
prevailing. 
During the depression decade of the thirties the 
corporate bond market shrank drastically, and there was 
very little demand for capital from private businesses. 
However, assets of the life insurance industry, because 
of the nature of its business, continued to grow at a 
steady pace in the face of economic adversity. The life 
companies bad an oversupply of funds available and would 
undoubtedly have desired to place them in industrial 
securities, but the amount wbich could be considered a 
proper investment risk was not adequate. These reasons, 
along with the fact that the direct placement technique 
was not fully developed, severely limited life insurance 
investment in industrial bonds, in the pre-war period. 
The indus try invested increasing percentages in U.S. Govern-
ment and public utility bonds. Industrial bonds increased 
from l. 9% of total assets in 19 SO to 5. 0% in 1940, although 
it was still far behind other asset categories. It was, 
however, the first time that these securities became of 
any significance in Ute portfolio, and this laid the ground-
work for the tremendous increase that was to follow. 
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During the war, the industrial demand for funds 
was again severely restricted with the capital market be-
ing dominated by the financial requirements of the federal 
government. As a result, the life companies had almost 
half their assets in u.s. Government bonds in 1945, and 
industrial bonds declined to 4.3~ of total assets. With 
the cessation of hostilities the situation reversed. An 
economic boom, unprecedented in the nation's history, be-
gan which resulted in heavy demand for capital from the 
private sector of the economy. '11le life companies began 
liquidating large amounts of their government securities 
in order to meet this demand and to obtain the higher re-
turns offered by corporate bonds, with the industry becom-
ing the leading supplier of long-term debt. Holdings of 
industrial bonds rose sharply from 1945 through 1954, 
both in dollar total and as a per cent of total assets. 
Growth as a per cent of assets bas leveled off since 1954 
although Chart IV-1 shows that the dollar total has in-
creased from $16.9 billion to over $28.6 billion during 
that period. Participation in these securities has been 
to such an extent that by the end of 1961 the $28.6 bil-
lion invested in industrial bands represented more than 
one-fifth of total assets, and more than one-half of the 
corporate bond portfolio. 
CHART IV-1 
DIDUSTRIAL BONDS HELD BY U.S. LIFE COMPANIES 
billions of dollars 
- 30.0 
i 22.5 
~· 15.0 
l?.S 
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CHART IV-2 
PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS HELD BY U.S. LIFE COMPANlES 
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CHART IV-3 
RAilROAD BONDS HELD BY U.S. LIFE COMPANIES 
billions of dollars 
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SOURCES, Charts IV-1, IV-2, and IV-3: Life Insurance 
Fact Book, 1962, PP• 79,80, 81. 
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The expansion of iuvestments in this area is a 
direct result, of course, of the continuing growth of the 
nation's industrial and commercial facilities. Another 
factor that helped to increase this investment activity was 
the amendment to the New York State Investment Law in 1928, 
which allowed the life companies to purchase debentures. 
This opened the way for extensive use of non-secured bonds 
in the field of industrial financing. Deterioration of 
traditional investment outlets, such as railroad bonds and 
mortgages, during the depression, led the industry, al-
though limited, into this field, with the full impact be-
ing felt starting in the Late forties. 
Industries.--Table IV-1 shows that investments 
are well diversified among the various industry groups. 
The life companies invest heavily in the securities of the 
chemical, rubber, plastic, petroleum, and machinery firms, 
with these firms accounting for almost half of the hold-
ings in manufacturing industries. They have contributed 
to the growth and benefited from the favorable financial 
experience of these industry groups, which have been vastly 
transformed by technological innovations and the introduc-
tion of an extensive array of new products. Many of these 
loans are to leading companies which have shown rapid 
rates of growth in the post~ar period. A good percentage 
TABLE IV .. l 
DISTRIBt.JTION OF DU>USTRlAL BONDS HELD BY 
U.S. LD'E INSUlWlCI COMPANIES 
(ill per cent) 
Manufacturing Indus tries 
Aircraft 
Automobile 
Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products 
Food~ Tobacco and Kindred Products 
Iron and Steel 
Machinery, Equipment and Supplies 
Nonferrous Metals 
Paper! Printi~,.PubliSbing and Allied Products 
Petro eum, Ref~, and Related Industries 
Textiles, Apparel and Leather 
Other MaDufacturiaa 
Non-Manufacturing Industries 
FiDance and Credit 
Retail Trade 
Services 
Transportation and Coaaunications 
Wholesale Trade 
Other Non-Manufacturing 
Total 
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book. 1962, p. 84. 
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67.3% 
0.2 
3.2 
10.0 
6.7 
6.1 
9.8 
4.3 
4.5 
12.2 
3.1 
7.2 
32.7% 
15.8 
5.3 
1.9 
6.3 
6.2 
3.2 
100.0% 
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of the petroleum financing is done on pipelines, service 
stations, and oil tankers backed by leases given by the 
major oil companies. At the end of 1962, John Hancock 
had 26% of its industrial securities invested in the oil 
industry and considers this an attractive investment out-
1 let. 
The impression was given that the major life com-
panies follow each other's investment activity closely, 
and any new practice on the part of one or a few will be 
watched for success or failure. As one investment officer 
put it--''We're in the hula-hoop business. If the fellow 
across the street makes a hula-hoop which is a success 
overnight, then naturally we're going to make hula-hoops 
to stay ahead in this business." It was reported that New 
York Life bas invested, to some extent, in bonds of foreign 
companies and that there may be increased activity in this 
area by the other life companies. 
The investment in non~nufaeturing industries, 
which was 32% of the industry total, is concentrated in the 
debt of finance and credit firms, the retail trade, and the 
service industries of transportation and communication. 
Sales finance companies, because of the extensive growth in 
1schedule of Investments, 1962, John Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance Company (Boston: 1963), p. 9. 
consumer credit, have turned to the life companies for 
their long-term financing needs. John Hancock, one of 
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the leading companies in this field, had 18.5% of its in-
dustrial securities in sales finance companies at the end 
of 1962. 1 There is an ample supply of this debt, and the 
life companies get the opportunity to participate in con-
sumer financing while maintaining a long-term position. 
One investment officer expressed the opinion that these 
companies have been seeking more funds in recent months 
because of the decline in interest rates. They would hope 
to borrow as much as possible before an upward trend be-
gins. Loans to airlines have been one of the major means 
of financing the changeover from conventional to jet air• 
lines and transports. The life companies were pioneers in 
this type of investment, and as of mid-1960 had provided 
more than half of the capital for the conversion to jets. 2 
Yields.--Life insurance funds have been attrac-
ted to industrial bonds because of the higher yields ob-
tainable, compared with other long•term debt. Table IV-2 
shows that the return achieved on industrial bonds by tbe 
life companies is higher and is increasing in recent 
2Institute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance 
Fact Book, 1962, p. 82. 
TABLE IV-2 
RATE OF INTEREST RETURN OH BOND_s.l EIGHTEEN 
LIFE IHSUlWICE CC»>PAHlES CUliUINEDa (i.a per cent) 
u.s. Industrial Year Govent• Ralls Uti.liti.es 
meucfs aad Mi.sc. 
1945 2.35 4.48 3.33 3.35 
1946 2.45 3.81 3.12 2.77 
1947 2.45 3.88 2.97 2.81 
1948 2.46 3.83 2.98 3.00 
1949 2.46 3.78 3.06 3.09 
1950 2.o53 3.77 3.03 3.06 
1951 2.43 3.64 3.02 3.14 
1952 2.51 3.88 3.05 3.26 
1953 2.55 3.76 3.09 3.40 
1954 2.50 3.94 3 .. 18 3.48 
1955 2.61 3.63 3.17 3.52 
1956 2.59 3.79 3.22 3.64 
1957 2.72 3.69 3.27 3.72 
1958 2.67 3.71 3.33 3.85 
1959b 2.93 3.78 3.41 4.02 
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a These campaaies accounted for 73% of assets of all u.s. 
Li.fe Iasurance Companies. 
b Obtained from Jgigt XmmatMPt 1&&11at:LD, No. 421. 
Source: ifint 9Y1fi"nt Bylll&;il, American Life Conven-
on a:n L e lnsuraace saociation, No. 380, 
Table 5. 
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years, when compared with that on public utility and U.S. 
Government bonds. These are the only other areas of long-
term debt (except for mortgages, discussed in Chapter V) 
which are in sufficient supply to interest the life com-
panies to any appreciable degree. At the present time, 
yields obtainable on high grade industrials is over 5% 
which is a substantial rise from the early post-war years 
when a life company was fortunate to get a 3%% bond. 
However, Chart IV-4 shows that yields on new direct place-
ments obtained by the life insurance industry has shown a 
declining trend throughout 1961 and 1962. This has been 
accompanied by heavier competition in the direct placement 
field than was in evident in the past, resulting in a bet-
ter market for the corporate borrower. 
Direct Placement.-~reat impetus bas been given 
to the acquisition of industrial bonds through the facil-
ity of direct or private placement. This technique may be 
defined as: 
. • • the sale of a security issue by direct nego-
tiation between the borrower and one or a limited 
number of lenders with or without the aid of an 
investment banker as agent; thus, the private 
placement differs from the public offering in that 
there is no intermediary wbo underwrites the issue, 
and there is no offering of the security to the 
general public.l 
1Arnold R. La Force, "Corporate Debt," Invest-
ment of Life Insurance Funds, ed. David McCahan (Phliadel-
pbla: university o! Pennsylvania Press, 1953), p. 163. 
CHART IV-4 
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This technique in many ways is unique to the life compan-
ies and is essential to their heavy investment in indus-
trial securities. 
The practice began to take on importance in the 
1930's stimulated by the passage of the Securities Act of 
1933, requiring that publicly issued securities be regis-
tered with the S.E.C. and that certain requirements be 
met. Issues offered to a limited number of investors was 
exempt from this; therefore, by placing their securities 
directly, corporations could avoid the reporting require-
ments and the delays and expenses involved. Seeking more 
satisfactory outlets for their funds, the life companies 
began to negotiate directly with large corporations, thus 
reducing the role of the investment banker. This prac-
tice has grown ever since and is the vehicle through which 
industrial bonds have become a significant portion of life 
insurance assets. The importance of direct placements is 
shown in Table IV-3. Almost all industrial bonds are ac-
quired in this manner. 
Direct negotiation bas considerable advantages 
for the life companies. It gives them the opportunity to 
allocate funds in advance of their actual receipt through 
the forward commitment process. They can usually receive 
a higher rate of interest than they could obtain by pur-
chasing the same security in the open market, because of 
Year 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
TABLE IV-3 
CORPORATE BONDS ACQUIRED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY 
BY '.l'WEBTY•EIGHT MAJOR LD'E IBSUIWfCE COMPANIES 
COMBINED 
(in per cent) 
llldustrial and Mise. Public Utility 
D:Lreet Nondirect Total Direct Nondirect Total 
83.1 16.9 100.0 34.5 65.5 100.0 
87.0 13.0 100.0 30.0 70.0 100.0 
95.7 4.3 100.0 33.4 66.6 100.0 
87.3 12.7 100.0 50 .• 2 49.8 100.0 
96.2 3.8 100.0 49.0 51.0 100.0 
93.7 6.3 100.0 68.4 31.6 100.0 
93.5 6.5 100.0 73.5 26.5 100.0 
94.1 5.9 100.0 74.5 25.5 100.0 
92.3 7.7 100.0 66.7 33.3 100.0 
94.0 6.0 100.0 76 .• 6 23.4 100.0 
96.6 3 .• 4 100 .• 0 81.8 18.2 100.0 
97.3 2.7 100.0 71.6 28.4 100.0 
93.2 6.8 100.0 67.6 32.4 100.0 
98.8 1.2 100.0 89.0 11.0 100.0 
96.4 3.6 100.0 76.4 23.6 100.0 
96.1 3.9 100.0 81.1 18.9 100.0 
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SOURCE: ;sztp f!Hstment Bul1etip, ALC and LIAA, No. 463, 
a e • 
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their bargaining position and the savings involved. Also, 
they establish closer relatioaShips with the borrowing 
corporation which frequently leads to additional business. 
The most distinct advantage of this method is its flex-
ibility. Both lender and borrower confront each other 
directly and can make their views known on any particular 
point. Agreements can be tailored to meet the requirements 
of both borrower and lender, and any changes to be made can 
be ironed out while negotiation is in progress and even 
after the loan has been made. This enables a life company 
to write protective provisions into the loan indenture, 
which would not be possible in the case of a publicly of-
fered issue. 
Protective Provisiona.••As long•term investors, 
the life companies stress the importance of safeguarding 
themselves from early refundiug of their corporate loans. 
They seek adequate call protection to avoid the possible 
loss of income t·esulting from reinvesting at lower yields, 
the inconvenience and cost of reinvestment, and the gen-
eral disruption of the portfolio. In a survey of fifty-
seven life insurance companies, fifty-four indicated that 
protection against early redemption at a low« interest 
rate was a factor "'of very much importance" in their in-
vestment policies with several stating that such 
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protection was second only to safety of principal and rate 
of return. 1 In the words of Victor B. Gerard, Treasurer, 
CODDOnwealth Life Insurance Company: 
Certain other large purchase;sof senior 
securities do not seem to view this call protec-
tion quite so seriously as does the institution 
of life insurance. Perhaps such institutional 
bond buyers have not yet suffered the agony of 
having a portfolio refunded from their grasp.2 
This did happen in times of falling interest rates, especi· 
ally in the public utility portfolio. 
Table IV-4 shows the trend towards more call pro• 
tection in the mid-fifties, when the life companies began 
to show greater concern because of past experiences and a 
rising pattern of interest rates. At present, most compan-
ies get what they consider to be adequate call protection 
on their industrials. If fact, they insist on it in direct 
negotiation. John Hancock trt,. to make all its industrial 
acquisitions non-callable for refunding at a lower inter-
est rate for at least one•half the life of the issue. 
The ability of a life company to incorporate 
many protective provisions in the loan agreement has seen 
1survele~fe lnsura,ce Com~ lnyestment 
Policies Towardgs Protec ion on~orate tionds, 
Aiir!can Ll!e Convention and tlfe Insuranci:Assoclatlon of 
America, Joint Investment Bulleti• No. 346 (New York: 
November 3, 1958), p. 5. 
2victor B. Gerard, "More Cell Protection Is 
Vital," American Life Convention, Proceedinfs of the 
Forty-Eiptb AllJlU8.1 Meeting (Chicago: 1953 , p. 295. 
TABLE IV-4 
BEFUBDDIG CHARACTERISTICS OF INDUSTRIAL AND MlSCEI..LANEOUS BONDS 
ACQUIBED BY FORTY ...SEVER LIFE IBSUIWICE COMPANIES 
(in per ceu.t) 
Year 
1953 1954 1955 1956 
Total industrial and miscellaneous bonds 100.0 100.0 ~00.0 100.0 
Nonrefundable at lower iatereat rate for 
life of bond: 28.3 38.5 28.7 31 .. 3 
Refundable after more than one year: 
1. At premium greater than ODe 
1.6 year's coupon 2.3 2.1 3.5 
2. At premium equal to or less than 
orae year • s coupon 21.8 17.1 21.5 33.8 
Refundable in one year or less: 
1. At premium greater than one 
year' s coupon 9.1 11.4 8.8 9.7 
2. At premium equal to or less than 
one year's coupon 38.5 31.5 38.8 21.6 
Source: Joint Investment Bulletin, ALC and LIAA, No. 346, p. 16. 
.. - -~--------- ·--
1957 
100.0 
38.1 
6.6 
42.3 
3.9 
9.0 
....., 
VI 
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a trend towards unsecured loans in the post-war period. 
The bulk of life insurance investing in industrials is 
now unsecured. They place the emphasis on the fu~re 
earning power and competitive position of an industrial 
enterprise, backed by protective restrictions, rather than 
relying on a lien on physical assets as the main form of 
security. 
The main protective provisions sought by a life 
company in bargaining with an industrial borrower include 
the restriction of dividend payments, limitation of addi· 
tional long-term debt, prevention of senior debt, mainten-
ance of working capital, and a sinking fund requirement. 
In order to insure a senior position in the debt 
structure of the borrowing corporation, it is often 
agreed that the assets of the debtor will not be pledged 
or mortgaged without at least equally securing the out-
standing debentures or notes and/or that additional long-
term debt will be incurred only in a specified amount or 
upon approval of the life company. This is known as the 
negative pledge. In cases where restrictions on dividends 
are deemed necessary, the usual provision freezes the 
debtor's past surplus, so that dividends or other distribu• 
tions on common stock can only be made from current or 
future earnings. Also, payments may be limited to a cer-
tain per cent of net earnings after sinking fund requirements 
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have been met, or may be prohibited when working capital 
falls below a certain point. To provide for amortization 
of the loan some sort of a sinking fund is ahiays sought. 
New England Life makes very few loans that do not require 
100% payout by maturity and John Hancock sets a minimum 
requirement of 66 2/3%, as seen in Table IV-5. This helps 
to improve the borrower's financial position, reduce the 
life company's risk, and avoid complete refinancing at 
maturity. A contingent sinking fund, calling for extra 
payments whenever earnings €ncceed a certain figure, may 
be set up when the borrower is in a weaker financial posi-
tion or in a cyclical industry. The nature of the bor-
rower's business also governs the use of provisions re-
garding the level of working capital to be maintained in 
relation to total long-term debt. 
Other provisions which are inserted when they 
seem appropriate to the facts of the individual case in-
clude restrictions and the right of approval on mergers, 
the first refusal clause (specifying that in the event 
the borrower desires additional long-term funds, he will 
first contact the company which made the original loan), 
restrictions as to the sale, or lease of assets without 
prior approval, restriction on investment in assets other 
than U.S. Governments, and limitation on the debt of sub-
sidiaries. The variety of protective covenants is limited 
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TABLE IV-5 
J<JIH BANCOCK HVlYA:L LD] lHSY!!)!CE COMPW SAP'm S'Wfi?:A!PS FOR BQJJP IJ!V!STMPIS 
Pro-Forma 
s 
T 
A 
N ~t Ratio 
D 
--- .. 
(000' s) .. .. - -
1. Interest t&!@s Earned: 
a. Last 5 Years 5 
* b. Last 10 Years 4 $ 
2. Interelf & S:f:slk&!l Fwd 
£11iis . 't'De<l: 
a. Last 5 Years $ 
b. Last 10 Years $ 
3. Ratio: Wor~Capital 
to F d Debt 1·2 $ 
4. Ratio: Net Property 
to Funded Debt 1-2 $ 
5. Ratio: Net TaDgible 
Assets 
to Fwded Debt 2 1/2 $ 
6. Ratio: Market Value 
of Equity to 
Funded Debt 2 $ 
*Common 
7. Ratio: Book Value of 
Equity 
to Funded Debt 1-2 $ 
8. Years to Maturity 20 
9. % Sinking Fund by 
Maturity 66 2/3 
*Price Range of COIIIDOll Stock (Traded) 
Source: Securities Department, John Hancock Mutual Life 
Insurance Compally. 
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only by opportunities available and the imagination of the 
investment staff. 
The degree and nature of the provisions will vary 
among different loans depending on the size of the corpora-
tion and the loan, the indust1~ concerned, and the com-
pany's financial and competitive position, all of which 
help determine the bargaining position of the borrower. A 
good amount of hard bargaining takes place in negotiating 
industrial loans, and many times there is some good old 
fashioned uhorse trading.u To receive a provision that a 
life company considers important it might have to yield on 
some other point, or accept a slight decrease in the inter-
est rate. 
Therefore, while industrial financing commonly 
takes the form of debentures or promissory notes, exclud-
ing liens on physical assets, it can be seen that the loans 
are adequately protected, being well cushioned by junior 
debt and equity capital, and often having the advantages 
and position tantamount to a mortgage bond. 
Incentive Financing.--Sometimes a life insurance 
company will use what is called "incentive financing. 11 
This is the term used for actual or contingent compensa-
tion through stock warrants or convertible issues, in addi-
tion to the fixed interest payments. The use of incentives 
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has been most common for corporations that fall into the 
following categories: 
1. New companies without established earn-
ings records but with good prospects. 
2. Companies in high•risk industries. 
3. Companies in new industries. 
4. Small companies with i.Dherent risk 
qualities stemming from such factors 
as lack of diversification. 
5. Sound companies requesting full loans, 
viz., loans in amounts larger than those 
suggested by an application of the tra-
ditional credit standard such as debt-
equity ratios. 
The life companies do not aggressively seek these 
''sweeteners,'' and for most companies is the exception rather 
than the rule in direct leading to industrial concerns. 
Even several companies active in this field reported that 
only about 10% to 15% of their direct industrial placement 
volume in 1959 was on an incentive basis, and several of 
the largest comp~nies have done little or no incentive 
1 financing at all. 
1cbarles M. Williams and Howard A. Williams, 
11 Incentive Financing: A New Opportunity," Harvard Business 
Review, XXXVIII {March-April, 1960), p. 134. 
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Many companies feel that they should not give a 
speculative aura to their investments by extensively ac-
quiring these features. In addition, they become more 
attractive only when the stock market is in a general up-
swing, and many times cannot be obtained except in periods 
of tight money. T11e larger corporations are reluctant to 
give them, and others often give them in lieu of a lower 
interest rate. In the words of one investment officer: 
We love to have ''sweeteners," but the loan 
must first stand on its own bWo feet as a proper 
risk. We can get warrants from the smaller cor-
porations but the strong ones will not give them 
to us. The yields on convertibles have been so 
low, and we don't want to gamble that the rise in 
prices will offset the interest lost. 
Another officer said that a distinct disadvantage to his 
company in the past was that by the time recommendation to 
the Finance Committee and the approval of the sale of such 
securities were made, most of the profit potential was al-
ready lost. 
Security Analysis.--In order to bargain effec-
tively, and select the best opportunities, a thorough 
analysis of the corporate borrower is necessary. Robert B. 
Patrick, Financial Vice President, Banker's Life Insurance 
Company, states that a sound program of security analysis 
sllould include: 
1. A thorough study of the indus try in 
which the company issuing the secur-
ity is engaged. 
2. An analysis of the company's position 
within the indus try. 
3. A comprehensive analysis of the com-
pany's financial operations. 
4. Capitalization, that is, the capital 
structure of the ca:apany. 
5. Research activities of the company, 
and 
6 • The record of management . 1 
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All the leading life companies maintain a secur-
ities department with a number of experienced officers and 
analysts, usually specializing by industry and/or type of 
security. The bulk of analysis is done on new proposals, 
with the investment staff being already familiar with 
corporations which are currently borrowing or have bor-
rowed in the past. The amount of repeat business is a very 
important part of the investment opea:ation. A company will 
often develop a close relationship with the corporate bor-
rower, following his activities while the loan is outstand-
ing. It will be anxious to lend additional funds to cor-
porations which have proven reliable through the years, 
and have good earnings records. Many of the outstanding 
1Robert B. Patrick, "Hanagement of 
surance Investment Portfolio," Investment of 
ance Funds, ed. David McCahan (Philadelphia: 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1953), pp. 58-59. 
the Life In• 
Life Insur-
Uiilverslty 
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loans of a major life company are those of large corpora-
tions which are leaders in their fields, and which are 
constantly seeking funds. 
The services and advice of investment bankers, 
cODIDercial bankers, other life companies, accounting firms, 
statistical services, technical and/or management consult-
ants, credit agencies, legal counsel, customers, competi-
tion, and suppliers are used from time to time in connec-
tion with specific investment proposals. The life compan-
ies remain in constant contact with the large investment 
banking houses and commercial banks, through which they 
receive many industrial proposals. 
Particieation.--All life insurance companies 
show a willingness to participate in industrial loans with 
other companies. This is often done in the case of large 
size loans where the risk can be spread among various com-
panies. The extent to which this practice is prevalent 
in the industry is indicated in Table IV-6, with the 
largest company, Metropolitan, leading all others in this 
field by a t~ide margin. Often the smaller and medium size 
companies are happy to have the larger ones do the '\'mrk of 
originating and negotiating the loan, and will participate 
if the terms satisfy their requirements. Through this 
method they can acquire loans which otherwise they would 
not be able to obtain. For twenty-six companies with 
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TABIX IV-6 
PARTICIPATIONS IN MULTIPlE-PURCHASED INDUSTRIAL ISSUES BY LIFE INSURANCE 
C<M>ANlES IN 1958 (FIHABCE CCIIP.AIIES OOTIED) 
Compa- Total 
nies Shared Nwlber or Participatiou with SmaJ J er Life Companies by the 
Ranked with Thirteen Largest Lite Companies • Ordered by Aaaet Size 
by Larger 
Asset Carapa-
Size nies 1 2 4 6 7 8 9 10 ll l2 13 
2 4 4 
3 8 6 2 
4 12 10 1 1 
s 12 5 2 3 2 
6 17 .3 4 1 3 6 
7 13 5 1 1 2 3 1 
8 10 3 1 1 1 4 
9 10 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 
10 26 7 3 1 1 9 2 1 2 
11 33 6 3 2 3 5 4 1 1 8 
12 30 7 1 3 5 9 2 1 1 1 
13 10 5 1 1 2 1 
14 9 3 1 2 2 1 
15 19 7 2 3 3 l 2 1 
16 lS 2 1 1 2 3 2 1 4 1 1 
17 19 4 1 2 4 4 1 3 
lS l2 3 1 2 3 1 1 l 
19 13 4 1 
-
4 1 1 2 
20 lS 1 l 1 3 5 l 3 
21 15 2 1 2 1 3 2 l 1 2 
23 l8 3 1 1 6 1 1 1 1 3 
24 l4 4 3 1 2 1 1 2 
25 7 2 l l l l 1 
27 5 2 2 1 
28 6 l 1 2 2 
29 ll 5 1 l 2 l 1 
30 9 3 1 1 1 3 
32 3 1 1 1 
35 4 1 1 1 1 
.36 7 3 2 2 
38 
-1 _. - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -Total 390 113 28 24 39 68 35 12 6 3 2l 10 22 9 
Total 
Issue a 139 22 14 8 15 20 14 6 3 3 lJ 6 9 6 
Average 2.8 5.1 2.0 3.0 2.6 3·4 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.6 1.7 2.4 1.5 
SOURCE: ~·~\:{f9!!!!l H C!llreterJI!S bz k!!S~ W'! Iattu:i19! 
CS!IIil:!'dte t P• • 
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assets between $100 million and $4 billion in 1958, the 
average ratio of participations with larger companies to 
total acquisitions was 47.7%. 1 
Most companies also engage, from time to time, 
in participation with commercial banks and pension funds. 
A commercial bank will sometimes contact a life company 
seeking an arrangement whereby it would do the short-term 
financing for one of its customers, and the life company 
would lend the necessary long-term funds. In such cases, 
John Hancock prefers to share proportionally with the 
banks in each maturity, although under certain conditions, 
the banks have been allowed to take the proportion of the 
loan maturing in early years. In either case, however, 
both the bank and John Hancock are co-equal, in proportion 
to the claim of each in the event of default. 
Small Business Financina.--The life insurance 
industry does very little industrial bond financing of 
small business. What sized company is considered to be a 
small business is relative, but, as a rule, the securities 
departments of the large or medium large life companies, 
which do the bulk of the corporate financing, will not be 
concerned with an individual loan under the $750 thousand 
lwalter, p. 16. 
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to $1 million range. Almost all the loans to smaller con-
cerns (as seen in Chapter V) are secured by mortgages, and 
handled by the Mortgage Loan Department. Table IV -7 shows 
that aLmost all the non~rtgage commercial and industrial 
loans by the industry are in amounts of over $1 million. 
Investment of $3.2 billion, in individual loans of over 
$1 million, was unsecured in 1956; as contrasted with a 
total of $690 million, in individual loans of over $1 mil· 
lion, which was secured. 1 Tbe ratio of loans falling be-
tween $1-to-$5 million was $510 million unsecured to $433 
million in mortgage loans, with all non-mortgage lending 
to industrial concerns totaling $3~391 million compared 
to $1,268 million in mortgages. 2 
There are numerous reasons why the industry does 
not develop a substantial volume of loans to small busi-
nesses. Many companies wish to avoid the speculative ele-
ment and greater risk that such lending would involve. 
The larger life companies generate such a large cash flow 
and have so many funds available, that large loans are far 
more desirable. Also, the large or medium-sized 
1Gordon W. McKinley, "Life Insurance Company 
Lending to Small Business," Journal of Finance, XVI (May, 1961), pp. 296-297. 
2Ibid. 
-
TABLE lV-7 
HOII-IC)R1'GAGI COMMD.ClAL AND lNDUSTIJAL LOANS BY LIFE DISlJIWtCE C<ICPANUS• 
BY SUE OF LC:W1• ltUMBE1l OF BODOWING OPI&ATIOHS. AND A.JOJHT AUl'HOlillZBD8 .. 
(AS PERCBNT OF TOTAL NUMBER AND TOTAL AJI>UNT) 
Size of Loan 
(in thousands 
of dollars) 1953 1954 
YEAR 
1955 1956 
Nuaber Amount NUIIlber Amount N\Dber Amount Jlwabe£ Amount 
Under $50 3 .. 0 b. 2.2 b. 0.8 b. 0.5 b. 
$ 50.$ 100 3.0 b.. 1.9 b. 2..1 b. 2.0 b .. 
$ 100 - $ 250 9.4 0..2 8.1 0.2 10.4 0.4 8.4 0.2 
$ 250 - $ 1,000 31 .. 5 2.9 32..8 3.9 29.9 3.6 24..4 2 .. 9 
$ 1,000 - • 5,000 31.5 12.6 37.5 1.S.9 33.7 17.0 36.6 15.1 
$ 5,000 - $10,000 9.0 8.0 5.2 8.0 9.6 11.2 9.9 9.5 
$10,000 aacl over 12.6 76.3 12.3 72.0 u.s 67.8 17 .. 2 72.3 
4 Covera sixty-seven life insurance companies which accountec:l for 771. of the assets of all life 
insurance companies in 1957. 
bLess than 0.05'1 
SOllRCI: JQurnal of finance, May, 1961, p. 297. 
00 
...., 
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corporations are more likely to meet the standards set 
down by the state laws. Life insurance companies operat-
ing under the New York Law are prohibited from making 
unsecured loans to unincorporated businesses, and invest-
ments must meet tests based on the corporate earnings dur-
ing several successive years prior to the acquisition of 
such securities, as seen in Chapter I. This in effect 
prohibits loans to new businesses. It is also felt that 
the needs of smaller concerns are often satisfied by com-
mercial banks. 
The life companies do not have sufficient in-
vestment staffs to analyze and service a large volume of 
smaller loans. On the whole, they do not feel that this 
type of investing is practical for them, or that the 
higher yield obtainable justifies the higher expense, 
greater risk, and a more complex organization. The only 
observed case of interes~ or aggressive lending in this 
area was the Commercial and Industrial Loan Department of 
Prudential Life. In 1956, Prudential departed from tradi· 
tional investment practice and established this depart-
ment, a branch office operation, to lend to medium and 
smaller size industrial corporations. All loans under 
$2 million are currently referred to this department, with 
over 40% of the loans in 1958 being under $500 thousand 
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and nearly two-thirds under $1 million. 1 However, it was 
only responsible for about 6% of Prudential's industrial 
bond investment in that year. 2 
Forward Commitments.--Because of the ability of 
a life insurance company to forecast its cash flow to a 
fairly accurate degree, it can agree to commit its funds 
many months in advance. A forward comnitment may be de-
fined as a binding agreement on the part of the company 
to lend a specified amount of money, at a given interest 
rate, for a certain number of years, within an agreed 
upon time period. 
A corporation will approach a life company in 
need of funds for future construction or some other pro-
ject. The terms of the loan will be negotiated and a 
definite date will be set, at which the corporat:lo n will 
begin to draw down the needed funds. This satisfied both 
parties in that the company can plan on maintaining a 
fully invested position, and the borrower will know that 
the funds will be forthcoming when required. 
Forward commitments will be geared to expected 
cash flow in the same period, and a company will try to 
lwalter, p. 114. 
2Ibid. 
Year 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
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RATIOS OF EXPECTED TAKED~1NS OF COMMITMENTS 
TO EXPECTED CASH FI.D<J or U. S. LlPE INSURANCE 
COMPANIES DURII«; ENSUING SIX MONTHS 
ln Millions of Dollars In Per Cent 
TakedO".ms of Ratio of Commit• 
Commitments cash Flow ments to Expected 
Quarter Expected in Expected in Cash Flow During 
lnded Sb Honths Six Honthsa insuing Six !fenths 
March 31 1,972 2,329 85 
June 30 1,892 2,434 78 
Sept. 30 1,822 2,400 76 
Dec. 31 1,721 2,110 82 
March 31 1,687 b b 
June 30 1,955 b i> 
Sept. 30 2,201 2,514 87 
Dec. 31 1,953 2,398 81 
March 31 1,969 2,507 79 
June 30 2,126 2,728 78 
Sept. 30 2,000 2,705 74 
Dec. 31 1,855 2,430 76 
March 31 1,965 25 472 79 
June 30 2,013 2,642 76 
Sept. 30 2,114 2,607 81 
Dec. 31 2,019 21543 79 
81xcludes sale of stcuri ties and adjuabaent for cash position. 
bane company did not provide projections of expected cash flow; ratios 
are based on data of companies reporting both commibDents and cash 
flow. The companies account for 561 of the assets of all life insurance 
companies. 
SOURCE: Life lgaurance Companies a• Financial Institutions. p. 189. 
maintain a committed position in order that funds will 
not be idle. Table IV-S shows that the percentage of 
commitments to expected cash flow, disregarding the sale 
of securities and other adjustments, for the next six 
months has been around 80~. New England Life estimated 
that it earned an extra $1 million for 1962, which is 
roughly 1% of its $102 million in investment income for 
that year, by improving its forward commitment ratio. 
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Forward commitments run anywhere from a month 
to 2i ~o 3 years, but committing after three years is 
unusual, except in certain cases. Time periods can vary 
depending on the policy and size of a company. At pres-
ent, New England Life has only $20 million of total com-
mitments of $150 million, committed for more than a year, 
while John Hancock is approximately 90% committed for the 
next two years. 
Public Utility Bonds 
The life insurance industry plays a major role 
in financing the nation's public utilities. The life 
companies accounted for about 2/Stlls of the entire long-
term financing of privately owned utility companies in the 
United States at end of 1961. 1 About half of the holdings 
1Institute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance 
Fact Book, 1962, p. 79. 
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are concentrated in the bonds of electric light and power 
companies, with nearly a quarter in gas utility and natural 
gas pipeline companies, a fifth in communication firms 
(mostly in issues of the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company or subsidiaries), and the rest in water supply and 
local transit. 1 
History.--The industrj began to invest in util-
ities on a large scale in the 1920's. Because of a pros-
pering economy and the promising fu~~re of electricity, 
the life companies were attracted to the securities of 
electric light companies. Again, in 1934, because of the 
decrease in safe investment outlets, tl1e industry began 
to channel a greater portion of its funds into these secur-
ities, with this continuing on to 1941. As a result, in 
both periods, utility bonds showed a marked increase as 
a per cent of assets, as seen in Table II-1. 
In the post-war years, the life companies have 
had the opportunity to invest heavily in the securities of 
natural gas utilities, as they financed a major share of 
the new pipeline construction which would carry natural 
gas from Texas and other Southwestern producing fields to 
the big cities of the East and Midwest. Table IV-9 shows 
the tremendous growth in this area in the early post-war 
1tbid. 
'lABLE IV-9 
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE BOND INVESTMEm'S OF ALL DOMESTIC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
IN SELECTED YEARS 
~ 
Pipeline Bonds Percentage of Total Natural Pipeline Bonds OWned by Gas Pipeline Outstanding U.S.Life Bonds Owaed by Year Insurance OUtstanding Life Insurance Companies Companies 
(iD ailllons 
of dollars) 
(ill 11111J.oDS 
of dollars) 
1945 170 318 53 
1949 975 1,211 81 
1950 1,130 1,452 78 
1955 1,884 2,920 65 
---~---------
Source: Finaacipg the Natural Gas Industry, p. 48. 
\0 
w 
94. 
years, as pipeline construction grew rapidly. 
The companies obtain security on these invest-
ments by lending only on the basis of proved gas reserves 
as established by geologia ts, and by req·uiring the pipeline 
companies to obtain firm long•term contracts to sell at the 
end of the line, which are backed by the sound credit 
standing of the distributing utilities. The depreciation 
charge on the pipelines usually provides more than enough 
cash to pay the required sinking funds, which further 
strengthens the position of the bonds. 
Almost all of these bonds are acquired through 
direct placement, with the life insurance industry being 
the major market for them. This is because of the special-
ized and technical nature of the investment and the large 
size of these issues, which is necessitated by the exten-
sive work involved. Because of their position, the life 
companies can write in manr protective provisions similar 
to those used in industrial bonds, and generally can get 
far better call protection than is the case in other util-
ity bonds. 
They are also attracted to these issues because 
of their superior yields when compared with other utility 
issues. For two major life companies, New York Life and 
Phoenix Mutual, there was a constant differential between 
yield on natural gas pipeline issues and the rest of the 
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public utility portfolio, with the former averaging close 
to SO% above the latter, for the period from 1947 to 1958. 1 
Importance.-·Altbough holdings of public utility 
bonds reached a record total of $17.J billion at the end 
of 1961, they have been declining in importance in the 
corporate bond area. Beginning in the early 1950's, when 
utilities representee 16% of total assets, they have de-
clined steadily to stand at 13.4% at the encl of 1961. The 
supply of utility bonds is not as great as that of indus-
trial securities, but also, these bonds, especially elec-
tric light ~id power companies, have become less attractive 
to the life companies. 
T11e result of a survey of life insurance compan-
ies in 1958, when this trend had definitely been estab-
lished, is contained in Table IV-10. Their answers to the 
question 'tif the trend in your holdings of public utilities 
bas been downward, what are the reasonG therefor?r' point 
up the major reasons for this decline. 
While the life companies find public utility 
issues a reliable outlet for their savings, the lower yields 
on these bonds, because of the lower degree of risk, makes 
TABLE IV-10 
SUMMARY OF REASONS GIVEN BY THIRTY-SIX LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
FOR DOWliJARD TREND IN INVESTMEN'.r IN PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS 
~--
Uuattractive Portfolio Unsatisfactory Other 
Yield Balance Refundiag Reascms Protection 
Primary reason 1 2 5 
-
DcaiDillt reason, 
but other reasons 
also cited 10 3 10 2 
Cited as important, 
but subsidiary to 
another reason 7 7 13 4 
Cited as of equal 
importaD.ce with 
one other reason 3 2 3 
-
Cited as of equal 
importance with 
two other reasons 2 2 2 
-
Source: Joint Investment Bulletin, ALC and LIAA, No. 436, p. 2. 
\0 
C\ 
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them somewhat less attractive than the obligations of in-
dustrial, cODDercial, and other enterprises. The compan-
ies feel that higb•grade directly acquired industrial bonds 
satisfy their risk standards, while returning a better 
yield. Another major reason is the high degree of regula-
tion exercised over public utilities by the Securities 
and Exchange CODIDission and the Federal Power Commission, 
resulting in a large amount of public offerings, and the 
inability of the long-term investor to receive what the 
life companies consider to be adequate call protection. 
Under the provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act of 1935 these authorities control the redemption fea-
tures in the bond issues of utilities coming under their 
jurisdiction. They have generally required that bonds 
be callable at any time, and that the call premium be lim· 
ited to one interest coupon above the offering price, so 
that the utilities could obtain lower financing costs, and 
thus lower the cost of service to their customers. 
The life companies have been burt on previous oc-
casions through wide scale refunding of their public util• 
ity holdings. During the war, the utilities took advantage 
of the lower interest rates and called many of their bonds 
for refinancing purposes. In 1945 alone, $1.3 billion in 
the industry's portfolio was redeemed, which was about one-
quarter of the total owned at the beginning of the 
98 
year. 1 New England Life received more cash from refund-
ing of these issues in that year, than it did from any 
other source, in any siugle year of its existence. Again, 
in 1953, the sharp decline in interest rates in the second 
half of the year, led to the calling of a number of elec-
tric utility bonds, which had been offered earlier in the 
year. Since then, the life companies have attached spe-
cial importance to obtaining protection against the call 
of bonds which they hold. 
This is one of the reasons why they have pur-
chased a large amount of utilities through the direct 
route, generally avoiding the public issues, as seen in 
Table IV-3. The utilities will be reluctant to give a 
life company any concessions, if they can obtain their 
funds in the public market at better terms, because of 
federal regulation. This undoubtedly restricts life in• 
surance investment activity in this area. In connection 
with the preceding survey, investment officers of thirty-
eight companies indicated directly or by implication that 
a larger amount of utilities would have been acquired if 
there bad been more satisfactory protection against early 
1Institute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance 
Fact Book, 1947 (New York: Institute of Life Insurance, 
1947), p. 59. 
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refunding of such issues. 1 Both John Hancock and New Eng-
land Life will only purchase these issues if they can re-
ceive refunding protection on them. At the present time, 
New England Life is deciding on what policy it will have 
on telephone issues, which were acquired five to seven 
years ago, and which are now becoming c~llable. Recently, 
the company sold a large telephone issue in anticipation 
that it would be called, which is exactly what happened. 
Railroad Bonds 
l!fortance.•-Life insurance holdings of these 
securities have declined from over a third of total assets 
in the early 1900's to an insignificant 2.8% at the end of 
1961. Table 11•1 shows that from 30.5% of total assets in 
1917, railroad bonds declined steadily in importance to 
wbere they fell under 10% for the first time in 1940, and 
at present they are the least important asset category, 
with the exception of Foreign Government bonds and farm 
mortgages. Total acquisitions of railroad bonds was only 
$69 million in 1961 and Chart .IV. ·3 shows that they have 
decreased in total dollar amount since 1955. 
Po lie 
p. • 
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A main reason for this bas been the small supply 
of these securities, which is a result of the declining po-
sition of the railroad industry. The supply of railroad 
obligations bas decreased about 25% in the period from 
1925 to 1960, while the supply of other types of bonds has 
multiplied many times over. 1 At the end of 1925 life insur-
ance holdings of rail obligations amounted to $2.2 billion 
and at the end of 1960 were $3.7 billion--an increase of 
about 68%; this increase in OWDersbip of a shrinking supply, 
has placed the life companies in a position where they held 
44% of publicly outstanding railroad debt in 1960 as 
against only 19% in 1925. 2 Therefore, it can be seen that 
the life insurance industry is still a major supplier of 
funds to the railroads, as it bas always been. 
Rising internal costs and intensified external 
composition bas resulted in steadily declining earnings for 
the railroads, a trend which the industry has been power-
less to reverse. The railroads were earning a relatively 
high rate of return following World War I wben they were a 
vital factor in the economy, but the rate of return of the 
1Robert s. Macfarlane, "What's Ahead for the 
Railroads," American Life CoRVention, Proceedinas of the 
Fifty•Sixtb Aunual Meeting (Chicago: 1961), p. 441. 
2Ibid. 
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rail industry bas dropped from around 5% in the mid-1920's 
to less than 3% during recent years. 1 They have been hurt 
by a decline in passenger traffic, by inroads which trucks 
and other competitors have been making on freight traffic, 
which is the backbone of railroad earnings, and by steadily 
increasing expenses. Tbeae factors, along with the high 
bankruptcy rate of the 1930's, have impaired the railroad 
credit and made many traditioaal methods of fiD&Dcing un-
safe, thus largely precluding aooequipment debt financing. 
§suipm!nt Obligatioas.--The vast majority of 
railroad financing is done through equipment obligations--
either equipment trust certificates or conditional sales 
contracts. Equipment obligationa are those secured by ex-
clusive reservation of title to tbe rolling stock for the 
acquisition of which they are issued. It is often done 
under a lease arrangement whereby the lender holds title 
and leases the equipment to the railroad until final pay-
ment is made. If the railroad defaults the lender has the 
right to ;&possess and sell the equipment. The equipment, 
rolling stock of the railroad, can easily be moved by rail 
to any part of the country and is readily marketable. Be-
cause of the preference for this type of financing the 
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yields are relatively low, and thus many life insurance 
companies consider these investments "too rich for our 
blood,'' and cbamael their funds into higher yielding in-
vestments, in other asset categories. 
CHAPTER. V 
Real estate mortgages have always played an im-
portant part in the investment activity of the life insur-
ance industry. In the 1920's and early 1930's they rep-
resented the largest major category of assets. Since that 
time mortgages have been a close second to corporate bonds 
as the most important investment category. The growth of 
real estate mortgages as compared with that of business 
securities (includes stocks) and other assets is shown in 
Chart V•l. Mortgages and corporate bonds, including indus-
trial, public utility, and railroad issues account for 74% 
of all assets at present, and are the two categories with 
which the investment staff of an average life insurance 
company devotes almost all of its time and effort. 
History 
Mortgage holdings have varied considerably as a 
percentage of total life insurance assets over the last 
forty-five years, which can be seen from Table II-1. In 
the 1920's the industry bad 40% of its total assets in-
vested in real estate mortgages, because of the high level 
of construction activity and a prospering and growing 
- 104 -
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economy. The depression of the 1930's had a drastic im-
pact on the mortgage market and on the participation of 
life insurance companies in this type of investment. With 
the decline in income and property values, the life compan-
ies had to foreclose on many loans as defaults became wide-
spread. As a result, they found themselves reluctant 
owners of an ascending stock of both urban and farm real 
estate with real estate holdings rising from $548 million 
in 1930 to $2,065 million in 1940, an. increase of almost 
300%. 1 Especially hard hit by the unfavorable economic 
conditions was tbe farming community. In the space of ten 
years, from 1929 to 1939, total holdings of farm mortgages 
dropped from $2.1 billion to $889 million, or from 12.0% 
of total assets to 3.0% of total assets, never again to be-
come an import.-'lnt part of life insurance investment. 2 
From 1930 to 1935, total mortgage holdings dropped from 
$7.5 billion to $5.3 billion, declining from 40.2% to 
23.1% of total assets. 3 
1Institute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance 
Fact Book, 1961, p. 66. 
2Life Insurance Association of America, Life 
Insurance Companies as Financial Institutions, p. ~ 
3Institute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance 
Fact Book, 1961, p. 66. 
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After 1935, mortgage investment started to climb 
again, but only at a slow pace. Therefore, with an in• 
crease in total assets, reflectiP& a constant growth in 
sales of life insurance, the percentage of mortgages to 
total assets kept declining. and at the end of 1945 totaled 
ouly 14.8%, the lowest per cent that real estate mortgages 
have ever been. However, with the strong demand for real 
estate created during World War II, the life companies 'vere 
able to sell a. great percentage of the real estate which 
they acquired through foreclosures during the depression. 
Thus, the amount of real estate owned by life insurance 
companies declined frOID $2 billion in 1940 to $73;) million 
in 1946.1 
In the post-war period, life insurance investwcnt 
in mortgages expanded considerably. \.;J.th tbe rise in bouse• 
bold formations, the rise in family income, and an increase 
in the birth rate, the demand for loana greatly increased. 
The life insurance industry became one of the major finan-
cial institutions which satisfied this demand. The life 
companies participated heavily 1n all the post-war housing 
and construction booms. with mortgage holding$ rising from 
a total of $6.6 billion in 1945 to $47.0 billion at the end 
of 1962. 2 As funds became available from liquidation of 
1Ibid. 
-
2"Real Estate Credit," Federal Reserve Bulletin 
XLIX (March, 1963), p. 372. 
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the heavy portfolio of U.S. government securities, which 
had been built up during the war, tl1ey were quickly chan-
neled into corporate bonds and mortgages. Mortgages once 
again achieved a position of prime importance in the in-
vestment portfolio. They have shown a steady increase in 
dollar amount in recent years, wbicb can be seen from 
Table V-3; but their rate of growth has slowed down. They 
grew rapidly as a per cent of total assets from 1946 to 
1956, and since that time have leveled off to stand at ap-
proximately 34% in recent years. 
Advantages 
The advantages of real estate mortgages as an 
outlet for life insurance funds are summed up by L. Douglas 
Meredith as follows: 
1. Abundant security in the form of real 
property and debt•paying capacity of 
the debtor. 
2. Attractive income, depending, of course, 
upon the relative condition of the 
mortgage market and other investment 
markets. 
3. Attractive maturities. 
4. The possibility of high geographic di-
versification. 
5. High di versificatioo of c:redi t risks. 
6. A high degree of liquidity which in 
former years has aot been an at-
tribute of mortgqe loans. 
7. Funds invested iu 110rtgage loans are 
directed, geurally speaking, to 
highly coa.andable purposes which 
contribute to elevation of1the na-tion's staadard of livilll· 
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Securitx.-~tgaaes provide considerable secur-
ity for lJ.fe insurance funds. In appraising the property, 
the appraiser will typically allow a margin of safety by 
estillating its value below 11bat the market would probably 
set. Lhd. ts are set by state law on the amount a company 
can lend agaillst the appraised value on non-guaranteed or 
aon•insured loans, with the hi.Pst limit set at 75% on 
residential loans and lower on commercial properties by 
the New York law (see Chapter I) • A mortgage g1 ves the 
c<apany a lien on tbe property, which is the ultimate 
security behind the loan. This eubles the company or its 
correspondent to take possession and sell the property in 
the case of default. Furthermore, loans are made to debt• 
ora who satisfy the company about their ability to meet 
future payments baeed on their i'DCome and financial position. 
1L. Douglas Meredith, "Real Estate Mortgages,!' 
Investment of Life Iaaurance Fuada, ed. David McCid.l&n (Fillideipoli: Uiilverslty Of Pemasylvania Press, 1953), 
p. 163. 
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Diversification.•-Geographical diversification 
of the mortgage portfolio enables the life companies to 
reduce the risk involved. They can concentrate on areas 
enjoying the most rapid rates of growth, and most favor-
able economic conditions. A smaller percentage of funds 
can be channeled to areas or cities which appear to have 
achieved ecoaomic maturity, or do not show a favorable 
growth rate. The large life companies have mortgage hold-
ings scattered throughout the country, concentrating on 
the most populous and most rapidly growing areas. They 
have invested a good percentage of funds in recent years 
in the more rapidly growing areas of the West and South-
west. Table V•l shows that these states have received a 
greater percentage of mortgage loans from the life insur-
ance indus try, than their perceatage of total funds saved 
through life insurance. The life companies act as inter-
mediaries channeling savings from the rest of the nation, 
especially the populous Northeast, into these areas. For 
the year 1962, John Hancock reported that it made 18.7% of 
its non-farm mortgage loans in california, 8.4% in New 
Jersey, 7.8% in Texas, 7.7% in New York, which were the 
leading areas for the company's new loans. Concerning 
mortgages on single family homes, California was in first 
place, Texas ran a close second, and Florida was third. 
TABLE V-1 
COMPARISOII CJl MOR'MAGE BOLDDCS C1f U.S. LIFE DISURANCE COMPAIIIES 
Wl'm LIFE lBSURANCE D FORCE Dl SELECTED STATES AT mE END OF 
1960 
Life Iasuraaee ~er Ceot of Life Insurance Jer Cnt of 
Mortaase Bold· Total Life 1D. Total Life 
State ~s lasuraace Force Iasurance 
(m111ioas of Mora:• (llilliODS of Ia 
dollar:s) Bo1 s dollars) Force 
ca11fond.a $5,457 13.3'%. $54,291 9.31 
Texas 4,349 10.6 28,271 4.8 
Six Westen States: 
Colorado $ 765 $5,813 
Itaasas 609 6,118 
Mlasouri 1,033 13,604 
Oklaboaaa 723 6,184 
<>:: 451 4,943 w . iDgtoD 918 7,985 
Total Six States !1,.221 lJ.,Q 44.883 7.6 
Total $14,308 34.9% $127,445 21.7"4 
Total u.s. $41,041 100.0% $586,448 100.04 
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book1 1962, p.89; and Life Insuraace Fact Book1 1961, p.to. ,.... ,.... 
,.... 
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In addition to geographical diversification there 
is a wide diversity of family incomes and occupations back• 
ing the properties against which residential loans are made, 
and a similar diversity among industrial and business con-
cerns backing commercial loans. 
Yields.••However, the main attraction for life 
insurance companies is the net yield available on real es-
tate mortgages. The rate of return obtained on mortgages 
compares favorably with the return on their other long-term 
investments in a similar risk category. This is shown in 
Chart v-2, Where the net return achieved on life insurance 
mortgage investment is compared to the net interest earned 
on industrial bonds. The industrial bond category gives a 
higher rate of return than other long-term debt and is the 
chief competitor of mortgages, in the allocation of funds 
by the Finance COIIIDittee. 
Mortgage Oraanization 
Heavy investment in real estate mortgages necessi-
tates the use of an active field organization to originate 
and service the loans. This may be effected through: 
(l) mortgage loan correspondents, (2) branch offices main-
tained and operated by the company, ( 3) a combination of 
1 and 2, and (4) direct operation of the home office. The 
CHART V-2 
NF;T YIELD ON REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES AND IN'IEREST EARNED ON INDUSTRIAL BONDS 
OF U.S. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANJES 
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correspondent system of obtainiug and servicing loans 
means that a life insurance company has a contract or ar-
rangements with outside companies or individuals called 
"correspondents," whereby loan proposals are brought to 
the attention of the home office. Under the branch of-
fice system, which is administered by company employees, 
offices are established in selected cities, with the re-
sponsibility for originating and servicing loans in a 
specified region. 
Practices.--Tbere is considerable variety among 
life insurance companies as to the method they use to ac-
quire mortgage loans. Obviously, direct acquisition of 
all or a great percentage of loans by the home office is 
ruled out, except for small companies which only lend over 
a certain area. Many of the larger companies rely solely 
on a correspondent relationship or a branch office opera-
tion, with many employing a combination of these. How-
ever, most companies rely heavily on a correspondent opera-
tion. 
A survey of ninety-one life insurance companies 
in 1962, which accounted for 87~ of assets and 86% of non-
farm mortgages held by all U.S. Life insurance companies, 
showed that twenty-six companies, each with a mortgage 
portfolio of over $100 million, accounting for 50.2% of 
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the total ninety-one company portfolio, had a correspond-
ent operation (the twenty-six companies were divided into 
eighteen with portfolios ranging between $100 million and 
$500 million which accounted for 14.1%, and eight compan-
ies with portfolios over $500 million accounting for 36.1%); 
there were twenty-seven companies in the $25 million to 
$100 million range and six companies with portfolios under 
$25 million having a correspondent setup, but these groups 
accounted for only 4.2% and .3% respectively; only three 
companies with portfolios of over $100 million bad a branch 
office operation, but they accounted for 29.3% of the total 
portfolio; eeven companies with portfolios of over $100 mil-
lion bad a combination of correspondents and branch offices 
and accounted for 11.2% of the portfolio; those companies 
with a correspondent-home office operation were seven, with 
portfolios under $25 million and accounting for 12%, and 
ten with portfolios over $25 milllon and accounting for 3.2%; 
five companies accounting for ouly 1.4% of the total port-
folio had a strictly home office operation. 1 It should be 
noted that although a company will employ one of the above 
systems, it may use the other system in a certain area or 
1
"city Mortgage Lending Income and Costs of Life 
Insurance Companies, 1961," AI£ and LIAA, Joint Investment 
Bulletin, No. 466 (New York: October 23, !962), pp. 2-3. 
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for certain types of loans. Often a company will accept 
loans from independent brokers if the conditions satisfy 
its requirements. If the broker is in a correspondent's 
area, he will usually have to work with or through the cor-
respondent. 
Correspondents.--Tbe correspondent method pre-
sents a greater degree of flexibility to a life insurance 
company. A company can enter into newer and more promis-
ing sections of the country more readily by making arrange· 
ments with real estate firms or mortgage brokers, who are 
already familiu with the territory, rather than training 
new personnel or shifting others. Correspondents can usu-
ally adjust better to difficulties encountered in seasonal 
or cyclical periods when the demand for loans may be down. 
Many correspondents have a diversity of operations which 
include the managing of real estate, selling of real estate, 
and operating general insurance agencies, with many acting 
as sub-dividers, builders, SDd fee appraisers. In addition 
most of them represent several investors which makes it 
more likely that they will have a steady market for mort-
gages. In contrast, the mortgage loan department and 
branch offices, set up for the sole purpose of originating 
and servicing the company's loans, represent a fixed cost 
which would mean an increase in the expense per loan, as 
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total volume declined. 
Permanent arrangements are made with selected 
correspondents in various areas and a verbal agreement is 
made or a formal contract is drawn up between the two par-
ties. Robert B. Patrick reviews the essential provisions 
inserted in the contract. They include the following: 
l. 
2. 
3. 
The correspondent agrees that be will 
endeavor to procure loans of a type and 
on a basis that will meet the investor's 
policy requirements. In return, the in-
vestor agrees as far as possible to pur-
chase such loans as meet his requirements 
at prices and 011 terms to be furnished 
the correspondent from time to time. 
The correspondent is, as a rule, free to 
represent other investors in the same 
area, and the investor reserves the 
right to be represented by other corres-
pondents. In other words, such contracts 
are usually not exclusive. 
The correspondent agrees to service each 
loan sold1 for which the investor agrees to pay a s:ee. This service normally in-
cludes: 
a. The maintenance of an adequate local 
office for the collection of payments 
and the transaction of other business 
with the borrower. 
b. The use of due diligence to enforce 
the covenaats of the loan afreement, 
including collections of de inquencies 
and the assistance and cooperation 
in any legal effort required to en-
force these covenants or to effect 
collections .. 
c. Periodic inspection of property secur-
ing the loans and the reporting of im-
portant infor-mation learned as a result 
of such inspections. 
d. The maintenance of adequate insur-
ance, accounting and tax records. 
4. The contract may be ~celled at any 
time by either party. 
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The relationship is rarely exclusive, and the 
company reserves the right to cancel the contract at any 
time. This is done so that the company will always have 
the choice of who will represent it, and who will look 
after the loans outstanding. The fact that a correspond-
ent represents other investors in the same area means that 
he will not necessarily be an agent of the company for the 
acquisition of loans, but once the company accepts the 
loan and it is placed on the books as a company asset, the 
correspondent becomes an agent with regard to servicing 
the loan. 
In the process of originating mortgage loans, a 
correspondent will report all the data necessary about the 
property, the borrower, and the locality to the home office 
for evaluation and decision on the loan proposal. This 
will include tbe loan application made out by the borrower, 
which gives detailed information on the property, his in-
come, employment, assets, and liabilities and the desired 
terms of the loan; a legal description of the property; 
1Robert B. Patrick, "Servicing Mortgage Loans " 
Best's Insurance News: Life Edition, XLI (Fe&ruary, 1%1), 
p. 6:J. 
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the appraised value of the property; photographs; and an 
appraisal of the loan. The originating activities of a 
mortgage loan correspondent are described by Frank Shugrue, 
Vice President, Banker's Life Insurance Company, as fol-
lows: 
• • • I am sure that we are all familiar 
with the circumstances surrounding the birth of 
a mortgage loan, but let us review it. Rela-
tively few mortgagors walk into a correspond-
ent's office and apply for a loan. More often 
than no~, the application submitted to an in-
vestor is the result of considerable "bush beat-
ing" by a solicitor. In originating the appli-
cation he may have contacted an architect who 
gave his client's name to several mortgage 
solicitors. He may have gotten the lead from a 
builder. Be may have been following the transfer 
of lots in a desirable area and called a new lot 
purchaser. He may have followed a surveyor's 
truck to see what lots were being surveyed for 
new homes or possibly a real estate broker told 
him that he had made a sale. In any case, when 
the contact was made with the applicant a cer-
tain plan must have been offered, an amount 
estimated, a rate quoted, and financing costs 
figured. These est;imates must have been made 
with an investor's pr.ram in mind. Before an 
application results the applicant bas probably 
talked to two or three other mortgage people in-
cludibg a savings and loaa association and prob-
ably a bank. If our solicitor gets the applica-
tion, processing starts--an appraisal must be 
made, credit information secured, pictures taken, 
and various forms filled out. Tben it must be 
sent off to the investor for further processing. 
More often than not the time which has elapsed 
between first contact and actual submission may 
be a week or two. This is a conventional loan. l 
lrrank R. Shugrue, ''Mortgage Correspondents, 
Appraisers 1 and Investors," American Liie Convention1 Pro-ceed~& o:r: the Fiftieth Annual Meeting (Chicago: 1~55)";'" 
pp. -373. 
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From the above discussion it can be seen that 
the correspondent plays a vital part in the mortgage in-
vestment activity of a life insurance company. He is 
delegated the authority and responsibility of originating 
and servicing the loans. A ccxapany will depend on him to 
bring attractive and worthy proposals from his area to the 
company's attention. The main thing a correspondent must 
do is to became familiar with the preferences of the par-
ticular company. A typical company will have a long and 
close relationship with most of its correspondents, making 
this possible. As proposals flow into his office, the 
correspondent will contact the iuvestor whose investment 
requirements each proposal would most closely meet. If a 
correspondent is "on his toes" and submits an attractive 
proposal with a thorough analysis, it is often accepted 
with minor modifications. 
Although the correspondent system is more flex-
ible than a branch office system, a life insurance company 
will be reluctant to withdraw 110rtgage funds from its cor-
respondents on any large seal~, if it expects to do business 
in the future, and wishes to maintain the loyalty of the 
correspondent. This is a factor that would tend to restrict 
any sharp decline in the mortgage activity of the life com-
panies. The following statement by Frank R. Shugrue re-
flects this: 
• • • We, as investors, expect loyalty 
from our correspondents. Correspondents are a 
necessary part of our team. It is incumbent on 
us to give the same loyalty which we expect. 
We all k.aow that under some circumstances it is just about impossible to avoid a withdrawal from 
the market. • • • Nevertheless, each investor 
owes his correspondents the time it takes to 
hesitate and plan a program1 to estimate the run-
offs, to gauge the &1110UD.t OJ: new money which will 
be available for tnvestmeat and to determine how 
the money is to be invested. If it is decided 
that some percentage of these funds are to be put 
into mortgages they should be allotted to faith• 
ful correspondents on acae reasonable basis. 
When withdrawal from the aarket is indicated 
ample notice should be Jd.ven to the correspondent 
so that processi.Dg cau lie a~1 at the "retail" level,••Tbese remarks about p ng investments 
may seem fundamental. They are. 
Dtsadvgtages 
Cost.••Tbe need to maintain an active field 
-
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force points up a disadvantase of mortgage loans as an in• 
vestment, which is their relatively high cost. The cor-
respoudent must be paid for hia services and a home office 
department must be maintained to supervise the mortgage 
loan operation and to maintain adequate records on all 
loans outstanding. For ninety-one companies, holding 86% 
of total life insurance mortgages, mortgage investment 
costs totaled .47% on a gross iacome of 5.14% in 1961; this 
1 Ibid., pp. 373-374. 
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was comprised of .23% in servicing fees, .15% in home of-
fice expenses; • 02% in originating fees and premiums, and 
.08%in branch office expenses. 1 From Chart V-3, it can 
be seen that the cost experience bas improved since the 
early post-war years when in 1947 costs amounted to .• 88%. 
The main reasons for this bas been a decrease in o~iginat­
ing fees, as the size of tbe average loan and total volume 
grew larger, thus reducing the cost per loan; and a de-
crease in home office expenses reflecting greater economy 
of operation and increased automation. Total costs, how-
ever, have remained at a fairly constant percentage in re-
cent years. 
Whereas, the acquisition and servicing of corpo-
rate bonds can be handled by a number of officers and 
analysts in addition to a clerical staff, resulting in an 
insignificant expense, the mortgap department must be 
careful to control its costs of investment. The gross rate 
on a mortgage loan must be hip enough to allow for this 
additiOIUll expense. Therefore, a mortgage must offer a net 
return at the time of purchase wbicb compares favorably 
with the interest rate that can be obtained on corporate 
1
"City Mo~age Lend~ Income and Costs of 
Life Insurance Comp es, 1961, '' p. 17 • 
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bonds of comparable quality and maturity. 
Foreclosure.--Anotber disadvantage of mortgages 
is the problem of foreclosure. The expenses of foreclos-
ing loans include court and legal fees, and the loss of 
interest and possible damage to or neglect of the property 
during the period of foreclosure. When property is acquired 
through foreclosure the problem of real estate management 
and liquidation iDDediately arises, and this became a crit-
ical problem during the depression. Probably more important 
to a life insurance company ls the possible adverse public 
relations involved in such acts as seizing property and 
evicting or threatening to evict persons from their homes. 
The percentage of delinquent and foreclosed loans to total 
mortgage loans is shown in Table v-2. As would be ex-
pected, delinquencies and foreclosures are far greater on 
FHA and VA loans than on conventional loans. The fore-
closure rate on conventional loans,. which is the only sec-
tion where there could be any possible loss, was .08% of 
total loans outstanding at the end of September, 1962. 
Although mortgages have certain disadvantages, 
the foregoing discussion shows that the advantages of at-
tractive yield and security far outweigh their disadvant-
ages for life insurance companies. 
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TABLE V•2 
!l>a'.tGAGE LOAN DELINQUENCY AND fORECLOSURE IXPBRUNCI 
OF U. S. LIFE INSUBANCE COHfANIZ:Sa 
PER CENT OF TOTAL AMOUNT OUTSTANDING 
DELINQUENT LOANS LOANS IN FO:UCLOSURE 
TYPE or LOAN 9/30/61 6/30l62 9/30/62 9/30l61 6l30/62 9/30/62 
CITY t(W!S (TOTAL) • 66 .65 • 74 .11 .13 .13 
lilA Insured .92 1.02 1.03 .19 • 25 • 23 
Section 608 .83 1.66 .so .06 .10 .03 
Title VIII • .08 .12 • .04 .os 
Other .95 .99 1.10 • 20 .26 • 26 
VA Guaranteed .98 .93 1.04 .16 .18 .17 
Section 501 • 99 .93 1.04 .16 .18 .17 
Section SOS .73 .63 .80 .03 .07 .os 
Other • • • 
Canadian NHA .51 .56 1.03 .15 .16 • 24 
Conventional .44 .41 .53 .06 .06 .08 
FABM LOANS (TOTAL) .31 .44 .28 .06 .06 .05 
VA. Guaranteed .03 .07 .12 .. 
-
.03 
Other .31 .44 .28 .06 .06 .os 
Total Loans .63 .63 .70 .11 .12 .13 
I'BA Insured .92 1.02 1.03 .19 • 25 • 23 
VA Guaranteed • 98 .93 1.03 .16 .18 .17 
Canadian NHA .51 .56 1.03 .15 .16 • 24 
Other .43 .42 .so .06 .06 .o8 
aData for September 1961 are for atxty•seven companies; data for June 
and September 1962 are for sixty-nine companies. These companies held about 
82'& of the total mortgages of all u.S. Life insurance companies. 
SOURCE: J~int lnvesbaent B~llet1n, ALC and LlAA, No. 474, p. 3. 
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The life insurance compa:aies are one of four 
groups of f:l.Danc:Lal institutions that supply most of the 
coUDtry' a mortgage fu.Dds. Table V-3 shows that the life 
companies as a group held $47 billion of the $250 billion, 
or approximately ooe•f:Lfth of tbe total mortgage debt 
outataodia.g, and one-fourth of the total mortgage debt held 
by fiDancial institutions, at the end. of 1962. They have 
been aa: important source of residential mortgages in the 
post-war period. Table v-4 shows that life companies 
held $27 billion, of their $47 billion total, in loans on 
one•to•four family b.es at the cm.d of 1962. As a group 
they were ahead of both the .mtual saviDgs banks and the 
c~rcial banks 1 but were far behind the savings and loan 
associatiODa, which have ahOWD a tremendous growth in the 
residential mortgase field in recent years. Table V•5 
provides a breakdown of mortgap holdings in different 
cateaortes up to the end of 1960. In the residential field, 
the life compan1es have invested heavily in both conventional 
loans and soverument•backed FHA and VA loans. Government 
underwritten mortgage l081UJ on both one-to-four family resi-
dences and multi-family residences (apartment houses) 
totaled $15 .. 4 billion, while total conventional loans 
amounted to $11.9 billion at the end of 1960. 
--
-------~~--
All End of Holders Year 
1941 37.6 
1945 35.5 
1956 144.5 
1957 156.6 
1958 171.9 
1959 190.9 
1960 207.1 
1961 225.5 
1962 249.9 
TABLE V-3 
TOTAL MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTABDIHJ 
(tn billions of dollars) 
-~----~ ~-- -~·--·---------- ~- ~-
Fiaaacial Saviags Life Iaatitu• and Insurance tlons Loan 
27.0 4.6 6.4 
21.0 5.3 6.6 
111.2 35.7 32.9 
119.7 40.0 35.2 
131.5 45.6 37.0 
145.5 53.1 39.1 
157.6 60.0 41.7 
172.6 68.8 44.2 
192.3 79.0 47.0 
CQG'IIIercial Mutual 
Banks Saviags Ballks 
4.9 4.8 
4.7 4.2 
22.7 19.7 
23.3 21.1 
25.5 23.2 
28.1 25.0 
28.8 26.9 
30.4 29.1 
33.2 31.5 
----------·--------------------------·----------------- ------------------ -
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, lurch, 1963, pp. 371-372. 
.... 
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End of 
Year 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
196Q 
1961 
1962 
TABLE V-4 
MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDING ON NONFARM. ONE-TO•FOUR FAMILY HOMES 
(in billions of dollars) 
-- ------- ·- ----------- ------~ --~-- ·- - -- - ~-----~-- ---- ------ -~------------------
Savings Life Commer- Mutual Federal Agencies 
Total and Insur- cial Sav-
Loan ance Banks ings FHMA Other 
88.2 30.0 17.7 15.5 11.1 2.4 0.6 
99.0 34.0 20.0 16.2 13.0 2.9 0.7 
107.6 38.0 21.4 16.4 14.1 3.8 0.9 
117.7 42.9 22.4 17.6 15.6 3.6 1.1 
130.9 49.5 23.6 19.2 16.9 5.0 1.0 
141.3 55.4 24.9 19.2 18.4 5.5 1.2 
153.1 62.9 25.8 20.0 20.0 5.4 1.9 
168.3 71.6 27.0 22.1 22.2 5.1 1.9 
----~~ 
Individu 
-
a1s and 
Others 
11.3 
12.1 
13.0 
14.5 
15.7 
16.7 
17.1 
18.4 
Source: Housing Statistics, Housing and Home Finance Agency, May, 1963, p. 37. 
,... 
N 
00 
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1957 
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1960 
SOURCE: 
J'8A 
1.3 
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5.4 
5.5 
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8.0 
TABU: V•5 
lDt'l'GAGE BOLDDCS OF U. S. LIFE t.NSU&AMCB COMPANIES 
(In Billions of Dollars) 
KESlDENl'IAL 
Ooe•to•Pour Paaily Jl&lti•Faad.ly 
Conven• Conven• COIIIIIer• 
VA tioul Total lltA tional Total cial 
H. A. 1.0 2.3 0.1 1.3 1.4 2.2 
2.0 2.8 8.5 0.9 1.7 2.6 3.7 
6.1 6.5 17.7 1.3 2.3 3.6 6.0 
7.3 7.4 20.1 1.2 2.4 3.6 6.8 
7.7 8.2 21.4 1.2 2.3 3.6 1. 7 
7.4 8.7 22.4 1.2 2.4 3.5 8.5 
7.1 9.3 23.6 1.1 2.6 3.7 9.1 
6.9 10.0 24.9 1.1 2.8 3.9 10.0 
-
Total Total 
Non•Fam Fana Hortj&ieB 
5.9 0.8 6.6 
14.8 1.3 16.1 
27.2 2.3 29.4 
30.5 2.5 33.0 
32.7 2.6 35.2 
34.4 2. 7 37.1 
36.6 2.8 39.2 
38.8 3.0 41.8 
The Tally of J,J._{~ Irusuran~~~~atiati~ Institute of Life Insurance, October, 19tH, p. 1. 
;-a 
N 
\0 
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FHA and VA Loans.--Tbere has been a great deal 
of fluctuation in the acquisition of FHA, VA, and conven-
tional loans down through the years as Table V•6 points 
out. Flow of funds into conventional loans was consider-
ably more steady than the flow into FHA and VA loans, but 
conventional loans also showed large variations from year 
to year. The activity of the life companies has varied 
among these different categories of residential loans, de-
pending on the demand for them, and changes in the attrac-
tiveness of the rates obtainable on such loans in various 
periods. 
The FHA and VA programs were inaugurated by 
Congress to help provide mortgaae funds for persons in 
lower income brackets, at terms and interest rates which 
they could not otherwise obtain. The lender is insured 
(under the former) or guaranteed (under the latter) 
against loss of the principal amount of the loan. '11le 
regulatory maximum interest rates on FHA mortgages secured 
by single family houses have behaved as follows: 
Date of Chaye in Rate Ratel: 
November 24, 1934 • • 0 . . . • 5 and 5 1/2 June 24! 1934 • • • • • • • • . 5 August , 1939 • • • • . . • • 4 l/2 April 24, 1950 • • • • • • • . 4 1/2 May 2, 1953 ••• • • • . • • • 4 1/2 December 3i 1956 • • • • • • • 5 August 5, 957 •• . • • . • . 5 1/2 September 23, 1959 • . • • • • 5 3/4 
lsriuiDer, p. 285. 
TABLE V•6 
CIWGES IN NON•FARM MORtGAGE HOLDINGS OF U~ S. LIFE 
INSURANCE cntPANIES 
IN MILLI<IfS OF DOLLAB.S 
RESIDENTIAL 
To til' Govern- Conven• Total 
Year PHA VA ment Backed t1ona1 Total Coumercial Non•Farm 
1947 170 589 759 296 1,055 365 1,420 
1948 983 261 1,244 475 1,719 344 2,063 
1949 1,073 119 1,192 408 1,600 325 1,925 
1950 1,119 802 1,921 783 2,704 303 3,007 
1951 684 1,105 1,789 759 2,548 464 3,012 
1952 424 216 640 764 1,404 355 1,759 
1953 331 214 545 968 1,513 377 1,890 
1954 104 1,083 1,187 812 1,.999 493 2,492 
1955 279 1,431 1,710 946 2,656 588 3,244 
1956 232 1,230 1,462 1,070 2,532 804 3,336 
1957 124 417 541 706 1,247 897 2,144 
1958 692 
- 288 404 525 929 814 1,743 
1959 830 
- 347 483 835 1,318 640 1,958 
SOURCE: Life Insurance Companies as Financial Institutio~f• p. 47. 
1-' 
(..,~) 
..-
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The maximum interest rates under the VA program have be-
haved as follows: 
Date of Change in Rate 
June 22! 1944 • • • • 
May 5, 953 ••• 
April 4, 1958 • • • • 
July 2, 1959 •••• 
. . . . . 
• • • • • 
. . . . . 
• • • • • 
Ratel 
-
4 
4 l/2 
4 3/4 
5 1/4 
In the early post-war years the maximum legal 
rate of over 4% on FHA loans was well above the rate that 
could be obtained on many high grade corporate bonds. 
Therefore, because of their riskless attribute many life 
insurance companies were attracted to these loans as the 
demand for new houses grew. In the first post-war housing 
boom the life companies participated heavily in FHA lend-
ing with the net gain in FHA loans rising to $983 million 
in 1948 and going over $1 billion in both 1949 and 1950 
as seen from Table v-6. 
With the liberalization of terms on VA loans in 
1953 and the return of veterans from the Korean conflict, 
a heavy demand for new homes and for this type of £inane-
ins was created. This, coupled with an increase in the 
maximum rate in May of 1953, enabled the life companies to 
lend a large amount of VA loans on single family homes in 
the mid-fifties. For the years 1954, 1955, and 1956, the 
TABLE V•7 
ID'lGACI 1.0A11S A(XlUIUD BY U.S. Lin DiSUIArtCB OOIIPdiiS 
u Mli.Llacs or DOLLAaS 
lbl•fAIM 
IliA VA Cuar• Total 
Year lM!r!d etMJl QSJaK tcztal r!l'!l *rtup• 
1955 971 1,839 3,298 6,108 515 6,623 
1956 84S 1,652 3,707 6,201 514 6,715 
1957 653 831 3,339 4,823 407 5,230 
19.58 1,301 19S 3,343 4,839 438 5,277 
1959 1,S49 201 3,722 5,472 498 5,970 
1960 1,401 291 3,930 5,622 464 6,086 
1961 1,388 220 4,625 6,233 SS2 6,785 
1962 1,397 4.58 4,999 6,854 622 7,476 
souaca: federal &eaerve Bulletin. March 1963, p. 63. 
..... 
w 
f..,) 
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net gain in VA loans was above $1 billion annually. 
However, with the pegged interest rates on FHA 
and VA loans, the general uptrend in interest rates on con-
ventioaal loans and corpomte bonds have, at times, made 
these loans less attractive. Ccmgress bas continuously 
raised the maximum rates on FHA and VA mortgages to make 
them more attractive to institutional investors. With a 
diminished demand the net gain in VA loans amounted to only 
$417 million in 1957, and starting in 1958 there was a net 
reductiou of VA loans as the payments on loans outstanding 
swamped the small amount of VA loans acquired in recent 
years. Tbe rate allowed on FHA loans is greater than that 
on VA loans, and there bas been a substantial spread be-
tween the rates obtainable on conveutional residential 
loans and VA loans in the past few years, as seen from 
Table v-10. The gain in all government backed loans fell 
under the gain in conventional loans begimling in 195 7. 
However, with an increase in the maximum rate in 1957, FHA 
loans showed a sharp increase in 1958. From 1958 through 
1962, total acquisition of FHA loans bas remained fairly 
constant. 
Amortization. ••Almost all residential loans made 
today are fully amortizable over a number of years. This 
is quite different from pre-depression years when fully 
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amortized loans were rare, which helped contribute to the 
widespread defaults during the depression. The amortized 
mortgage, with monthly or quarterly payments, adds an addi· 
tional margin of safety to the loan, because, as payments 
progress, the ratio of the outstanding amount of the loan 
to the value of the house decreases. In the words of 
FraDk R. Shugrue: 
In the mortgage industry there is consider-
able sentf.ment that tbe inauguration of the 
amortized mortgage was the greatest phenomenon 
since the invention of the wheel, that the ~ 
amortized mortgage is the sole reason for the 
remarkably low delinquency experience now being 
enjoyed. There is little doubt but that monthly 
payments on principal, interest, taxes, insur-
ance and special assessments has vastly improved 
the attractiveness of the mortgage as an invest-
ment ••• 
Maturities. --The maturities on residential mort-
gages run over twenty years with twenty or twenty-five 
years common for conventional loans and thirty years is 
not uncOIIIDOn on VA and FHA loans. The fact that loans 
are amortized and that pre-payments occur when houses are 
sold reduces the mortgage turnover period to well below 
the average maturity length for the mortgage portfolio. 
This is shown in Table V-8 where the actual turnover rate 
fell between seven and twelve years for most companies. 
1 Shugrue, p. 371. 
TABLE V•8 
DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL LD'E INSURANCE 
COMPAHIES' MORTGAGE TURNOVER PERIODS, 
1961 
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Turnover Period Number of Companies 
5 to 6 years • . . . . . • • • • • • 
6 to 7 years • • • • • • • • • • • • 
7 to 8 years • • • • • • • • • • • • 
8 to 9 years • • • • • • • • • • • • 
9 to 10 years • • • • • • • • • • • • 
10 to 11 years • • • • • . . • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • . . . . 
11 to 12 years • 
12 to 13 years . 
13 to 14 years • • • • • • • . . . • • 
14 to 15 years • • 
15 years and over 
.. . . . • • • • • • 
. . . . . . . . 
l'ot&l~: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
1 
8 
12 
23 
17 
11 
11 
9 
8 
1 
1 
104 
Source: Join§ IllVestment Bulletip, AI.£ and LIAA, No. 466, 
p. 1 . 
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This is analogous to the situation in the corporate bond 
portfolio where sinking fund payments reduce the effec-
tive tumover rate on corporate bonds. 
Size of LoaDs. --Tbe life companies will lend a 
greater percentage of their residential mortgageiwads on 
higher priced homes than will mutual savings banks and 
savings and loan associations. The saviu.gs and loan as-
sociations, especially, will coacentrate on the lower 
priced homes. About three out of five residential loans 
made by insurance firms in March, 1963, were on homes 
priced above $25,000. 1 However, as shown in Chapter I, 
the maximum amount that can be loaaed against a single 
parcel is $30,000 under the New York law, and is gener-
ally around $35,000 in other states. The maximum loan-
to-appraised value ratio on coaveational residential loans 
is set at 75% by the New York law, which is among the 
lowest ratios allowed fin&DCial lnstitutioll8. A review of 
mortgage investments approved by the Finance Committee of 
one company showed that for most conventional loans the 
maximum 75% was loaned. Some of the loan-to-value ratios 
falling below that were cases where families were swapping 
lt'Home Finance: The Terms Now," U.S. News and 
World Report, May 27, 1963, p. 105. 
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houses and bad little or 110 aortgage debt on the old one. 
The loan-to-value ratio on iasured FHA loans was over 
90% with 100% being fairly coaaon on VA loans. 
Differ!Qces tp le!estment Policies 
Life insurance compaaies show a marked difference 
in their mortgage investllent policies. This is seen in 
Table V-9. However, the majority of companies prefer con-
ventional loans to those that are federally-backed. 
Fifty•ooe companies, in Table V•9, had an investment 
largely f.n conventioual loans, accounting for 38% of the 
ninety-one company portfolio. Even those companies concen-
trating on FHA and VA loans bad an average of 30. 0% of 
their total portfolio f.n coaventional loans (19.8% in 
residential and 10.0% :l.n coaaercial loans). Nineteen com-
panies, accounting for 32% of the total portf$lio, could 
not be classified as favoring any particular category, but 
combined holdings of commercial and conventional residen-
tial loans brought total conventional loans to over half 
of their entire portfolio. Of those ccapanies concentrat-
ing 1n conventional mortgages, four were heavily invested 
in cOIDIIlercial loans, having au average of 731. in that type 
of mortgage, with 5.0% :l.n institutional mortgages, and 
only 16. 3% in residential 110rtgages; whereas, eight 
TABLE V•9 
DISTRIBUTION OF MORTGAGE PORTFOLIOS f6 NIBETY-o:J!m LIFE IBSUIWICE cc.MPAHUS 
(Per Cent of lovestaent at End of 1961) 
Ccapaaiu 1JaviDs 
Portfolios FBA.-VA ~-i•te Mortpge Portfolio C_,ositiot:t Larp!lia Loans laDCe!' Coavea aaal 
Loaas 
VA 4.5 29.4 19 .. 2 
FHA 7.9 40.6 27.3 
Coaventioual 87.6 30.0 53.5 
Res1deat1al 44.9 19.8 32.1i 
Ccmaercial and 
Iutituticmal 42.7 10.0 21.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Bo. of companies 51 21 19 
Per Cent of 91-eompany portfolios 38.0 29.4 32.6 
I 
Source: Jt#at Investment BulleAAs, AI£ and LIAA, No. 466, p. 7. 
t-' 
1.,...) 
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companies bad an average of 71.5% in residential loans and 
only 14. 2% in c011111ercial mortgages. 1 
The preference for conventional loans in the resi-
dential field is due to the fact that the rates on such 
loans are higher than those on FHA and VA mortgages. The 
gross rate obtained on new loans by life insurance compan-
ies for the years 1955 to 1961 is shown in Table v-10. The 
serviciag cost on FHA and VA loans is greater than that on 
regular residential loans, because of the lower amount per 
loan and the fact that federally backed loans are more 
likely to run into trouble. This further reduces the net 
yield in comparison to conveatioaal loans. For the twenty• 
one companies in Table V -9, having portfolios largely in 
FHA and VA loans, total operating costs averaged . 60% com-
pared with • 44% for the first group and • 40% for the third 
group; this was entirely due to higher servicing fees which 
averaged .39% for the twenty-one companies and .18% and 
.15% respectively for the other groups. 2 In addition, the 
life companies have far more expet:ieuee with conventional 
lending on residential properties, and there is a greater 
freedom of choice 1n negotiating terms. 
1
"City Mortgage Lenc:llast Income and Costs of Life 
Insurance Companies, 1961," p. Io. 
2 Ibid., p. 7. 
TABLE V-10 
AVERAGE GROSS COHTRACT RATE ON NEW MOR1'GAGE LOANS BY U.S. LIFE IRSURANCE COMPANIES 
--- ~------~ ----------~--------- --------
Conventional 
Number of 
Year Cc:.apanies Total VA FHA a Total Residentialb Otberb 
1955 60 4.62-z. 4.48% 4.52% 4.74% 4.70% 4.61% 
1956 76 4.69 4.50 4.56 4.84 4.82 4.75 
1957 74 5.01 4.50 4.95 5.18 5.21 5.10 
1958 74 5.34 4.53 5.22 5.45 5.34 5.47 
1959 71 5.46 4.84 5.30 5.57 5.55 5.60 
1960 70 5.87 5.09 5.71 5.99 6.05 5.94 
1961 70 5.90 5.22 5.62 6.03 5.98 6.04 
-----~---- - - ~-----~-~-- --------------- ~------ - ~ ------------
~ Includes Cauadian N.H.A. loans which in 1961 averaged 6. 75 per cent. F .H.A. 
loans excluding N.H.A. 's averaged 5.57%. 
b All companies reporting data on total conventional loans could not provide in-
for.mation for this breakdown.. These ratios are based on the following number of 
companies: 
1955 - 35 11956 - 45 I 1957 - 48 11958 - 50 11959 - 5l:.ll960 - 54 I E%1 - 52' 
Source: Joint Investment Bulletin. ALC and LIAA, No. 466, p. 14. 
,_ 
.f.:'-
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The companies that invest more heavily in FHA 
and VA mortgages (mostly FHA 110rtgages in recent years) 
feel that, although yields are not as high as those ob-
tained on conventional loans, the added safety factor plus 
a relatively high yield makes these loans attractive. 
They also help to diversify the mortgage portfolio. The 
difference in the gross rate obtained on new conventional 
residential loans and new FHA loans was • 36% in 1961, and 
ranged from .12% to • 34~ in the preceding six years. 
While some companies shy away from purchasing such loans 
at discounts (resulting from the legal maximum interest 
rates) because of the disfavor wbidb the practice may incur 
with the federal authorities, many companies have bought 
these loans through this method, which makes the rate 
comparable with tt.': obtaiaable 011 conventional loans. As 
mentioned before a few companies invest heavily, almost ex-
clusively, in coauercial and industrial mortgages. New 
England Life, for example, is a company that invests ex-
clusively in coamercial and apartment house mortgages and 
makes no loans on single family houses. Such factors as 
company size, location, method of acquiring loans, and 
historical preference play an important part in contribut• 
:lng to this wide divergence in investment policies. 
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Aparqoegt Jlouse Slld Cq!!!!!rcial Lending 
While the life companies have a heavy investment 
in one•to-four family residential mortgages, there bas 
been more emphasis on aparbae1lt house and commercial mort-
gages for the industry as a whole in recent years. This 
trend began about 1957 as the growth in the one-to-four 
family portfolio slowed down, which is seen from Table v-5. 
From 1945 to 1950, mortgage holdin&s on one-to-four family 
dwellings showed a gain of $4.2 billion or 183% to a gain 
of $2.7 billion or 75% on combined holdings of multi-
family residential and COIIII&rcial mortgages. From 1950 to 
1955, the gain was $9.2 billion or 108% for the former 
category, compared to a gain of $3.5 billion or 52.4% for 
the latter. However, from the end of 1956 to the end of 
1960, mortgage holdings on oae•to•four family residences 
rose only $4.8 billion or an increase of 23.8%, while 
total holdings on multi-family residential and commercial 
properties rose $3.5 billion or an increase of 33.5%. 
Table V-6 shows that in 1957, cOIJIDercial mortgages began to 
achieve a greater percentage of tbe net gain in total mort• 
gage holdings when compared with the net gain in residen-
tial and commercial mortgages in earlier years. 
John Hancock changed the emphasis of its mort• 
gage investment policy about five or six years ago and is 
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now investing heavily in commercial and apartment house 
mortgages, and they report that this is also the trend 
wi tb the other very large life companies. Up to that time, 
the company was placing approximately 70% of its mortgage 
funds in single-residence loaas, but it reports that 32. 7% 
of new loans made in 1962 were on single-residences, and 
67.31 were on other properties. This contrasts with 51% 
of the outstanding city (aoa•far.) mortgage portfolio in 
single-residence mortgages, at the end of 1962, which re-
flects the investment made 1a previous years. 
The main reason for preferring commercial mort-
gages is that the rate on these loans bas been favorable 
when compared with the rate on residential loans* which 
was not true in earlier post-war years. Table v-10 shows 
that the rate obtained on conveational loans, other than 
residential, has moved up to, and in some years, has sur-
passed tbe rate obtained on residential loans. In addi-
tion to this, cOJIIDercial loau, because of their far larger 
size, carry a lower cost burdeft than residential loans. 
This is shown in Table V-ll where total cost was approxi-
mately one-half that on residential loans. 
The favorite outlets for life insurance companies 
in this area are apartment houses, shopping centers, office 
buildings, and industrial properties. New England Life re-
ports that tbe percentage breakdown of its mortgages held 
TABLE V•ll 
DtCOME AND TOTAL ~~ CONVER'l'IONAL MORTGAGE LOAN PORTFOLIOS 
OF SELt."t;TIID LD'E INSURA!ICE COMPANIES 
COHVENTIONAL LOAN PORTFOLIOS LABGELY IN: 
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGES RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 
1957 1958 1939 1960 1961 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Per Cent of Moath1y Average Investment 
Gross In-
come 4.50 4.64 4.73 4.83 4.98 3.76 4.91 5.03 5.15 
Total 
Costs .33 • 32 . 32 .32 .32 .61 .62 .63 .60 
Net Income 4.17 4.33 4.41 4.51 4.66 4.15 4.29 4.41 4.55 
Number of 
Companies 5 5 5 4 4 9 9 9 8 
I 
Source: Joint Investment Bulletin, AI£ and LIAA, No. 466, p. 10. 
1961 
5.30 
.58 
4.71 
8 
.... 
.p. 
VI 
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at the end of 1962, was as follows: industrial mortgages, 
35.9%; office buildiDgs, 16.1%; apartment houses, 12.2% 
( 4. 2% FHA and 7. 91. conventioaal) ; shopping centers over 
100,000 sq. ft., 10.5%; sboppiag centers under 100,000 sq. 
ft., 5.3%; free standia& discouat department stores, 7 .5%; 
all others, including free staadi~~g grocery stores, hotels, 
and u.s. post offices, 12.5%. Joba Hancock reports that 
its city (D.Oil•faxm) aortgagea acquired in 1962, were 
classified as follows: apart:Milt houses, 26. 3%; stores 
and shoppillg centers, 23.44; office buildings, 6.1%; hotels 
and 1110tels, 2 .lt; industrial mortgages, 5. 9% (1. 8% on 
warehouses and 4.1% on m&DUfacturing buildings); medical 
office buildiags, 2.6%; miacellaaeous properties, .9%; 
and 32. 71. on siagle residences. The life companies will 
vary as to their preferences for each type of investment, 
but the majority of their non•siDgle residence mortgages 
will consist of the above-aamed investments. 
Aerl:i!PDt Houses. --In apartment bouse lending, 
multi •story, high rise apartments in, or near, populous 
regions or fast growtila areas are favored. Much importance 
is attached to proper location because an owner cannot pos-
sibly obtain long-term leases from the many families that 
will occupy the buildings, as can be done in the financing 
of commercial properties. A life company will expect its 
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correspondent to have "a pulse of his area." It will want 
to know the vacancy rate, current demand, competition, and 
whether the area is overbuilt or not. Some areas that are 
favorable for other mortgage loans may not be attractive 
for apartment houses and will be avoided, while others 
will be keenly watched. This is also true of hotels and 
motels. Both conventional and FHA lending are used on 
apartment houses, but conventional mortgages are used far 
more in the better areas and return a higher yield. Table 
v-5 shows that $2.8 billion was held in conventional multi-
residential loans and $1.1 billion in the FHA type at the 
end of 1960. 
Retail Properties.--Tbe life companies lend ex-
tensively on retail properties such as shopping centers, 
supermarkets, and department stores. They have special-
ized in mortgages on shopping centers for a number of 
years. The industry bad more than $1.5 billion invested 
in the nation's 4,500 shopping centers at the end of 1960, 
primarily through mortgages; this was nearly one-half of 
the total basic capital for shopping center development. 1 
A regional or community center where the central stores 
are part of large and established chains is typical in 
1Institute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance 
Fact Book, 1961, p. 86. 
148 
this type of investment. The company will want the loan 
secured by a long-term lease given by the perspective 
tenant. The correspondent will usually line up the leases, 
submit the construction plans, terms of the mortgage, and 
give an appraisal of the loan. Again, the company will 
look into the location and the competition in the area, 
and the likelihood of future competition. 
The credit standing of the tenants usually de-
termines what rate is charged, for example, whether it 
will be 5 3/4% or 6%. The case of large chains like w. T. 
Grant and Kresge's, which will occupy a good percentage 
of the center, is the easiest type of investment. This 
will carry the lowest rate and often be allowed the maxi-
mum loan-to•value ratio. The maximum for commercial 
properties under the New York Law is 66 2/3%, and this 
is scaled down, depending on the credit standing of the 
prospective tenants and the geaeral degree of risk in-
volved. Along with suitable tenants a strong lease is 
also desired. As one mortgage officer put it, "it will 
not do us much good to line up a strong chain store if 
they are able to walk out the aext time it rains." The 
minimum lease term allowed under the New York law is 
twenty-one years and the mortgage must be amortized within 
thirty-five years. The maturities on John Hancock's com-
mercial mortgages generally fall between fifteen to 
TABLE V-12 
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL MORTGAGE LOANS BY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
BY SIZE OF LOAN, NUMBER OF AimlORIZATIONS , AND AMOUNT AUTHORIZED 
1953 I 1954 I 1955 
Total Size 
1956 
of Loan J Number I Amount I Number JAmountl NumberJ Amount I Number I Amount (in thousands) t 
Under $ 25 
$ 25-$ 50 
$ 50-$ 100 
$ 100-$ 250 
$ 250-$ 1,000 
$ 1,ooo-$ spoo 
$ 5,000-$1QPOO 
$10,000 and over 
26.1 
22.2 
19.4 
19.4 
9.1 
3.3 
0.2 
a 
8:·Less than 0.05 per cent. 
As Per Cent of Total Number and Total Amount 
2.1 
4.3 
7.3 
15.6 
21.8 
36.4 
7.1 
5.4 
23.2 
20.8 
19.3 
20.7 
11.8 
3.8 
0.3 
0.1 
1.5 
3.2 
5.8 
13.6 
23.4 
33.1 
8.8 
10.6 
21.7 
20.1 
19.6 
21.7 
12.6 
3.6 
0.5 
0.2 
1.3 
2.9 
5.5 
13.8 
22.9 
27.9 
13.8 
11.9 
18.8 
20.3 
21.1 
22.4 
12.5 
4.3 
0.4 
0.2 
Source: Journal of Finance, May 1961, p. 296. 
1.1 
2.8 
5.7 
13.5 
21.7 
34.2 
11.0 
10.0 
..... 
~ 
\0 
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twenty-three years. 
Industrial Proeerties.--Almost all life insur-
ance financing of smaller industrial concerns is done 
through mortgage loans. Many firms which could probably 
not meet the requirements for an unsecured loan from the 
Securities Department, take loans from the Mortgage Depart-
ment for acquisition of additional plant facilities. This 
can be seen from Table v-12 which is the result of a study 
requested by the House of Representatives. Loans under 
$5 million totalled 79% of mortgage financing in 1956, 
while only 18.2% of noumortgage industrial loans was under 
that amount, as seen in Table 1V•7, in Chapter IV. 
CHAP T E R VI 
GOVERNMENT BONDS 
Uui.ted States G9J!E1!9!nt ~d.s 
A limited 8110U1lt of apace will be devoted to dis• 
cuss ion of life insuraDCe investment in United states Gov• 
emme.nt boncl8. These securit:Les present no portfolio man• 
agement problems nor involve aay aegotiation or riek selec• 
tion process, only the decisioa to buy or sell. They have, 
however, been particularly unattractive to life companies 
1n the post-war period because of their low yields. Life 
lnaurance holdings of these securities bave declined 
throughout the post-war years 1n total dollar &IIOUUt, seen 
1n Table VI·l. and have beea reduced to a small per cent 
of total iadustry assets, aa seen from Table II•l. 
Long•tem United States Goverament bonds are 
undoubtedly proper iuvestmeats for life insurance compan-
ies because of their safety fact.or. However, there has 
been a sufficient amount of other hish -grade long-term 
debt available, mail\ly corponte bonds and real estate mort• 
gages. The life companies. which desire the highest income 
pugn~~hle while investing the bulk of their assets in rela-
tively safe long-texm debt, feel that these forms of in-
vestment satisfy the safety requirement while giving ~~em 
- 152 • 
Year 
1917 
1920 
1925 
1930 
1935 
1840 
1941 
1942 
1943 
TABLE Vl-1 
U.S. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES OWNED BY 
U.S. LD'E INSURANCE COMPANIES (in millions of dollars) 
Total Year Total Year 
70 1944 16,531 1953 
830 1945 20,583 1954 
627 1946 21,629 1955 
319 1947 20,021 1956 
2,853 1948 16,746 1957 
5,767 1949 15,290 1958 
6,796 1950 13,459 1959 
9,295 1951 11,009 1960 
12,537 1952 10,252 1961 
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book, 1962, p. 73 
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Total 
9,829 
9,070 
8,576 
7,555 
7,029 
7,183 
6,868 
6,427 
6,134 
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a higher rate of return. The yield on long-term U.S. 
Governments throughout 1961* for example, ranged between 
3.73% and 4.06%. 1 This is far below the yield that the 
life companies obtained on directly placed corporate bonds 
shown in Chart IV-4, and real estate mortgages shown in 
Table v-10. Life insurance companies, unlike other finan-
cial institutions, do not have any great liquidity require-
ment and therefore do not have to maintain any large amount 
of these secu~ities for this purpose. 
Because of the deterioration of traditional in-
vestments during the depression and the general lack of 
attractive investment channels, the life companies turned 
to U.S • Government bonds to safeguard their growing amount 
of funds. Holdings of u.s. Goverament bonds rose from $319 
million or 1.7% of assets in 1930 to $2,853 million or 
12.3% of assets in 1935, and then increased to $5.767 mil• 
lion or 18. 7% of assets in 1940. With the enormous demand 
for funds by the federal government and the consequent re-
striction of demand in the private sector of the economy 
during World War II, U.S. Government bonds became almost as 
important as all other asset categories combined, rising to 
45.9% of life insurance assets. This was the reason why 
1
"Interest Rates1 " Federal Reserve Bulletin, XLVIII (March, 1962), p. 3~4. 
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the rate of return on life insurance assets declined 
throughout this period and reached an all time low in 1947. 
Through their liquidation, U.S. Government secur-
ities became an important source of investment funds in the 
earlier post-war years. Total holdings declined 50% from 
$20 billion in 1947 to $10 billion in 1952. In addition 
t:~ the af-orementioned reasons for the post-war decline, 
the life companies generally feel that their obligation 
now lies with financing the private sector of the economy, 
and that substantial purchases of government securities 
would only increase the prospect of inflation, which would 
burt the savings of their policyholders. 
The life companies do, however, have a certain, 
although limited, demand for U.S. Government bonds. Life 
insurance companies, being quasi-public institutions, 
would probably bold a small amount of u.s. Government 
boads under any ec01101Dic conditions for "window· dressing!' 
purposes. These securities make the portfolio appear 
safer to the state authorities and the public in general. 
Some companies, especially the large mutuals, might be con-
sidered a little unpatriotic by some if they dLd not hold 
U.S. Goverument bonds. In addition the bonds add strength 
and diversity to the portfolio. Many companies are will-
ing to sacrifice the 1% or more difference in yield, for 
the small amount of assets that are invested in u.s. 
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Government bonds, to achieve these purposes. 
State aa.d Local Goverument Bouds 
The life companies, because of the relatively low 
federal income tax rate which they are subject to, do not 
invest heavily in state and local governments bonds. These 
securities usually have little attraction for investors 
who do not place a high value on tax exemption. Therefore, 
the amount of state and local government outstanding is 
coucentrated in commercial baaks and fire and casualty in-
surance companies, both of whom are subject to the regular 
corporate income tax rate, and individuals in high income 
brackets. Of $66.4 billion of these securities estimated 
to be outstanding in 1960 by the treasury, only $4.5 bil-
lion was held by the life companies. 1 
The tax on the investment income of life insur-
ance companies was increased with the passage of the 1959 
federal law which was retroactive to 1958 earnings. This 
did not, however, greatly iDcrease the attractiveness of 
tax•exempt state and local government bonds for the life 
companies. As seen :Ln Chapter III, the law did not in-
crease the tax burden to anywhere near that borne by 
1Jobn L. O'Donnell, "Some Postwar Trends in 
MUP.icipal Financing," Journal of Finance, XVII (May, 1962), 
p. 267. 
157 
industrial corporations or other financial institutions. 
The consensus of opinion is that the law increased taxes 
on investment income in the range of 65% to 100%, depend• 
ing on the company involved. This would make the effec• 
tive tax rate on investment lncome about 12 to 16%; only 
about 8% of investment income was previously paid in 
taxes. Table VI•2 shows the substantial conformity be-
tween the before tax yield and after tax yield on indus-
try investments (the after tax yield on investment for 
the years coming uuder the 1959 law is not available) • 
It can be seen that the yield on a tax-exempt municipal 
bond would have to be very close to that on taxable bonds 
to interest a life insurance company. 
The tax is no longer assessed on a simple per-
centage of investment income as it was previous to the 
1959 Act. Now it is a caaplex system and is based on 
many factors, which can differ widely both between various 
companies and at different times in the same company. In 
1960, Thomas E. Lovejoy, President, The Manhattan Life 
Insurance Company, c~nted on the law thusly: 
It is a very cOl'lfusing lawi subject to many in• 
terpreta.tions. Since the aw was passed, some 
people have expressed the view that there are 
inequities which have resulted in a heavier tax 
burden being thrown on some of the companies and 
a lighter tax burden on others ••• 
One of the factors which I have not been able 
to clear up in my own mind, and the people in my 
office have not satisfactorily answered for me, 
TABLE VI-2 
BEFORE TAX AND AFTER TAX BATE OF RETURN ON INVESTED FUNDS OF 
U.S.. LIFE INSUPANCE COMPANIES (in per cent) 
- ---~·--- ---~-- ----------- ~-------- ----~~----~ -----~-- ---
Rate Before Rate After 
Year Federal In .. Federal In- Year 
came Taxes come Taxes 
1941 3.42 3.42 1952 
1942 3.44 3. 36 1953 
1943 3.33 3.23 1954 
1944 3.23 3 .. 14 1955 
1945 J.ll 3.05 1956 
1946 2.93 2.89 1957 
1947 2.88 2.88 1958 
1948 2.96 2.96 1959 
1949 3.06 2.98 1960 
1950 3.13 3.00 1961 
1951 3.18 2.98 
- - -----~- ----~--~~ :......__.____-~--------
------
"--· 
a Not Available 
b Obtained from Life Insurance Fact Book 1962, p. 60. 
Source: Life Insurapce Fact Book, 1961, p. 59. 
Rate Before 
Federal In-
come Taxes 
3.28 
3.36 
3.46 
3.51 
3.63 
3.75 
3.85 
3.96 
4.11 
4.22b 
_______ .. _ --------------------- ----------- -· 
Rate Af te:r 
F e<.\eral In-
come Taxes 
3.07 
3.15 
3.23 
3.23 
3.33 
3.41:. 
4 
a 
a 
a 
...... 
\.1'1 
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is what effect will this new tax have on the at• 
tractiveness of tax-exempt bonds to a life insur-
ance company. As I mentiODed before, under the 
old tax we had a rule of thumb that tax-exempts 
were worth twenty to twenty-five basis points to 
a life company. This new law is not that simple. 
I am not even sure that in one phase of the ta,."{, 
exemption of income from tax-exempt bonds is 
properly recognized. Also, from what I have been 
told, the value of tax-exempt securities may vary 
fr0111 company to company, and from year to year 
for each company. We no longer have a rule of 
thumb. 
In anticipation of the enactment of the new 
law, some of the companies began to pay more at-
tention to tax-exempt securities and bought sub• 
stantial amounts. However this exaggerated in-
terest in tax-exempt securities seems to have 
subsided somewhat as the companies recognized 
that tax exemption may not be as importanf or 
worth as much as they first thought • • • 
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Five companies-.. Prudent:l.al) John Hancock, Massa-
chusetts 1-iutual, New England Life, and Connecticut General, 
were polled on this matter. All agreed that in general 
the 1959 law had very little effect on their investment 
in state and local govermaeut bonds. One company reported 
that the after tax differential between taxable bonds and 
tax-exempt municipals bad increased from 7.8% to around 
11 or 12% of the before tax yield, under the 1959 law, but 
that they were not sure of the exact figure because it 
varied from time to time. Thus, the company could acquire 
a municipal bond with a lower yield than before the law, 
Lrbomas E. Lovejoy, "C~ing Investment Con• 
cepts," Best's ~surance News: Life Edition, XLI (July, 
1960), p. 104-1 • 
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and receive the same after tax return. Another company 
mentioned a differential in the range of 13 to 16%. One 
company said that they iuereased purchases of municipals 
in 1959 figuring that these boRds would be worth one-
hundred basis points under the new law, but has found that 
they are only worth around sixty points recently as opposed 
to thirty-two points under the old law. Two companies re-
ported that they are particularly unactive in this area, 
preferring to purchase aost1y Canadian municipals. One 
investment officer reported that his company would have to 
get 4 3/4% on a high grade municipal to interest them, and 
as be stated "there are not 11&1ly of those around." 
The companies that were buying tax-exempt muni· 
cipals reported that the chang$ in regulation Q bas had 
an opposite effect on their investment in state and local 
goverruaent bonds. The Federal Reserve changed Regulation 
Q which a Uowed the coaaerc:La.l banks to pay up to 4% on 
their t:Lme deposits beginning in January 1962. This in-
creased the volume of savings in commercial banks which 
resulted in an increase in the demand for municipals by 
these institutions, and which contributed to a rise in 
prices and lower yields on these securities, thus malting 
municipals even less attractive to the life companies. The 
average yield on new liiUDicipal bonds in 1961, for example, 
was 2.89% on ten-year maturities and 3.37% on twenty-year 
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maturities for Aa rated bonds; the yield was 3.03% and 3.57% 
on respective maturities for A rated bonds. 1 In 1962, the 
average yield declined to 2.62% on ten•year maturities and 
3.07% on twenty-year maturities for Aa rated bonds; and to 
2.76% and 3.21% on the same maturities for A rated bonds. 2 
Two of the companies reported that this decline bas virtu-
ally priced them out of the market on some issues which 
they might otherwise have bought. 
Altbougb the life companies increased their pur-
chases of municipal bonds in 1959, Table VI-3 shows that 
activity in this area bas leveled off in the last few years, 
which bears out previous testimony. The table also shows 
that the vast majority of u.s. State and Local Bonds ac• 
quired by the life companies are revenue bonds. Whereas, 
general obligations, backed by the taxing power of the is• 
suing municipality, may be attractive to other investors, 
the low yields on these securities just about precludes any 
heavy life insurance imrestment in them. 
l..rbe Municipal Bond Market :1n 1961, 11 Investment 
Bankers Association of Aaerica, Statistical Bulletin: A 
survet of the MuDiciral BODd Mar&it~ko. 22 r;asnlDgEOn: 
Ray, 962), p. 6. 
2
"Tbe Muaicipal Bond Market in 1962," Investment 
Bankers Association of America, Statistical Bulletin: A 
Surve;z; of the Munica,al BopS Markif, No. 2& (Washliliton: 
February, t§G~), p. • 
TABLE VI-3 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVEB.RIENT BONDS ACQUIRED BY U.S. LIFE INS~E COMPANIES 
(in millions of dollars) 
------ - ----------------- ,-~- ----~---- -----~------- ------ ---- --- --- ----- --------~----~-- --~----------
Year: 1962 1961 1960 1959 
u.s.: Direct and guaranteed 129 188 180 148 
Special Revenue and other 410 329 349 466 
- - - -Total u.s. 539 517 529 614 
Foreign: Direct and guaraateed 208 96 93 136 
Special Revenue and other 6 6 3 3 
- - - -Total Foreip8 214 102 96 139 
Year: 1958 1957 1956 
u.s. b 439 265 371 
canada 87 81 124 
Other 
--
1 ... 
-·----
L__ ____ 
8 Almost all Canadian. 
b Method of reporting was changed from 1958 to 1959. 
Source: The Tally of w.e Insurance Statistics, Institute of Life Insurance, Feb. ~ 
1963, p. 3; Fe • 1962, p. 3; Feb. 1961, p. 3; Feb. 1960, p. 3; Feb. 1958, N 
p. 3. 
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The life companies have been able to participate 
in municipal financing because of the higher yields on 
revenue bonds. Revenue bouda are so•called because their 
security lies with the revenue produced from the operation 
of business-type enterprises aad are usually not backed by 
the taxing power of the state or local government. The 
yields ou these securities have often approached or were 
cOIDp&l:'able to yields on taxable bonds when the tax exempt 
feature is allowed for. Tbis is due to the fact that 
there is a greater risk illvolved in a business-type enter-
prise, such as a toll road, and the lack of a government 
guarantee behind the bonds. 
The use of revenue boads by state and local 
authorities bas been an importau.t part of municipal bond 
financing in. the post-war period. Better than one-third 
of the net increase in tax exempt debt from 1946 to 1960 
bas been raised by uugua.ranteed securities that took on 
varied legal forms. 1 The value of new state and local 
revenue bonds issued in 1962 was $2.6 billion as opposed 
') 
to $5.5 billion of general obllgations.~ Contributing to 
the rise in this type of f:.lnanciug was the fact that many 
caa.Dlities undoubtedly felt that the general populace 
1o•Dounell, p. 260. 
2
"The Municipal Bou.d Market in 1962," p. 6. 
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should not be exposed to a tax for projects like bridges 
and highways that were too specialized and served a lim .. 
ited number of people. Many of these revenue bonds are 
sold by special authorities or districts set up for con-
structing and admiaisteriag specific public projects. 
Most are autOilOIDOUs bodies, free of supervision by either 
the general electorate or regulatory agencies and usually 
possess the power of eminent domain. Through this setup 
the local government can avoid the requirements and debt 
limitations imposed oo them by previously enacted statutes. 
Table VI•4 shows that 40~ of life insurance in• 
vestment in state and local government bonds have been in 
utility issues of cities, towa.s, and counties, mostly for 
sewage and water projects; and that 30% have been bonds 
issued for the purpose of cOD.Structing bridges, roads, and 
tunnels. Toll road turnpike bonds have been a favorite in-
vestment for the large life companies. Tbe main attraction 
of these securities are their loag maturities, large issues, 
and high rates of return. The fact that they are unguar-
anteed and usually not rated when issued (73.1% of the 
revenue bonds issued in 1961 and 74.7% of those issued in 
1960 were not rated) does not pose the problem to life 
insurance companies that it might to other iuvestors. 1 
lt1Municipal Bond Ratings, 1957·1961," Investment 
Bankers Association of America, Statistical Bulletin: A 
SurveiJf the M.ipal Md Marl#ff• QccasJonaJ; !a@jilo. 3 (Wash Eon: J aauary, 1 ) , p. • 
TABLE VI-4 
U.S. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY HOLDINGS OF STATE AND LOCAL BONDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES BY PURPOSE OF BOND ISSUE, JUNE 30, 1959 
(in per cent) 
Purpose of Bond Issue 
BODds Issued By: 
States ~ountries c: an(l Anrhar- Other T .ps ities 
Public Utilities 
Electric, Gas 24.1 13.0 15.5 13.2 
Sewage, Water 35.6 50.9 9.3 8.1 
Other · 0.8 5.2 0.6 0.2 
Total 60.5 n:T IS:'7; n7S' 
Bridges. Roads Tunnels 55.6 13.0 7.7 61.1 3.3 
Education Fa.ctiit!es 32.7 12.6 3.8 5.8 65.8 
Texm1nals (Airl:I.De, Bus, 
Railroad, etc.) 1.9 1.2 7.1 3.4 0.7 
Ilousi~ and COiliDUD.i ty 
Faci iti&.:s 2.9 2.4 4.6 2.9 3.0 
Flood Coutrol, trriga-
tion, Water Conserva-
tion 1.0 4.3 0.2 0.5 3.3 
Hospitals 0.5 2.0 0.2 0.2 o.t. 
General Pul.)lose or Other 5.4 4.0 7.3 0.7 2.0 
'l'otal 100.0 mo.o IOO.o IOO.O tOU.o 
,...IIIII I '!'IJt w 
Total 
14.0 
24.3 
2.0 
7+U':'1 
30.4 
16.7 
3.9 
3.4 
1.2 
0.4 
3.7 
rao.rr 
~--~----··------·-- ~ . --~----- t..-~----
Souz:ce~ Tpe T:;,llx .. ~f Life Insurance Statistics, Institute of Life Insurance, 
!::i59, p • .L. 
t-' 
0\ 
VI 
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The life COIDpanies have bad lensthy experieuce in apprais-
ing the risk on their directly placed corporate bonds, and 
in large revenue issues tbe coapanies can sometimes di-
rectly negotiate with the issuing authority and devote time 
to the study of ea.glneerina estimates, and determine the 
risk involved. 
A life caapany will often hold 1'DU.D..icipal bonds 
for reasons other than the tax-exempt yield. Additional 
diversification may be the maiu reason for seeking these 
bonds, or they may sometimes be held as an accoaaodation 
to the company's home area, or for other political reasons. 
A compaay will desire to .aintain its good will in its 
local state or community aad .ay feel obligated to parti· 
cipate in the financing of some local projects. 
In addition to u.s. state and local revenue bonds, 
the life companies are attracted to Canadian municipals be• 
cause of their higher yields. C&uadian bonds are not tax-
exaapt in the United States and therefore must offer yields 
that are comparable to other taxable securities to in-
vestors in this country. Because of this, many companies 
see the advantage of holding more Canadian municipal than 
u.S. state and local bonds and others confine their invest• 
meat in muaicipals almost exclusively to Canadian issues. 
Table VI•3 shows that :purchases of Canadian municipals 
totalled $214 million in 1962 as opposed to $539 million 
in u.s. state and local issues. 
C H A P T E R VII 
EQUITY IHVESTMENTS 
The life insurance industry does not place its 
funds to any substantial degree in investments of an equity 
nature. This is primarily because of the small amount of 
surplus and/or capital to total assets which is character-
istic of life insurance companies. The state reg~latory 
authorities and, for the most part, the life companies 
themselves, have felt that reserves, which are fixed-sum 
obligations, should not be subject to the fluctuations that 
are possible in stock and real estate investments. Conse-
quently, life insurance ownership of stocks and real estate 
has always been a small per cent of total assets and al• 
though state laws regarding equity investments have been 
liberalized in recent years the life companies held only 
$9.1 billion in stocks and investment real estate (excludes 
real estate owned for company use), which amounted to 7.2% 
of total life insurance asset~at the end of 1961. 
COOIDOll s toek 
Common stock is probably the most controversial 
area of investment within the life insurance indus try and 
is Where investment practices show a great amount of 
- 169 -
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diversity among various companies. Some see common stocks 
as an opportunity to diversify and obtain a higher yield 
on a portfolio largely in long-term debt. Others maintain 
that common stock bas no place in the portfolio of a life 
insurance company because of the duty to protect the 
policyholders, and that a substantial amount of funds in-
vested in this manner would be wrong. The Texas stock com• 
panies, for example, invest up to 10% of their assets in 
common stock given the liberal investment laws in that 
state, while some companies in other states shy away from 
them completely. Of one-hundred-and-eight life companies 
surveyed in 1959, thirty-four reported tbat they did not 
purchase common stocks. 1 
The arguments that have been advanced in favor 
of common stock ownership include the following: 
l. Fire insurance companies, trust compan• 
ies, universities and foundations, English and 
French life insurance companies have invested 
successfully in common stock, some over long 
periods of time. 
2. A wider portfolio diversification is 
possible, especially in companies other than 
railroads and utilities. Many excellent com-
panies in the nindustrial and other" group have 
little or no debt, e.g., equipment, food, tobac-
co, beverage 1 chemical, nonferrous metal products, banking and 1.nsurance companies. These permit 
investment only in common stock. 
3. To invest in the common stock of com-
panies having little or no debt is to improve 
. 
l BriDDer, p. 348. 
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the induatry and company composition of the port~ 
folio. This is another way of saying that com• 
paniea having a capitalization structure consist-
ing only of common stock are the most conservative. 
4. Because life insurance companies are lon&-
term investors! they can affoxd to weather the 
larger cyclica price variations found in common 
stock for the greater security against failure and 
greater certainty of income to be derived from the 
common stock of seasoned debt-free corporations. 
5. As interest rates rise, high-grade bonds 
and preferreds decline to "lock in" existing com-
mitments. COIIDOll stock is not so affected. 
6. The average rate of return on higb•grade 
common stock is at least as good as the return on 
medium•grade corporate bonds and mediumrgrade pre-
ferreds while offering better security. 
However, the arguments that have been advanced 
against common stock ownership outweigh the above and are 
summarized as follows: 
1. Investment in common stock is not invest-
ment at all but speculation and morally wrong for 
life insurance companies. ''I'm against it," says 
one leading l:l.fe insurance official. "I think it 
would be a sin to utilize r,olicybolders' funds to 
speculate in common stock. ' 
2. Earlier investigations coupled with their 
great size make life insurance companies sensitive 
to accusations of monopoly control. One official 
states: "Life insurance executives • . • are 
reluctant to become partners in economic enter-
prises lest they be accused of exerting economic 
power." 
3. Common stock fluctuates widely creating 
valuation problems. 
4. The income (dividends) from common stock 
is less certain than from boads or preferred stock. 
There is no cushion of earnings upon :wldoh it can 
draw nor any sinking fund provision. 
5. Common stock bas no maturity date nor is 
there any promise to pay. Hence, there is no "day 
of reckoning" against which present values may be 
lc;. Wright Hoffman, "Breferred and Common Stocks," In-
vestment of Life Insurance Funds, ed. David McCahan (Phi'!= 
adelphia: Urilverslty of Pennsylvania Press, 1953), pp.l94-
195. 
measured. It is free to move as high or as low 
as the market is willing to discount earnings 
and prospects. 
6. State laws have not favored the holding 
of coauon stock. 
7. Company policy may be influenced by 
policyholder and public criticism. If c0111110n 
stock prices are declining, or low, management 
might shy away from addtt:l.cmal purchases and 
instead sell to minimize criticism. On the 
other band, if prices are advancing or high, 
additional shares might be bought. This Is the 
problem of timing-~11 important but difficult 
to control. 
8. The problem of what to buy is also 1m• 
portant. Again to avoid possible criticism, 
companies might buy only those issues which at 
the time have greatest public favor. But these 
may prove later on to have been high priced. 
9. The small 8110\11lt of c011110n stock which 
companies are permitted to buy could not appre-
ciably Improve their over-all net return. 
10. Life insurance c_,anies do not need 
to look to higher ~elds than those to be bad 
from prime bonds, since the interest coupled 
with underwritinf gains plus the cushion of 
life insurance d videnda a~e ample to meet all 
future dollar obligations.l 
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Aside from the additioaal risk involved the main 
reason for objecting to common stocks is the fact that the 
higher yields or capital gains obtainable is not really 
needed for efficient operation of the company. A life com-
pany does not promise the policyholder any appreciation or 
a high yield on his funds It does, however, promise that 
a fixed S\DD will be available at a distant date or upon his 
death. A fairly low rate is assumed to be constantly 
112!2·· pp. 195-196. 
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earned on his funds and accounted for in the premium paid. 
Thus, while safer fixed income forms of investment are 
adequate in amount and return and the cushions mentioned 
above are present, then there is little need for cOUIDOn 
stock. Although capital gaf.ns from these investments in 
a period of rising prices could enable a company to lower 
its cost of insurance and gaf.n an edge on its competition, 
again the low amount of surplus aay mean that the amount 
of c0111110n stock investment needed to gain this advantage 
would involve too great a degree of risk. 
There is also a long standing tradition in the 
industry against the speculative elements often associated 
with cOIIIDOn stocks. Some of tbe companies feel strongly 
about this. In addition the life companies, especially the 
large ones, would want no part of criticism, public or 
otherwise, which might evolve from the circumstances men-
tioned above. 
Another factor that affects life insurance in-
vestment in this area is the valuation procedures required 
on cODIDon stocks. Whereas, corporate bonds~ which pass 
certain tests, may be carried at cost regardless of their 
market values, C0111D0ll stocks must be kept at current 
market values in the statements of life insurance compan-
ies. So far a satisfactory formula other than market value 
has not been found for common stocks. This helps to 
, 7. 
.... 4 
discourage life insurance iavesbaeat iu these securities. 
Tbe life CCII'DPflnies desire to show stable or iucreasing 
values from year to year and CC81QA stocks, even blue chips, 
can fluctuate widely and could reduce the surplus account. 
Tbe amount of COIIIIIOA stock that is proper for a 
life insurauce Compat'ly under given economic conditions is 
debatable, but in recent years many companies have felt 
that, althoup they should be lhd.ted to a small per cent 
of assets, cOIIIIOI\ stocks deaerveci a place in their port• 
folios. Life insurance iuvestment :l.n stocks as a per cent 
of total inciuetry assets is shown in Table II•l. This in-
creaaed invest::ment :l.n the laat decade was spurred on by 
liberalization of tbe state taveataent laws. The New York 
bweat.meftt law, wbich most of the larger companies must 
substantially comply with, had b811D8d ccaaon stock invest• 
meat ever s:I.DCe the Amstrona IDvestigat:l.on in 1906. In 
1951, however, the law wu cbaaaed to allow the life com-
panies to :I.Dvest in ccaaon stocks up to 31. of assets or 
one•th:l.rd of surplus, whichever was lower. 1 In 1957, it 
was further liberaliaed to allow .ax:l.mum holdings to be 
5'%t of total assets or SOt of capital and/or surplus, as 
lwill:l.am B. Neenan, ''Review of Institutional 
Activity 1n the Equity Market, 1951•54," Journal of 
Finance, XII (December, 1957), p. 471. 
175 
seen in Chapter I. In addition, there is a leeway provi• 
sion in the law which allows a company to invest up to 2% 
of total assets as it sees fit, which could be used for 
c0111110n stock investing. Table VII-1 shows the types of 
stocks held by the life companies. The amount of cOUJDOn 
was twice that of preferred, with industrial cOIIIDOn stock 
issues accounting for one•balf the total stock portfolio 
at the end of 1961. Although a life company will be look-
ing for attractive situations in smaller companies most of 
their holdings of industrial common stock is in high-grade 
issues, which are actively traded on the major stock ex-
changes. A survey of twenty life companies in the mid-
fifties showed that 47.6~ of their combined common stock 
portfolio was concentrated in the fifty-three largest 
corporations, ranked by total stock outstanding, listed on 
the New York Stock Excbange. 1 The New York law requires 
that investment in common stock be limited to those listed 
on a recognized exchange. 
As long•term investors, the life companies do 
not trade for capital gains in their common stock port-
folios. They purchase stocks to hold for a long period of 
time as they do with their other investments, and usually 
1Norman c. Miller "Concentration in Institu-
tional Coamon Stock Portfolio~;· Jourual of Finance, XVI 
~reb, 1961), p. 38. 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
~-----~ 
TABLE VII-1 
TYPES OF STOCKS Ol-TNED BY U.S. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
(in millions of dollars) 
~-~ --~~~ ~----
P r e f e r r e d Common 
Rail- Public I.Lndustrial Rail- Public Industrl.a.L 
road Utility and Total road Utility and Misc. Misc. 
71 302 660 1,033 22 73 262 
75 295 685 1,055 24 77 272 
79 413 766 1,258 25 100 335 
93 529 832 1,454 35 143 471 
91 527 783 1,401 31 197 592 
106 595 782 1,483 38 246 679 
102 668 761 1,531 34 279 729 
98 862 772 1, 732 64 386 1,086 
80 944 720 1,744 70 449 1,370 
64 868 619 1,551 56 447 1,449 
62 878 584 1,524 37 464 1,366 
61 932 568 1,561 57 618 1,873 
59 1,005 543 1,607 47 661 2,246 
58 1,173 567 1,798 39 815 2,329 
58 1,356 621 2,035 43 1,048 3,130 
'-- ~- ~- --------~- '---~-~~-- -- - -----------
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book, 1962, p. 85. 
Total 
357 
373 
460 
649 
820 
963 
1,042 
1,536 
1,889 
1,952 
1,867 
2,548 
2,954 
3,183 
4,223 
~ 
Total 
1,390 
1,428 
1,718 
2,103 
2,221 
2,446 
2,573 
3,268 
3,633 
3,503 
3,391 
4,109 
4,561 
4,981 
6,258 
"""' ...... 
"' 
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will aot sell them unless there t.s a change in investment 
policy, a detertorad.oa. in the position of a stock, or a 
chance for an urw.sual capital gat.n. In 1962, a year which 
saw a aubatautial decline in the stock market, the indus-
try sold a total of $242 millicm in COIIDOtl stocks while 
tbe market value of ccaiiOD stocks held at the end of the 
yeu was $3,966 milllon. 1 Althoush coaaon stock invest• 
ment bas risen sbaxply 1n the last decade, the extent of 
life illsurance particlpatioo 1rl cGIIDOll stocks is really 
overstated by Table Vll•l becauae much of the growth has 
beeD due to a rise in prices. la 1961, for example, the 
total gain in the COIIIIDOD stock portfoUo was $1040 mil• 
lion. Acqulsitiou in tbat year totalled $608 million, 
which was 60% of the gain; aad $396 million in COUIUOU stock 
was sold during the year. 2 Subtnctiag sales from acqui· 
sitions gives a net pin of $212 million, only 21% of the 
growth 1n the COUIDOil stock portfolio. 
Tbe dollar averagf.Dg method of acquiring common 
stock bas a certain attraction for the life companies,which 
typically bold their iovestments over a long period of time. 
1Institute of Life Inaut:ance, "Common Stock 
Investments of u.s. Life Insurance Companies," The Tallt of 
Life Insurance Statistics (February, 1963), p. 4. 
2tnstitute of Life Insurauce, Life Insurance Fact 
Book, 1962, pp. 85-86. 
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Dollar averaging is used with the primary objective of ob-
taining an average cost per share which is less than the 
average market price over a period of time, and involves 
the invesbDent of a constant number of dollars in a stock 
or a group of stocks at regular intervals. At the lower 
prices a large number of shares are bought, resulting in 
a lower than average price in a fluctuating market. It 
is not a system of quick profits but is primarily a method 
of long-term capital gains and is usually dependent upon 
having a regular amount of funds to invest, the continua• 
tion of purchases in market declines, and a willingness 
to purchase over a long period of time, all of which the 
life companies appear able to do. 
Most life companies, however, do not dollar 
average. In a recent survey of sixty-one companies ac-
counting for over 88% of the total assets and over 86% of 
all cOIIIDOD and preferred stock held by the life insurance 
industry, nineteen reported that they were dollar averag-
ing. 1 Of those companies that dollar averaged most do not 
follow a strict or conventiODB.l plan, but have adopted a 
modified plan for greater flexibility in investment policy. 
1George E. Redj~J. "Dollar Averaging_:_ Part I/' 
Best's Insurance News: L~e Edit&oe, LXIII (March, 19o3), 
p. 61. 
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Eleven of the above companies bad a modified plan while 
only t.wo stuck to the conventional method. 1 The usual 
practice under a modified plan is to have an approved list 
of stocks and invest an aggregate fixed amount each mouth 
or quarter, but the allocation of the total may vary among 
individual stocks on the list. The companies that do not 
dollar average undoubtedly recognize the disadvantages of 
a conventicmal plan, mainly that many stocks may be 
bought when they are overpriced, and would rather have no 
plan at all than accept a aaodified one. 
Although only a few companies dollar average, 
tbey have accounted for an iDcreasiDg share of life insur-
ance purchases of c0111D0ll stock in recent years. Table 
VII-2 shows that only eight coapaaies accounted for 26.7% 
of industry purchases in 1960. Three of the eight ac-
counted for 22% of industry purchases :l.n 1960, with one 
company entering the common stock field in 1959 and it 
dollar averages $750,000 weekly. 2 
1 Ibid., p. 68. 
2George E. Redii£ ''Dollar Averafing: Part II," 
Best's Insurance News: e Ec:!ition, LXI I (April, 1963), 
p. 78. 
Year 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
19608 
~---
TABLE VII-2 
COMMON STOCK PURCHASES BY SELECTED LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
WHICH DOLLAR AVERAGE CCIIPARED 1r0 THE TOTAL INDUSTRY 
PURCHASES OF CVMMON STOCK 
Total Common Stock Common Stock ~er Cent of Industry Number Purchases of the Purchases of Dollar 
of Purchases by Dollar Life Insurance Averaging Companies Averaging Industry Compaldes Companies 
$22~,000~000 $31,000,000 3 13.72 
216,000,000 32,000,000 4 14.81 
257,000,000 30,000,000 7 11.67 
277,000,000 33,000,000 8 11.91 
354,000,000 71,000,000 11 20.06 
296,000,000 79,000,000 8 26.69 
- ------~--
a The data for 1960 are only to September 30. 
Source: Best's Insurance News: Life Edition, April, 1963, p. 78. 
t-1 
00 
0 
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Preferred Stock 
Preferred stock bas always been a relatively un-
important part of life insurance investment. Although in-
vestment in preferred was greater than common stock in 
earlier years (because this form of investment was allowed 
whereas common stock was not in many states), total bold-
togs of preferred stock was less than one-half of common 
stock held at the end of 1961, and represented only 1.6% 
of total life insurance assets. This small investment, 
especially in industrial issues, is mainly a result of the 
supply of such securities. The life companies have gen-
erally felt that there is not a sufficient amount of high-
grade preferred stock with attractive terms to interest 
them to an appreciable degree. The tax disadvantage asso-
ciated with preferred stock often discourages the raising 
of corporate funds by this method. Many times a corpora-
tion will issue preferred stock because it cannot issue 
bonds or coomon stock on favorable terms. The character-
istics of preferred vary widely and as one officer stated 
"sometimes we don't know what kind of a beast preferred is." 
Table II-1 shows that life insurance investment in indus-
trial preferred stock has actually declined in most of the 
post-war years. 
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Although they are almost always preceded by a sub-
stantial amount of debt, utility preferred stocks are in" 
vested in more heavily, because of a greater supply of high 
grade securities and the stable earnings of the utility 
companies. However, if the stock is a high grade issue • 
the rate obtainable will usually not be much more than 
that on the bonds ahead of it, and its price will be more 
vulnerable with a rise in the level of interest rates. 
Often the sinking fund and call terms are not favorable on 
these issues. 
Real Estate 
Total real estate holdings of u.s. life insurance 
companies amounted to $4.0 billion or 3.2% of industry 
assets at the end of 1961. Real estate owned is divided 
into three main groups--real estate acquired for company 
use, residential or commercial real estate acquired for in· 
vestment purposes, and other properties acquired mostly in 
the satisfaction of debt. Over one-quarter of real estate 
held at the end of 1961 was for DOn-investment purposes 
with investment real estate, both cOIIIIlercial and residen• 
tial, totalling $2,825 million or a small 2.2% of total 
assets. 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
TABLE Vll-3 
TYPES OF REAL ESTATE <MaiD BY U.S. LIFE IBSURAR:E COMPANIES 
(in millions of dollars) 
Compaay Investment Coaaercial Other Used Residential 
258 207 219 176 
299 240 384 132 
333 302 515 97 
353 349 657 86 
383 356 829 63 
418 461 985 39 
452 446 1,095 27 
519 456 1,297 26 
597 455 1,504 25 
680 437 4,679 21 
791 438 1,867 23 
853 425 2,063 23 
964 414 2,243 30 
1,046 401 2,277 41 
1,132 417 2,408 50 
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book, 1962, p. 92. 
Total 
860 
1,055 
1,247 
1,455 
1,631 
1,903 
2,020 
2,298 
2,581 
2,817 
3,119 
3,364 
3,651 
3,765 
4,007 
t-' ()0 
c. .. "'~ 
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Hous!eg Projects.--In 1938,a section was added 
to the New York investment law which allowed the life com-
panies to acquire and construct housing projects. After 
the war the life companies looked to this form of invest-
ment as a means to improve the low overall rate of return 
on their funds. There was a flurry of activity in this 
area in the late forties and early fifties, as some com-
panies coastructed large scale housing projects in vari-
ous sections of the couutry. But investment in this area 
quickly diminished, as the life companies encountered 
maay problems including fluctuating yields because of vary-
ing occupancy rates and risiDg construction costs. 
Probably most serious are the management and 
public realtioos problems iavolved for a life insurance 
company in owa1Dg multi•faily housing developments. It 
has been a tzadition in the life insurance industry that 
the best invesbllent is that which can be put away and 
will need a minimum amount of attention. In housing de-
velopments, however, the life companies have had to cope 
with difficulties in enforcing rules governing tenant 
conduct, race problems in the selection of tenants, un• 
favorable reaction to rent increases, and difficulty in 
keeping the apartment fully occupied. These give rise to 
the possibility of bad public realtions which a life 
insurance company wants to avoid. An insurance company 
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sometimes is looked upon by tenants as a charitable insti-
tution 'dlich is supposed to provide more services than an 
ordinary landlord. Only short•term leases are available 
in this type of investment, and because of the multiplicity 
of tenants involved, a uet lease whereby all costs and 
maintenance would be borne by the tenant cannot be ar-
ranged as it can in commercial properties, where one or 
a few corporations would be the tenant. In addition, the 
life companies have somet'*-s encountered problems beyond 
their control which have uafavorably affected this type 
of investment. As an exaaple of this, one mortgage of• 
ficer said that he knew of one company that awned an apart-
ment building outside of Los Angeles whose top stories 
were constantly engulfed in S'IIOg. He did not elaborate 
on the rent or the vacancy rate 011 those apartments. A 
study of life insurance investment in housing projects 
from the end of World War II to the mid-fifties ended with 
this conclusion: 
The yield experience from housing projects 
whiclLbave been acquired by insurance companies 
bas not been favorable as a whole. This is par-
ticularly true in view of the uncertainties and 
managerial problems that are associated with 
this investment. The yield from certain spe-
cific projects, however, bas been quite high when 
compared with other authorized investments. The 
favorable experience from some projects together 
with the social aspects may provide sufficient 
incentive for limited future investment in the 
field by a few companies, but under present 
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construction costs life insurance companies plan to 
make--no further investments in housing. In addi-
tion, the investment management of man~ companies 
believes that even with more favorable construc• 
tion costs, the disadvantages of equity housing 
ownership will prevent any future investment in 
the field by their companies, and some companies 
that have made investments in housinf have sold 
or are in the process of selling the r housing 
investments. 
It can be concluded then that this invest-
ment will not exceed a small percentage of total 
admitted assets of the life insurance industry, 
and while the legal lt.its set for the investment 
have not been approached, in the future these 
limits would prevent any individual companies 
from investing a major percentage of their total 
admitted assets in housing ownership.l 
Life insurance disinterest in housing develop-
ments has continued up to the present time. As seen in 
Table VII-4, acquisition of residential properties has been 
nominal in recent years. Whereas the life companies will 
lend extensively on apartment houses through mortgages 
where 100% financing and the problem of management are not 
involved, they will avoid the ownership of residential 
properties except for a few attractive situations. 
Commercial Prgperties.--Tbe majority of life in-
surance real estate ownership consists of commercial 
properties. The purchase and leaseback, a technique which 
came into prominence in the late forties as the state 
1Robert Schultz, Life Insurance Housi~ Projects (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., ~), pp. 100-
101. 
TABLE VII-4 
REAL ESTATE ACQUIRED BY U.S. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
(in millions of dollars) 
Year 
1962 1961 1960 1959 
Ca.paay Used 144 109 123 143 
Invest.Diellt 
Residential 9 12 8 9 
CC~J~Dercia1 146 214 153 261 
Other 50 35 15 32 
Total 349 370 299 445 
1958 
117 
14 
306 
20 
457 
Source: The Tall& of Life Insurance Statistics, Institute of Life Insurance, 
Feb., 19 3, p. 3; Peb., 1962, p. 3; Feb., 1960, p. 3; Feb., 1959, p. 3. 
~ 
co 
"-..! 
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investment laws began to allow the life companies to in-
vest in incoming producing real estate, is used exten-
sively in this area of investment. This comes about when 
a business firm sells some or all of its land and build-
ings to an insurance company and simultaneously enters 
into a lease agreement covering a long period of time, 
usually between twenty to thirty years. A new building 
can also be constructed for the future tenant and then 
leased to him with the same effect. The purchase-
leaseback method has certain advantages for the lessee 
corporation. It will receive additional working capital 
which can be used to expand company operations, while 
still having use of the building. If there is a mort-
gage outstanding then the corporation can reduce its long-
term debt. These considerations in turn help to improve 
the financial condition of the corporation. The tenant, 
at the same time, secures income tax benefits throu~1 
renting rather than owning, as all payments of rent are 
deductible as business expenses. Thus,tbe full amount of 
occupancy costs can be taken as an expense before taxes. 
A fixed rental covering the lease period is set, 
with part used to achieve complete amortization or amor-
tization of a substantial amount of the property within 
the lease term, and part going as the yield on the out-
standing investment. The amount of rent to be charged will 
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be determined by how fast the life company wants to write 
off the property and recapture its investment and what 
yield it will accept, which are usually based on the credit 
standing of the tenant and the property involved. The 
gross yield required on real estate will be higher, per-
haps as much as 1%, than mortgage investments, because of 
the additional risk involved. 
The types of coaaercial properties favored by 
the life companies are industrial properties, particularly 
warehouses, and retail stores and office buildings in good 
locations. The credit standing of the prospective tenant 
and the value of the property are both important consider-
ations, but the stress on each will vary with different 
types of properties. In the purchase of industrial proper-
ties the credit standing of the tenant is usually of prime 
importance. In the acquisition of industrial plants that 
may not be much use to anyone except the present tenant, 
the life company will want tbe tenant to occupy until the 
lease expires or the property is fully amortized. The 
credit strength and the competitive position of the cor-
poration forms the principal basis of its ability to stay 
w1 tb the lease over a long period of time. On general 
purpose warehouses the credit factor diminishes. A life 
company will prefer to own modern well-located warehouses 
near populous regions, and with means of transportation 
readily accessible. If the tenant fails in this case the 
life company will get another tenant or will be able to 
sell the property without any loss. In the retail field, 
supermarkets have used the leaseback method extensively. 
A favorite investment of the life companies has been the 
purchase of new stores of the big supermarket chains. In 
purchasing office buildings and mercantile properties the 
location is usually the important factor. If a life com-
pany can acquire a building in the business section of a 
large city or some other good location, it will often 
lease to lesser credits knowing that, if the operation 
of the lessee is unsuccessful, the demand for the property 
will still be high. In department storeFl the percentage 
lease is sometimes used where rent is a percent of sales, 
but with a fixed minimum rent. In office buildings the 
sandwich lease is often used, where the life company leases 
to a single tenant and it then subleases to others. Almost 
all other commercial properties are on a net lease basis, 
where the tenant pays all costs and takes care of all the 
maintenance required. 
The purchase and leaseback, however, has suffered 
in the last few years because of increased income taxes on 
this type of 1Dvestment, and this has resulted in the com-
plete withdrawal or diminished activity in this area by 
many life companies. This is the area of life insurance 
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investment where the 1959 Income Tax Act appears to have 
had its greatest effect. In cases where the depreciation 
allowed was lower than the portion of the rent that went 
to amortize the property, the tax was increased on the 
differential. Therefore, on many properties, that were 
being amortized within twenty or twenty-five years and 
where depreciation was on a forty or fifty years basis, 
the life companies felt that they were being taxed heavily 
on the repayment of their own money. One officer said 
that the effective tax rate after deductions figured to 
be 30% on the amount over and above the required yield in 
some cases, and another officer stated that the after tax 
yield on some of his company's real estate declined to 
1% or less. New England Life, for example stopped acquir• 
ing cODIIIlercial real estate in 1960 and bas subsequently 
sold many of its investments to corporate pension funds 
who have become increasiDgly active in this field, because 
they do not have the tax responsibilities that the life 
companies have in~this area. Table VII-4 shows that for 
the industry as a whole, acquisition of commercial real 
estate bas declined since 1958 and declined sharply in 
1960 and 1962. Gordon Emerson, Associate Director, John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company discusses the effect 
of increased taxation on life insurance real estate in-
vestments in the following: 
OUr initial interest in purchase-leasebacks, 
which is the most COIIIDOn name employed for the 
type of investment about which I am speaking, 
started in the late 1940's. At that time our 
Company, like most other life companies, became 
interested in purchasing and leasing back real 
estate such as office buildings, stores, and 
industrial properties to concerns of excellent 
credit standing. These investments were thought 
of as primarily credit transactions with the 
real estate of decidedly secondari importance. 
In some instances, we purchased h ghly special-
ized real estate in all types of locations--good, 
bad, and indifferent. The basic thinking that 
was involved in the negotiation of these trans• 
actions was that the price of the real estate 
would be the cost. Their rent would be based 
on the assumption that the entire investment 
would be recaptured in an initial lease term of 
15·25 years and that the interest factor would 
be cQIIIIlensurate with the credit standing of the 
lessee. It was generally thought that the 
lease term should be as short as possible and 
very little consideration was given by many 
investors to the matter of renewal terms, in-
cluding the renewal rent. It was felt that a 
low or almost giveaway rental during the re-
newal periods could be justified on the basis 
that, whatever the rent was, it was profit as 
the investment had been completely liquidated. 
Some investors even gave the lessee the right 
to repurchase tbe property during the initial 
term at a figure that ap.proximated the amortized 
book value on a fully liquidating basis. 
All of these negotiations were conducted 
during a period when little or no attention was 
given to the Federal Income Tax implications of 
the tr~saction. At this point, I might remind 
you that all of the rent less depreciation is 
taxable while in a mortgage only the interest is 
taxable. To illustrate the lack of concern for 
tax problems, 1 can cite a number of instances 
where investors were content to establish de-
preciation on a straight line 2~ basis, even 
though a shorter life could be fully justified 
and Where the lease term was set up as 20 years. 
It must be recalled that at that time there was 
little income tax paid by life companies because 
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the investment earnings of life companies were 
so low during this early post-war period. 
During the 1950 1 s the impact of Federal In-
come Taxes became 110re and more burdensome, as 
well as better understood, aDd in the last half 
of the 1950's it became generally recognized 
that this important factor could not be overlooked 
in the negotiation of such deals. While the 1959 
Federal Tax legislation on life companies was be-
ing discussed in ~reas, many companies com• 
pletely withdrew from the purchase-leaseback field 
and a number of companies actually began a sys-
tematic program of liquidating ~1eir portfolios 
of this type of investment. The John Hancock was 
among those companies which discontinued its 
purchase-leaseback activity. 
Following the passage of the 1959 legislation 
governing the taxation of life insurance companies, 
a number of companies began to realize that com-
plete withdrawal was too crude an approach to a 
complicated problem and it was possible under cer-
tain favorable tax circumstances to make a satis-
factory investment in this form. The factors 
that bad to be considered I am sure are quite ob• 
vious to all of us here. They include the ratio 
of land value to total value. Obviously, an in-
vestment that is high in laud value hurts in the 
calculation of depreciation. Another factor is 
the relationship of the lnitial lease term and the 
useful: life as permitted by the I.R.S. guidelines. 
If these two periods coincide or nearly coincide, 
it WOtAld be favorable to the investor who is try-
ing to write off the entire investment during the 
initial lease term as be would be paying little 
or no tax penalty on the recapture of his invest• 
ment dollar. The penalty can be very heavy when 
the useful life, as allowed for depreciation pur-
poses, far exceeds the investment recapture period. 
An appreciation of this factor has caused some in• 
vestors, including John Hancock, to encourage 
longer initial lease terms whenever the basic 
real estate values and the location permit. 15-
year terms would be clearly unaccyptable, while 
30 years or even 35 might be O.K. 
lcordon E. Emerson, "Outline of Talks at Commer-
cial Loan Clinic on Investment Real Estate," Pamphlet ob-
tained from City Mortgage Loan Department, J obn Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance Coarpany (Boston: By the author, 
April 29, 1963), pp. 1•2. 
194 
As a consequence of increased taxation, a longer 
lease term or a reduction in the per cent of the property 
which is amortized within the lease period is often made 
in new investments. This makes the amount of rent charged 
to amortization coincide more closely with the annual de-
preciation, varying with the method of depreciation used. 
Another important consideration in this type of invest-
ment is the renewal or repurchase options that may be 
granted to the tenant. If the property is to be only 
partially amortized at the end of the initial lease period, 
a higher renewal rent will be required. In earlier years 
of purchase-and-leaseback activity, the tenant corporation 
was often granted the right to renew its lease for a num-
ber of years at a nominal rent after the initial lease ex-
pired, if the property was fully amortized. Now the life 
companies try to avoid these terms, and if a renewal op-
tion is granted, will try to obtain the highest rent pos-
sible, but invariably below the rent over the initial lease 
term. The right to repurchase at Dominal prices, which 
was sometimes given in the past, is now rarely, if ever, 
given by the life companies. They fell that the surrender 
of control for sixty or seventy years through renewal op-
tions, or surrender of complete control by repurchase op-
tions, especially at zero or at the unamortized value, 
makes real estate not a true equity investment, and amounts 
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to nothing more than a 100% mortgage with the life company 
taking on the additional risk of ownership over a period 
of years. The companies now generally agree that there 
should be some consideration of the residual value in real 
estate properties. One officer said that his company had 
just P.urchased an office building for $4 million, where 
the tenant was to amortize the property, but his only re-
purchase option was the right to buy it back at $5 million 
at any time. When asked why it would not be logical for 
the corporation to have the right to repurchase for a 
nominal figure, because it bad paid back the original in-
vestment along with a rate of return, which is analagous 
to a mortgage, another officer replied: "well it's gravy, 
but if there is any gravy there, we would like to have it," 
which is probably typical of the feeling among all life 
companies. The corporation, however, receives 100% fi-
nancing and the advantages mentioned previously under such 
deals, and these help offset the disadvantage of rent pay-
ments, which are higher than the cost that would be incur-
red on a mortgage loan. 
C H A P T E R VIII 
CONCLUSION 
This study has examined the factors involved in 
the investment of life insurance funds. Emphasis bas been 
on industry investment policies although there has been a 
greater stress on the activities of the large companies, 
which as a group account for a majority of life insurance 
assets. Conclusions reached, therefore, are in terms of 
the industry as a whole and may not necessarily apply to 
one company or a specific group of companies. 
Life insurance iuveatment is guided by certain 
basic principles which are common to other institutional 
investors. These are safety of principal, diversifica-
tion, and maximizing the rate of return. It is generally 
recognized that the bulk of life insurance assets must be 
placed in safe outlets because of the nature of the life 
insurance contract and the company's liability to its 
policyholders. As premiums are paid they are added to a 
reserve which is calculated to meet all future benefit pay-
ments. These funds must be present at a future date to 
meet the company' s liability to the policyholder. Because 
of the high degree of predictability on mortality rates, 
the life companies do not need a large amount of surplus 
in relation to total assets. Policy reserves therefore 
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account for the vast majority of assets and there is only 
a small surplus to absorb any loss. In addition, life 
insurance is a vital commodity with death payments often 
needed for the protection of beneficiaries. A life in-
surance company, for all practical purposes, is placed 
in a trusteeship position with respect to its policyhold-
ers. 
Inflow of premiums and the outflow of benefit 
payments show a great deal of stability from year to year, 
with the former constantly above the latter. There is 
also a steady flow of funds from maturing investments, 
sinking fund payments, and loan prepayments. For these 
reasons the life companies have very littl~ need for 
liquidity. This contests with the requirements of other 
financial institutions, including the fire and casualty 
insurance companies. Except for an insignificant amount 
of assets that is needed for day to day operations of ti1e 
company, life insurance funds are channeled into long-
term investments. Policy reserves are fixed sum obliga-
tions which on the average are not due until distant dates) 
and this accounts for the fact that the life companies are 
long-term investors. 
An interest rate is assumed to be constantly 
earned on policy reserves and is adjusted for in the pre• 
miums paid. A company will desire to earn the assumed 
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rate on outstanding policies as a minimum requirement, and 
the higher the actual earnings rate is compared to the 
assumed rate, the lower the net cost of insurance can be. 
With a higher earnings rate a company can offer higher 
dividends or lower priced policies, and thus can become 
more competitive. Therefore, life insurance assets are 
appropriately placed in high-grade long-term debt with a 
fixed rate of return and carrying the highest yield con-
sistent with the safety of principal. This parallels 
life insurance obligations. 
Investment practices are regulated by state law 
to insure a high degree of safety and diversification in 
life insurance assets. Because the major companies are 
concentrated in a few states the majority of life insur-
ance funds is governed by the laws in these key states. 
Mostly through the efforts of the National ~ssociation of 
Insurance Commissioners a basically common framework has, 
however, been worked out 8IDOD8 tbe various states. The 
New York law is the strictest and also the most important 
in that companies domiciled within the state account for 
a good percentage of life insurance assets, and the state 
bas required that companies domiciled outside the state, 
but licensed to do business within its borders, must sub .. 
stantially comply with the state statute. After review-
ing the law, it was seen that in effect it limits life 
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insurance investment to high -grade debt, including pub-
lic debt, bonds of strong corporate enterprises, and real 
estate mortgages providing an ample margin of safety, al-
though it allows five per cent of assets to be placed in 
both COIIIIDOU stock and real estate. 
Life insurance funds have historically been 
placed in high grade debt, although the amount and the 
form has varied depending on legal restrictions and eco• 
nomic conditions prevalent at the time. In the early 
years of this century life insurance portfolios were dom-
inated by railroad bonds and real estate mortgages. This 
continued in the 1920's although railroad issues declined 
in importance and mortgages rose to forty per cent of 
total assets. Tbe depression saw the deterioration of 
these traditional investment outlets. Railroad bonds 
declined to a minor portion of assets and since then have 
bad an insignificant place in tbe industry's portfolio. 
Mortcages also declined and the life companies bad to fore-
close on many properties resulting in a sharp rise in real 
estate holdings. During this period the life companies 
turned to U.S. Government Bonds as a haven to protect their 
increasing amount of funds. They also purchased an in-
creasing amount of public utllity bonds. With the advent 
of World War II, acquisition of u.s. Government bonds 
greatly increased, with the enormous demand for funds by 
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the federal government and the lack of alternate invest-
ment outlets in the private sector of the economy. Heavy 
liquidation of the u.s. Government portfolio took place 
in the early post-war years as the life companies began 
to place all available funds into higher yielding invest-
ments, mostly corporate bonds and mortgages, as the de-
mand for those funds grew. These two categories nm1 ac-
count for approximately seventy-five per cent of total 
industry assets. 
The private placement method appears to be firmly 
established in the corporate bond area, with almost all 
industrial bonds and the bulk of public utility issues ac-
quired in this manner. Because of their strategic posi-
tion in the corporate bond market, the life companies can 
negotiate directly with the corporate borrower, circum-
venting the normal market process, which results in certain 
advantages for both lender and borrower. Industrial bonds 
have shown the most rapid growth and have been the most 
important investment category for the life insurance in-
dustry in the post-war period. Public utility bonds have 
become less popular with the life companies in recent 
years because of their lower yields in comparison to those 
of high-grade industrial issues, and the lack of favorable 
call protection on many issues. The life companies, being 
long-term investors, place special emphasis on obtaining 
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protection from early call of their bonds for refinancing 
at lower interest rates. Although most industrial bonds 
are unsecured, the life company is adquately protected by 
the insertion of protective covenants into the bond in-
denture. The prime concern inildustrial lending is the 
earning power and future competitive position of the cor-
poration, rather than relying on liens on physical property. 
Industrial bond acquisitions are well diversified among 
the leading manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries 
with many securities being the obligations of the largest 
and the strongest companies in the country. The life 
companies Show a willingness to participate with each 
other in these industrial proposals. This is often done 
on large loans where the risk can be spread among three 
or four companies. The average size of industrial issues 
is relatively large with the legal restrictions and extra 
cost involved prohibiting any substantial lending to n~1 
or small businesses through industrial bonds. Almost all 
life insurance loans made to small businesses are secured 
through real estate mortgages. 
Mortgages have always been an important part of 
life insurance investment activity. Their relatively 
high yields, fixed rates of return, long-term maturities, 
aad security in the form of real property have made them 
attractive to the life companies. For the most part, 
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mortgages are acquired by correspondents or a branch of-
fice system with the correspondent setup used extensively 
or exclusively by most companies. The life insurance 
industry is one of four groups of financial institutions 
which supply most of the country's mortgage funds. The 
life companies have invested heavily in one-to-four 
family residential loans, apartment house mortgages, and 
mortgages on commercial properties. However, they invest 
in apartment bouse and commercial mortgages to a far 
greater extent than other financial institutions. There 
bas been a greater emphasis in the industry on these 
types of mortgages in recent years, because of the high 
rates obtainable and the lower servicing and originating 
fees in comparison with single residence loans. Favorite 
commercial loans are those on industrial properties and 
shopping centers. In both mortgage lending and real 
estate ownership, properties leased to national retail 
chains are sought after and generally conceded to be the 
soundest type of investment. 
Because of the relatively low rate of taxation 
which applys to the life companies, they are not attracted 
to state and local goverament bonds and bold only a small 
amount of assets in this form of investment. Higher 
yielding revenue bonds are acquired far more extensively 
than general obligations. The low yields on general 
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obligations just about precludes any substantial life in-
surance investment in those securities. Equity invest-
ments are limited by legal restrictions and by the estab-
liShed and accepted norms of the industry itself. Total 
holdings of stocks and real estate acquired for investment 
purposes account for less than eight per cent of industry 
assets. Common stock is probably the most controversial 
area of investment for life insurance companies. The 
ones that are held are mostly blue chip issues, actively 
traded in the market. Investment in real estate has suf-
fered somewhat in the last few years because of increased 
taxes on the return from leaseback deals. This is the 
area if life insurance investment which appears to have 
been affected the most by .the Federal Income Tax Act of 
1959. 
Although all life insurance companies invest the 
bulk of their assets in long-term debt, they often show 
marked differences in investment policies. The amount of 
industrial bonds acquired seems to vary directly with 
company size. Tbe large companies have more funds avail-
able and are far better equipped to make large industrial 
loans, and have about twice the per cent of assets in-
vested in these securities than do tbe smaller companies. 
Some companies invest exclusively in commercial mortgages, 
some are mostly in residential loans or show a greater 
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preference for FHA financing, while others have a well 
diversified mortgqe portfolio. Some companies do not pur-
chase coauon stocks and others purchase as many as they 
legally cana and some invest in Canadian municipal bonds 
wore extensively than others. 
The life companies are sensitive to yield changes 
among the vartous categories of long-term debt. They will 
try to channel most of their funds into the areas offering 
the highest yields at that particular time, as long as the 
safety of principal is observed. Their earnings rate in 
determined by the yields obtainable in the long-term 
capital markets and the general economic conditions pre-
vailing. BecauGe of the general rise in long-term inter-
est rates throughout the post-tfar period, the life insur ... 
ance industry has shown a steadily improving earnings 
rate. This should coatiDUe for at least the next fet:; 
years as the result of the continuous liquidation of in-
vestments made in earlier years, ~mieb carry lower inter-
est rates. A net yield ~f around f1ve•and-one•half 11er 
cent on new investment authorizations in the past ffl'A 
years suggests that the before tax earn:Lngs rate CO"J.ld ap-
proach this vicinity, barring any sharp decline in future 
interest ratas, before levelinc off or declining again. 
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Industrial bonds and real estate mortgages will 
undoubtedly continue to be the prime outlets for life 
insurance funds in the next decade. Equity investments 
should continue to have a minor place unless there is sub-
stantial relaxation of the investment laws. It will be 
interesting to see i~, after more years of successful in-
vestment in common stocks by the life companies, the 
New York law will be liberalized to ten per cent or even 
fifteen per cent of assets, and if so, whether the life 
companies will take advantage of it. Barring any sub-
stantial increase in the tax burden of the life companies, 
investment in municipal bonds sbould be expected to re-
main a small portion of total assets. Unless there is a 
lack of attractive investment outlets in the private 
sector of tbe economy, a lengthy world conflict, or gen-
eral depression, u.s. govexnment bonds should not come 
into prominence tn life insurance portfolios. This is 
likely for the foreseeable future, but we have seen life 
insurance investment undergo sweepiug changes and differ-
ent cycles in the last forty years and who is to say that 
this may not be true in the future. 
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